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ABSTRACT
A Comparative Analysis Of Various Alternative
Energy Futures For Franklin County, Massachusetts
For the Year 2000 A.D.
September, 1982
Francis Paul Roster, B.A., State University of New York
at Old Westbury
M.Ed., Ed.D, School of Education, University of
Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Peter Wagschal
Traditional sources of energy (coal, oil, natural gas,
nuclear) for the United States are examined, and assessment
made about their present and future availability and cost.
This examination reveals serious constraints on further de-
pendence on traditional sources. A survey of public opinion
research reveals that this situation is not believed by sig-
nificant numbers of Americans in spite of nearly ten years
of public discussion. The author concludes that there must
be a fault in the way the information is presented.
A review of how people respond to warnings is under-
taken which reveals that an effective warning contains cer-
tain elements. The necessary elements are:
vi
(1) agreement among elected officials
(2) agreement among technical experts
(3) appeals to the protection of family, not self
(4) contains individually implementable coping
behavior
(5) familiarity (the threat must be linked to
experiences recipient already had)
Using this context, the author applies the predicted
United States energy problem to one county in Massachusetts
(Franklin County), and develops a scenario of an energy fu-
ture using traditional energy utilization, and a more de-
tailed scenario for a future using conservation and renew-
able energy.
Review of the scenarios reveals that traditional fuels
will become too expensive for the county to bear, resulting
in a profound decline in the health of the general economy
by the year 1990. The scenario based on conservation and
renewable energy would result in a healthy economy, many new
jobs, and reduced vulnerability to supply interruption.
The author reviews a variety of financing tools avail-
able to the county to assist in making the transition from a
traditional fuels-based economy to a renewable energy based
economy; and devises an implementation plan for the county.
This plan requires an active role for county government.
vii
uses minimal taxpayers dollars, and yields two dollars saved
for each one dollar invested.
The final chapter spells out how a transition from a
traditional to a non-traditional energy future could be
attained.
viii
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PREFACE
Rational
The Future Studies Group of the School of Education of the
University of Massachusetts defines "futurist" as one who "is
concerned with 'Future Possibilities'
. .
.
particularly those . . .
(1) that are not possibilities that are already understood and
expected by many people; (2) are multiple, rather than centered on
single options; (3) are long range in the amount of time they span;
(4) are comprehensive and holistic, taking into account as many
social forces and aspects of life as possible." This definition is
further expanded to include the notion of making those alternatives
more real for other people.
To be a successful educational futurist, it is not enough to be
knowledgeable about a given technical area. To be successful
(effective) one needs to:
- analyze the current problems which exist in the area of
study;
- develop various scenarios which outline the kinds of futures
that may or could occur given current problems;
- present or "package" technical information in a manner which
makes the Futurist's scenarios understandable, real, and
attainable enough to be seriously considered as policy
options by the general public (popularize information),
- provide implementable solutions for achieving the desired
scenarios
.
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Thus, the futurist not only holds up a mirror to the present and the
future, he or she must also empower the public to take part in
determining the shape of their own future by developing and
communicating realistic solutions.
This thesis attempts to apply these steps (analyze the
problem, create a suitable warning, develop alternative scenarios,
package the information and provide solutions) to the energy problem
in America today
... particularly, as it relates to one rural county
in Massachusetts.
Of the public policy issues under debate today, none more
directly affects more people daily than the energy problem. Since
the oil embargo of 1973 the energy "crisis" has been the subject of
daily headlines. Yet, nine years later, massive disagreement still
exists on the course our nation should take.
How we eventually solve this problem is a critical question
for futurists, because the energy problem is one of a "class" of
problems likely to confront our society in the next 20-50 years.
These kinds of problems might be defined as those involving a threat
to basic life support, such as food production, clean air, adequate
water supply, and stability of climate. The similar characteristics
these problems share are that they occur on a large scale, involve
political as well as technical problems (including many political
jurisdictions), are inherently complex, and occur subtly, imposing
powerful influences upon the society. They appear intractable.
Indeed, taken as a class, these problems may threaten the very
structure of organized society on our planet.
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In the Spring of 1982
,
due to the rather aggressive energy
conservation efforts being undertaken throughout the United States,
° i- 1 prices are beginning to decline slightly, and some economists
are trumpeting the "end" to the energy crisis. Such celebration is,
in my judgment, highly unwarranted, due to other disquieting
developments in energy research.
Five main situations loom that could at any time, alone or in
concert, render the energy crisis a "hot issues" overnight. They
are:
1) A supply interruption from the OPEC nations. Due to treaty
obligations, the United States would have to export oil if
the world market suffered a loss of traditional sources of
supply. Obviously, exporting our oil creates shortages at
home
.
2) The continued decline of America's proven oil and natural
gas reserves. Throughout the 1970' s and early 1980' s in
spite of vastly expanded exploration and drilling, the
United States used oil 5 times faster than new reserves
were being located, and the decline in known reserves
continues at about 2% annually. The same situation occurs
with natural gas, only worse, because the capital cost of
exploiting new discoveries is so high that much of the
statistically available gas is not affordable. In other
words, we are still "running out" in any practical sense of
the word
.
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3) The C0( 2 ) buildup (the so-called "greenhouse effect"),
which is postulated to result in a dramatic climate shift,
flooding of coastal cities, and destruction of agricultural
,
centers of the earth.
4) Acid rain, resulting from combustion of coal, oil, and
natural gas. Research now indicates acid rain has a
catastrophic impact on the eco-system, particularly lakes
and rivers and forest growth.
5) Nuclear Power Plant Failure. Perhaps best exemplified by
Three Mile Island, the possibility of a catastrophic
accident at one of our nation's 71 generating reactors, on
top of a seemingly endless string of minor break-
downs could result in a decision to shut down all remaining
reactors, causing an over-night loss of 20% of our
electrical supply, and resulting in a further demand for
the surviving alternatives.
These five issues, discussed in greater detail elsewhere in
this document, all serve to create a context of continued U. S.
vulnerability to the energy "crisis".
Yet, despite the magnitude of the problem, the general public
does not take the issue seriously. A review of the energy
literature and energy related public opinion polls reveals that by
1978, after massive price hikes, gas lines, and political
recrimination, approximately half of th e na^i^nj_s_a^d_ii 1^ t_ s di d £j_o_
believe the United Stat es fa ce d an energy crisis . The nation's
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economy is in shambles, the balance of payments knocked for a loop,
unemployment was climbing to the highest points since the
depression, and half of our adults did not see this problem.
Obviously, some educational process had failed, somewhere.
How is it that a significa nt perce n tage c^_f our nat ion's
population could be exposed daily to gas lines, carpool campaigns
and mass media warnings of an energy shortage for 5 years, and still
not believe that we have an important energy problem?
One answer is that the problem has not been effectively or
accurately communicated to the public. Future scenarios that employ
or clearly contain unpleasantness have a unique set of educational
problems attendant: people tend to repress information that is
frightening. So, once we have identified the problem (the energy
crisis, in this case), developing an alternative vision of the
future is not the end-task of an educational futurist, but the
beginning
.
If we, as futurists, are to have any impact on solving this
class of problems, it would appear tht full understanding of the
previous failure of the communication/education process would be
most useful. By understanding why people have not listened to
warnings in the past, we can begin to develop models for more
effective warnings in the future.
The next step is "packaging" the information in a way which is
understandable to the public. It is a question of "PR". By
looking
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at the way others have attempted to convey energy information to the
public, and analyzing their successes and failures, we can better
understand the elements of good and bad information dissemination.
Finally,' the futurist looking at the energy crisis must
spell out viable solutions. As it stands now, there are two
perceived ways to solve the energy crisis: the "hard path"
(non-renewable sources such as oil, coal and nuclear power), or the
"soft path" (renewables such as solar, wind and hydro-electric
energy systems). Several recent works ( Soft Energy Paths : The Road
Not Taken (Amory Lovins, 1977); Non-Nuclear Futures (Amory Lovins
and John Price, 1975); World Energy Strategies (Amory Lovins, 1975);
Rays of Hope (Dennis Hayes, 1977); Soft Energy Paths (Stobaugh and
Yergin, 1979); A New Prosperity (Solar Energy Research Institute,
1981) postulate that projected energy needs could be best met by the
so-called "soft path", and would be socially beneficial because it
would be ultimately cheaper, more secure, healthier, and more
politically empowering for future citizens. This set of energy
"crisis" solutions are a proposal for a radical shift in direction
for national policy. Yet, they are not likely to be taken as a
serious alternative if the problem they attempt to solve is not
acknowledged to exist.
This dissertation is an attempt to make real to the reader the
magnitude of the energy problem facing the United States, and
postulate a solution. It does so by exploring the problem in five
stages .
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First, I explain the nature of the energy problem facing the
United States, New England, and Franklin County, Massachusetts, in
the next quarter century.
Second, I explore the psychology of presenting "bad news" or
intrinsically threatening information and relate it to the manner in
which energy-related warnings might be more effectively presented to
the public. Based on a compilation of the literature, I propose a
set of guidelines to assist educators, policy makers, utilities and
public relations specialists in presenting energy warnings
effectively
.
Third, I then test guidelines against the efforts of various
mass media marketing techniques used by several utilities around the
country. I compare the effectiveness of the media campaigns with
the guidelines on issuing warnings developed.
Fourth, based on the assumptions gleaned from the energy
literature, the warnings literature, the utility advertising
campaigns, and the notion that the energy crisis is a series of
regional issues, I then develop a futurist's scenario of two
alternative energy futures for Franklin County, Massachusetts, for
the year 2000 . These scenarios attempt to analyze how Franklin
County would fare if it continued to perceive the energy situation
as a national issue, applying national energy policy to the county,
or by comparison as a local problem, utilizing effective warnings
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techniques to implement change and develop alternatives.
Since the utilization of local resources is a capital-intensive
exercise, this latter scenario runs headlong into one of the key
findings in the earlier two sections of the dissertation: evasive
action must be individu a lly implementable . Given the depressed
state of the Franklin County economy, unless a method for making the
scenario financially feasible is presented, the Franklin County
Study is an exercise in social science f ic t ion--n ice
,
but not
practical
.
The final sections of this dissertation, therefore, devise a
method of paying for the Franklin County Study implementation, using
innovative financing strategies. They spell out a possible
financing plan in some detail, as this has emerged as the key issue
in the problem of warning policy makers about our energy problems.
Methodology
The five main sections of this document involve very different
bodies of knowledge, and different approaches to problem solving.
Hence, the methodology for each section is different.
Section On^j_ The Energy Crisis Described. This section has been
developed by an exhaustive reading of the literature, with
particular emphasis on economic and environmental facets, as opposed
to raw numbers of units of energy found, produced, or
consumed.
ixx
This review was significantly broadened by visits made to centers of
energy research throughout the United States, and study of the
technical reports of the National Gas Association, the American
Petroleum Institute, the Atomic Industrial Forum, and the coal
industry
.
I have drawn on my own experience as Associate Director of the
University of Massachusetts Energy Office, Director of the Tennessee
Valley Authority's Solar Energy Program, and 2 years as an energy
consultant to industry and government.
Se ction Two
:
The History Of Giving Warnings. This section is
mainly a review of the literature of three major areas - psychology,
sociology, and civil defense. Use was made of computerized
literature searches, going through the Eric Index, the Psychology
Abstracts, and the Sociology Abstracts, which turned up remarkably
little. It should be mentioned that most of these computerized data
bases go back only to about 1963, and one has left a strong
impression that much of the good work on warnings was financed by
Civil Defense, during the Cold War, some years earlier.
Also read were most of the publications produced by the four
major national disaster research agencies.
Subsequent to doing this section of the research, I have
prepared and delivered seminars on the subject of "Warnings" to a
wide range of audiences, including federal, state, and local
officials
.
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The paradigms developed in this section have been exposed to
perhaps 5,000 people directly, and honed in the process
S ection Thr ee; Warn ings Process Applied To Energy. In comp i 1 in
g
the information contained in this section, I talked to persons
responsible for marketing and commercialization in the United States
Department of Energy, the Solar Energy Research Institute, the
United States Regional Commissions, the Regional Solar Centers,
leading (California, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Florida)
state energy offices, the seven most active utilities advertisers,
the Edison Electric Institute, Electric Power Research Institute,
the Tennessee Valley Authority, four advertising firms specializing
in energy advertising, the American Gas Association, the Public
Utilities Communicators Association, and several environmental or
political-ideological groups ranging from the Sierra Club to the
Americans for Energy Independence. An extensive computer literature
search of three data bases was also undertaken.
In each case the discussants were asked to identify advertising
campaigns that they felt worked, or failed, in some documentable
fashion. Particular emphasis was placed on locating campaigns which
had evaluation components, for which copies of the 'spots' or
advertisements could be obtained. In some cases sponsors were
unwilling to completely reveal evaluation data. When useful, I
used
such spots anyway, but not draw conclusions, only to
illustrate
documentable conclusions. The campaigns were then reviewed
and
discussed with the sponsor.
xxi
This effort involved reviewing 20 television and
campaigns with about 60 commercials on video and audio tape, as
as analyzing the print components of some campaign.
radio
well
Section Four : The Franklin County Study. Developing the energy use
history was mostly a matter of culling utility records, the county
and state records. The energy history is derived from reference to
existing data bases containing such information including the FEDS
Data Service of the Department of Energy records; the records of the
varaious utilities; and the records of the county's Energy Task
Force
.
Energy forecasts are made by currently acceptable practices, as
detailed in various utility documents, and state and regional energy
planning agencies like the Federal Regional Commission, New England
Federal Regional Council, United States Department of Commerce, and
Brookhaven National Laboratory.
Energy use data was obtained for the county going back from
1975 to 1950, and forecasts are made to the year 2000. All
technical assumptions are consistent with currently acceptable
practice in the United States energy community, and are, for the
most part, derived from official United States Government reports.
Input relating to social, economic, and environmental issues is
derived from the literature of those fields. No technical, social
or other economic practice is considered for inclusion in the
alternative future sets unless they have already worked elsewhere,
although some reasonable changes in economic or technical efficiency
may be assumed.
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Portions of this work were funded in part by the United States
Department of Energy and the National Endowment for the Arts,
specifically Chapters IV and V on the Franklin County Energy history
and renewable energy resources, which were originally researched as
part of the Franklin County Energy Project, of which I was the
principal investigator. The project involved research by many
individuals under the day-to-day supervision of Mr. David Pomerantz.
In order to utilize our findings, I have drastically edited them and
altered some figures to update them. The original work was mine in
organization and conceptualization, but others did the research.
Responsibility for the editing is mine alone.
S ection Five
:
Financing The Future. All financial numbers are
derived from generally recognized sources in the energy and
financial communities, and are usually bracketed by the highest and
lowest reasonable costs. Structures of capital formation are drawn
from examples across the nation, and only elements that have already
been used successfully elsewhere are incorporated. A comprehensive
literature search was undertaken, and extensive telephone
conversations with financiers were conducted to ascertain the
validity of the concepts used.
Those sections citing the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 were
developed with frequent reference to leading tax specialists.
Proposals dealing with shared savings schemes are derived from a
paper on the subject prepared by I.C.F., a leading energy consulting
firm, and other primary sources.
xxiii
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The financial scheme developed in this final section is
which I derived from assembling several financial, tax and public
policy scenarios. The plan itself is original work.
The development of the five sections of the dissertation has
been an ongoing work since 1976; and spans six of the most
tumultuous and fertile years in United States energy policy
development
. As a result
,
a balance had to be struck between a
timely document of up-to-the-minute research on the specifics of
energy, prices, and the over-arching issues of how to educate the
public about unpleasant information. I have tried to keep the
energy cost numbers timely. However, given the rapid development in
the field, they will undoubtably be obsolete soon. For the purposes
of illustration, however, the goal is served, for energy prices will
continue to rise, making my economic cases increasingly more viable.
It is my hope that, viewed together, the various sections of
this dissertation will demonstrate an alternative and comprehensive
model for educating the United States public to the viability of an
alternative vision of the energy future which is demonstrably
healthier, more militarily secure, and cheaper than current
practices. It is also my hope that by offering such a model for
implementation will enable educators to offer concrete solutions in
addition to pointing out the problems. By doing this, I hope to be
following my own prescription.
xxiv
CHAPTER I
TRADITIONAL FUELS AVAILABILITY:
THE CRISIS TO COME
Beginning in 1948, the United States began to import oil
for the first time. Prior to that date, we had been self-suf-
ficient and, indeed, an exporter. By 1960, we imported 5% of
our oil, and by 1973, fully one-third of domestic oil consump-
tion came from imports, a figure which held true until 1981, the
last year figures are available. [ 1
]
In September, 1960, a significant group of oil suppliers*
to the Western world banded together under the name of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and in
1973, having created an organization with enough internal
discipline to make the move stick, implemented a price hike and
a reduction in world oil sales of 10%. As an immediate result,
during the next year prices rose 800%, and gas lines formed.
Two other major price shocks were delivered to our national
economy. First, when OPEC raised prices 100% in 1978, and again
in 1979, when the Iran-Iraq War cut world supplies 10% - enough
to raise prices again by 15%. [2]
*Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Kuwait were the
original members, and controlled 90% of the then-known
world's oil reserves.
1
2As a result of the shocks and the vulnerability they
revealed, policy makers at the national level began to implement
procedures to ensure the nation's future energy supply by
development of domestic resources from a spectrum of supply
options available, ranging from windmills to nuclear power
plants, and including such exotica as methane from kelp farms
undersea, cultivation of oil producing plants, and building the
fast breeder reactor.
So much media attention is focused on these exotic forms of
energy that the sorry state of far more common forms of energy
supply is often obscured. Analysis of our basic energy supply
infrastructure reveals that critical dependency exists on non-
renewable forms of energy - for which our nation has adopted
policies to ensure continued availability. (See Table 1).
This set of energy supply strategies is looked to as
national salvation. Yet, when examined individually, each
energy source and its associated strategy is found to have
serious problems, such that when dependency on the source is
required, it will be infeasible either technically or economi-
cally, and will fail to provide an essential ingredient to the
continued functioning of our national economy. This failure is
not going to be due to "running out" of various energy forms,
but rather, running out of the ability to pay for them. The
United States energy problem is going to be defined by an
inability to physically develop new, traditional fuel supply
3Energy
Source
Imported Oil
Domestic Oil
Natural Gas
Coal
Nuclear Power
TABLE 1
AMERICA'S ENERGY SUPPLY PROFILE
Current %
of American
Consumption
16 %
32 %
26%
18%
4 %
4%
Associated Strategy
Raise domestic prices,
enhance security by
sharing treaties,
strengthen military
response capability,
provide military aid
to exporting nations,
reduce imports.
Increase domestic pro-
duction via decontrol
of prices, reduction
of drilling constraints
on Federal lands and
environmentally sensi-
tive areas, create
favorable tax climate
for investing.
Same as above.
Convert oil-fired power
plants to coal, ease
strip mining regula-
tions, improve national
infrastructure for
shipping, build coal
/
water pipelines.
Simplify regulations,
licensing, make
capital accumulations
easier, solve waste
disposal problem,
create Federal energy
parks
.
All Other (Hydro,
Geothermal, etc.)
100%
4infrastructures quickly enough to replace existing, obsolete
infrastructures, and an inability to pay for them, even if they
could be built.
This means that our current national attempts to cope with
the "crisis" first brought to our attention by dependency on
imported oil are doomed to failure, as we shall see in the
following examinations.
Imported Oil
Discussions of the risk the United States may be in involve
the use of the two concepts of vulnerability and dependency.
Dependency occurs whenever a source of supply lies outside our
borders. We may be dependent on a friendly nation (Venezuela or
Canada) or an unfriendly one (Iran). Vulnerability is a measure
of the security of those sources. While one cannot be vulner-
able to supply interruption unless one is dependent, one may be
dependent at different levels of vulnerability.
Since 1973, most of the United States energy policy has
focused on our vulnerability concerning our reliance on imports,
as evidenced in increased defense expenditures, much of which is
claimed to be necessary to protect U.S. interests in the Mid
East. Less emphasis is placed on our dependency, and little
attention is paid to how costly such dependency is on our
balance of payments or domestic economy.
5In 1980, 41% of free world production of oil came from
Middle Eastern states surrounding the Persian Gulf. Nearly all
of this production passes through the Strait of Hormuz.
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, "This critical
reliance on highly concentrated production and transportation
systems poses a substantial threat of a supply interruption for
some duration. "[4]
One independent analysis of the likelihood of supply con—
eluded that "a small disruption (in Mid East oil supplies) is
highly probable in the 1980' s and a very large supply
interruption was far from inconceivable. "[5
]
National security experts rate the chances of a serious cut
off (in the next several years) at about 75 percent. [6]
While many scenarios exist as to how the United States
would suffer a reduction in imports, almost all revolve around
war in the Middle East, usually of a religious or economic
origin. Both causes are possible, but lately economic issues
are more dominant.
The combination of economic slump and increased conserva-
tion have reduced oil sales, while oil producing nations have
continued to produce at, or close to, the historic rate, result-
ing in an over-supply. This so-called "glut" is sending a
signal to oil consumers that the fear of running out of oil, so
popular in the 1970's, is now passe'. Nevertheless, an
6examination of the numbers involved does not support this sense
of relief.
In the non-communis t world, oil consumption for the
years 1975-1980 has averaged around 52 MMBD.* [7] Beginning in
late 1979, a combination of factors cut demand to 46.5 MMBD. [8]
This 5.5 MMBD decline results in a softening of oil prices
worldwide.
Members of OPEC believe that much of the decline is due to
oil companies drawing down on inventory developed during more
tense times in the early and mid-1970's. This inventory, de-
signed to tide the oil companies over in the event of a supply
interruption, has become extremely expensive to store, due to
high interest rates. What the OPEC members believe is that
reduced tensions, a small decline in actual demand, coupled with
a slight softening of prices and high interest rates, resulted
in the oil companies dumping onto the market 2.5-4 MMBD through
Fall, 1982, creating the appearance of a larger reduction in
demand than is actually occur ing. There is support for this
point of view, as oil executives themselves reveal: [10]
*Oil is counted in barrels, with each barrel containing 42
gallons. A million barrels a day is expressed as MMBD. A
thousand barrels is expressed as MBD.
7• Ralph Baily, Chairman of Conoco, Inc. "We will see
tightness in crude oil markets by mid-year 1982,
because of an end to inventory drawdowns."
• G.D. Georing, Executive Vice President of Phillips
Petroleum. "The company cut its inventories 20% in
the first 6 months of the year and later reduced
its refined oil products 10%.
"
• Ralph Anderson, Chairman of Atlantic Richfield.
"Inventories have been drawn down in excess of the
reduction in demand."
To counter the "glut", OPEC decided to cut production a
total of 2.5 MMBD in the Spring of 1982. [11] This, coupled with
an anticipated improvement in the global economy - which should
yield an increase in demand of 1 MBD and the end of the
"dumping" - is expected by OPEC to stabilize the market.
Should this situation not obtain equality of supply and
demand, many analysts fear an increase in world tensions and the
possibility of another war in the Mid East of economic
origin. [12,13]
Bankers Trust Company has developed figures showing the
decline in oil prices and sales will cut OPEC member nations'
surpluses from $116 billion in 1980 to $60— $70 billion in 1981,
dropping to $30— $40 billion in 1982, to zero in 1983; and
ultimately, to a $20 billion dollar deficit by 1984. Morgan
Guarantee and Trust has come up with similar projections . [14]
8These reductions in surplus are not distributed equally
throughout OPEC, and pose serious problems now for some nations.
These cuts mean that governments may be unable to meet expenses
involved in development plans and indeed, might result in poli-
tical instability as various "have-not" populations overthrow
political leaders because of unmet promises.
As a result, some Arab nations have cut back on development
plans, while others appealed to OPEC for a reduction in produc-
tion to firm up prices [15,16], which was agreed upon in March,
1982.
Should this strategy be insufficient, other nations have
hinted at a more direct strategy, that of removing a major oil
producer from the market place by force. Both Iran and Libya
openly threatened the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [17] which
produces 40% of all exported oil. Iran, which used to be a
major exporter before its war with Iraq (1979-1982), has said
that it wants to re-institute oil exportation, and has threaten-
ed to attack Kuwait, Egypt and Saudi Arabian oil fields, among
others in order to spread Islam, punish those who aided Iraq,
and 'incidentally' create a market for its product. [18]
It would not take a long time or extensive military opera-
tions to halt the oil flow, as graphically demonstrated by the
Iran-Iraq War of 1980. Before the war broke out on September
22, 1980, oil production from the two countries totaled 4.9
9MMBD. Production was virtually halted after 3 days of bombing,
and almost two years later, production levels are back up to
only 1.2 MMBD. Such an impact does not require bombs, however.
After careful study of the implications of armed conflict in the
Mid East, one analyst concluded that ship owners would pull
their boats out of the area immediately, because insurance
policies on the multi- million dollar vessels become void in
wartime. Thus, even the active threat of war could bring about
a supply interruption. [ 19
]
If any significant Middle East oil producing nation should
have its oil field destroyed or the means of shipping exports
disrupted, the economic consequences will be enormous. These
consequences are disbursed unequally throughout the Western
economy, with significant portions of them falling on the United
States. They vary in size, depending on the amount of the
shortage.
In contemplating the effect of an oil supply disruption to
the United States, three levels of disruptions are usually
considered. The loss to the non-communist world market is
assumed, followed by the calculated loss to the United States,
assuming a normal production level of 52 MMBD. The three levels
usually considered (in millions of barrels of oil per day) are.
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Oil Supply Shortage
Non-Communist
Level Nations United States
1
2
3
2- 3 MMBD
4-10 MMBD
12-18 MMBD
Less than 1 MMBD
1-3 MMBD
4-6 MMBD
One way to put this into perspective is to consider the
distribution of the oil shortage, both as a percent of the world
market and of United States imports.
1980 data).
Reduction in
Oil Supply of
Level Non-Communist Nations
1 4- 6%
2 8-19%
3 23-35%
(All calculations using
Reduction in
United States
Oil Imports
16%
16- 50%
66- 100%
While any degree of disruption is possible, most analyses
of the impacts center around a 3 million barrel per day (Level
2) shortage to the United States, as this falls in the mid-range
of probabilities.
In 1974, the United States signed a treaty with 21 other
nations, binding the signators to assist each other in the event
of a supply disruption beyond a certain volume. This organiza-
tion is called the International Energy Agency (I.E.A.). In the
event of disruption, all member nations pledge to share their
resources. Thus, even if the United States reduced its depen-
dency to zero by eliminating oil imports, our vulnerability
would remain, because if our fellow treaty partners were to lose
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supply, we would begin to export oil to them, causing a
reduction of available supply domestically.
In a situation where we were dependent upon imports and
suffered a disproportionate loss, we would theoretically receive
supplies from other nations.
"The I.E.A. Emergency Sharing System may be activated when
the I.E.A. group of 21 member countries, as a whole, (general
trigger) or an individual I.E.A. country (selective trigger)
experiences a 7% shortfall of available petroleum supplies,
measured against final oil consumption during a specified base
period." (The previous four quarters, with a one quarter
lag). [20] Basically, the system is intended to make sure that
no one member or group of members suffers any more than any of
the rest of the members in percentage terms in a supply reduc-
tion situation. Thus, if any one country, through interruption
of normal distribution, were to receive a shortfall of more than
7%, other member nations would voluntarily reduce their consump-
tion to have reserves to share with their more affected fellows.
This scheme is intended to prevent wealthy nations from bidding
up on the price of remaining supplies for their own use. In
effect, it is a cartel of consumers to hold prices down when
supplies are scarce. [21]
For the United States to be a member of the I.E.A and par-
ticipate in its international energy program, three conditions
of membership must be met. [22] They are:
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1) Ability, by virtue of stored reserves or other means, to
survive 90 days without net imports.
2) Maintenance of the ability to reduce consumption of oil
by 10%.
3) Participation in the I.E.P. emergency sharing system of
both the United States Government and private firms in
the United States.
Let us examine the ability of the United States to honor the
preconditions for membership.
Precondition (1): Maintenance of 90 Days of Stored Reserves
Established under Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975.
To comply with I.E.A. treaty obligations, the reserve may
hold up to one billion barrels of crude, unrefined oil. As of
August 1981, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve held 177 million
barrels, which amounts to 59 days' supply at 3 MMBD, but pumping
equipment installed constrains draw down to 1.6 MMBD, for 100
days' pumping. [23]
The use of any goods stored for use in an emergency
requires decisions concerning when consumption will begin, and
at what rate. For example, assume a household has one week's
food storage in a snowstorm region that could see temporary
blockage of roads. Upon learning of a temporary blockage, the
owner of the food storage could feel comfortable immediately
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tapping the storage and using the food at a normal rate, under
the reasonable assumption that the roads would be cleared in a
few days. If, on the other hand, the forecast was for a solid
month of blizzards which were predicted to totally block the
roads, their usage of the stored food would probably be at a
slower rate. The same kind of problem (but with more uncer-
tainty) confronts the use of the national petroleum reserve, and
no planning exists as to when to draw down or for how long, nor
do clear procedures for making such a decision exist. Addi-
tionally, various studies have found inadequate capacity to
refine the stored oil, if needed, no clarity on what price would
be charged for the drawn oil, and no clarity of plans to
allocate it
.
[24
]
That such planning needs to be done can be illustrated by
examining the difficulty America has in reallocating oil
resources within the United States. Alaskan oil, one of our
most valuable resources, has legal constraints as to how it can
be used. Alaskan oil may not be sent outside United States
boundries and is now sent to California for refining and use.
Under many scenarios, including those experienced under a
"fire drill" run several years ago (the AST-3 tests in November
1980), California winds up with a surplus of supply and no place
f Alaskan oil. [25] Due to the lawto put incoming shipments o
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banning exports of Alaskan oil, it cannot be shipped to Japan,
where it could be traded on the international oil market for oil
to be delivered to the United States' East Coast. Since few
overland routes exist for moving crude from California to
another location, shortages in the East currently cannot be
helped by surplus in the West. [26] Thus, even though the entire
United States might be statistically adequately supplied, the
local regions would still be glutted or starved.
Some of these shortfalls in the storage program have become
recognized by oil industry officials on the East Coast, who
testified before Congress in the Spring of 1982.
"Unfortunately, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
is not, at present, designed to deal with problems of
the East Coast, and, in particular, the Northeast.
These areas remain vulnerable . . .to threat of a
shortage and perhaps most seriously, the threat of
sharply increased prices. A basic defect of the
reserve is its failure to place crude oil close to the
East Coast refineries. The East Coast uses 33 percent
of the oil in the United States, and is 83% dependent
on imported oil, compared with the United States as a
whole, which gets about a third of its oil from
imports. "[27]
It would appear that the nation canot count on the United
States Strategic Petroleum Reserve to solve more than a small
portion of a supply interruption problem.
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Precondition (2): Maintain Ability to Reduce Consumption
of Oil 10%.
Three laws have been passed since 1973 which require the
Federal bureaucracy to prepare plans, or help the states prepare
plans, to curtain demand. For a variety of reasons, the laws
have not been obeyed, and little planning exists. [28]
One of the major problems with the legislation which re-
quires that these plans be drawn up was that no money has been
provided for states to develop their plans. As a consequence,
no staff has been hired to produce plans. In addition, several
states' energy offices are so loosely constituted as to have no
legal power to gather data necessary for planning. [29
]
According to a study done by the State of Washington, only
35 state energy agencies have the authority to collect supply
and demand data, 24 have the authority to require forecasts, and
(only) 17 have subpoena power. [30]
The Emergency Energy Conservation Act (EECA) was made law
in November, 1979, requiring 57 states and territories to
prepare contingency plans to cope with supply interruption.
Eight months later, The National Council of State Legislature's
study team found only 13 states that were working on such
plans
.
[31 ]
Of the limited planning which has been undertaken to date,
five measures have been identified which have potential utility
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if needed - all of which require cooperation of the states.
They are:
1) Restrict purchase of gasoline at the pump by having
minimum gallon sales. This would not result in
reduction in consumption per se, but would remove
'topping up' gas lines.
2) Odd/even motor fuel sales; via license tag numbers.
Experience shows that this could save between 35-70
MBD. Authority expired September, 1981, but could
probably be a voluntary measure requested of the
states
.
3) Fifty-five mile per hour enforcement - could save
30-60 MBD.
4) A public information program aimed at the driving
public could save between 65-130 MBD. It should
be noted that, as a result of the Reagan policy,
DOE is planning to end all energy public informa-
tion efforts except those in nuclear energy in
1982.
5) Emergency building temperature restrictions which
limit temperatures in public buildings can save 80
MBD, on Executive order. No enforcement mechanisms
currently exist.
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The impact of these measures (in thousands of barrels of
oil per day) are:
Measure Savings
Restrict Purchase Miniraums
Odd/Even Fuel Sales
55-Mile Per Hour Enforcement
Public Information
Building Temperature
35 - 70 MBD
30 - 60 MBD
0 -130 MBD
0-80 MBD
0
65 -340 MBD
Compared with a shortfall of 3 MMBD, these measures
would, if instituted, save a maximum of 10% of the needed
volume if the mechanisms were in place to implement them. [32]
Not all states have mechanisms in place, or necessary legal
authority for implementation.
It would appear that our ability to respond to a shortfall
by relying on I.E.A. membership qualification Number 2 is
seriously limited.
Precondition (3): Maintain Participation in the I.E.A.
Emergency Sharing System of both
United States Government and United
States private firms
All oil sharing mandated between countries affected by the
I.E.A. agreement is not sharing between countries at all, but
governments directing private companies to sell their product to
customers of the governments' choosing. The theory behind this
is that oil companies would rather 'volunteer' to comply than
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face government orders to do so, assuming the government had the
legal power to issue such orders.
In other words, in a situation where a significant shortage
of world oil existed and a climate of price escalation also
existed, the United States Government would request United
States-based multi-national oil companies to export U.S. oil
(potentially including that contained in the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve) to countries whose economies may be floundering, with
unclear prospects of reimbursement. To make matters worse,
after Congress passed a bill to give the President power to
actually order such transfers, he vetoed it, saying, "What I do
not have, do not want, and do not need, is a general power to
reimpose on Americans another web of price controls and manda-
tory allocations. We must recognize that an interruption of a
significant proportion of foreign energy supplies . . . will
involve real costs to the United States and the world . . . and
no magic Federal plan can make them go away. "[33]
A set of Federal hearings by the Government Accounting
Office into the general state of readiness to comply with I.E.A.
obligations reviewed major laws and their impacts. Members of
the G.A.O. staff participated in four national conferences with
a variety of experts, consulted with five agencies and 11 indus-
try groups, and surveyed 380 proposals from over 20 studies done
on the subject. The study [34] found:
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• The nation is grossly under-prepared to cope with a 3
MMBD shortfall.
• No plan has been prepared for emergency surge oil
production.
• No adequate plan exists to tap the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve.
• The Government has no plans to manage private stock
drawdown
.
• Authority to tap private stocks expired September 30,
1981.
• Federal and State plans for restraining oil demand are
totally inadequate.
• Emergency oil reserves here and abroad are inadequate.
• The international oil sharing mechanisms may not work.
Reliance on a so-called "market forces allocation," (those
who can afford, get), is the current United States official
policy in the event of a supply disruption of any size and it
appears that we can expect no help from our I.E.A. treaty.
Costs of supply disruption . That the United States will, at
some time, have to cope with a supply interruption in the 3 MMBD
range, seems a likely event. That our current efforts to cope
with such an interruption will be inadequate has been demon-
strated. But what of the economic impact of such a disruption?
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One characteristic which sets post-1981 oil supply
interruptions apart from previous supply interruptions is that
U.S. oil was price decontrolled under President Carter. Prior
to decontrol, if international oil prices soared, high priced
oil purchased on the world market was combined with low priced
domestic oil, resulting in average prices to the consumer which
were lower than world market prices.
Since 1981, any rise in world oil prices can be followed by
a rise in U.S. domestic oil price, resulting in much less
shielding of domestic customers. In other words, any post-1981
supply interruption will hit the U.S. harder in the pocketbook
than any experience to date would indicate.
Most studies conducted before decontrol state that a 3 MMBD
shortfall in the United States or in other words, the loss of 8
to 15 percent of our domestic consumption, would result in
prices to customers doubl ing . [35 ] This is borne out by history,
where we find oil prices tripling in 1973-74 as a result of a 1
MMBD domestic shortfall. In 1978-79, oil prices doubled again,
with a global shortfall of 2 MMBD (less than 1 MMBD to the
U.S. ) [ 36 ] The Department of Energy has estimated that gasoline
and distillate would rise to $3.00 per gallon under a scenario
of 9.4 MMBD world shortfall (a 3 MMBD U.S. share). [37]
We have seen that a shortfall is likely, probably through a
Mid East war, that our plans to cope with it probably won' t
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work, and that the economic impact will be significant. We
should look to domestic sources of supply for a more secure
future.
Domestic Oil
Production of oil in the United States began in 1859, with
the construction of the first commercial oil well. Domestic oil
production climbed to its peak in 1970, when we produced 11.3
MMBD, a level which we held for two years, after which decline
set in due to exhaustion of resources in known oil fields. By
1976, at 9.7 MMBD, production was spiraling downward and by the
late 1980' s, only 5 MMBD of oil is expected to be produced from
reserves known in 1978. [38]
This implies that if the United States were going to reduce
imports and depend on domestic oil for a portion of its energy
budget, two conditions would have to be met First, substantial
new reserves would have to be located, and secondly, they would
have to be economically exploitable in the global oil context.
In evaluating the potential success of the search for new
oil fields, certain assumptions must be made. Given that oil
requirements in the United States will be 10 MMBD by the late
1980's and, given that known oil reserves will decline to 5 MMBD
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by the end of the decade, the United States would have to locate
new sources to produce approximately 5 MMBD of economically
recoverable oil by the late 1980's.
Maintenance of that 10 MMBD level of production requires
location of oil fields which would produce approximately four
billion barrels of oil annually. Historical trends stand
against this possibility, because there has only been one year
in the last thirty years where more than three billion barrels
were produced domestically. [39
]
To find this quantity of oil, a significant increase in
exploratory wells would have to be drilled and a good portion of
these would have to be successful. This also implies a substan-
tial increase in innovative drilling practices.
The range of recent innovation in drilling is impressive,
and includes drills that drill sideways, around 90° turns so
that old wells can have feeder wells inserted like spokes on
wheels, chemicals that make "stiff" oil "runnier" so it flows
better, and drilling rigs 13 stories high which are capable of
drilling 9 miles deep. [40] These innovative procedures are
expected to be combined with enhanced drilling activity, and
indeed, the number of oil drilling rigs in active service has
soared from 814 in 1971 to 4,500 in operation in 1981. [41]
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The United States' public perception of its likelihood for
success is skewed by statements from energy executives and
politicians alike, who assert that we have vastly improved our
effort to search for energy.
• Active seismic crews - up 33% (over '79)
• Drilling rigs at work - up 34% (over '79)
• Wells drilled - up 22% (over '79)"[42]
These, and similar headlines appear with frequency. Lost in the
morass of numbers is the net result: "proved oil and gas
reserves - decl ine slowed ." (emphasis added). [43] This is the
result that can be reported after 8 years of ever-increasing
activity, utilizing new technologies.
Yet for all of this furious activity, the decline in known
reserves in the United States continued. In 1980, oil produc-
tion in the contiguous United States declined two to three
percent - and that was an improvement over recent years. As an
article in a recent gas and oil journal put it, the blistering
pace of U.S. drilling, expected to set an all-time record for
well completion this year, is credited only with slowing the
declining rate. [44]
A study of the United States Office of Technology Assess-
ment projected that U.S. domestic production of oil would fall
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to between 8.5 and 7.2 MMBD by 1985, (a 15% - 27% drop),
followed by a further decline to 4 MMBD by the year 2000. [45]
This would imply an annual decline in domestic production of 2%,
which fits in with results of activity for the last two years
after the report was written.
In other words, a massive increase in domestic oil explora-
tion resulted in locating significantly less oil than was
consumed. The situation is even more ominous, however, when
drilling is classified into two categories - those wells drilled
in known oil fields (resulting in more access to known reserves,
and better estimates of the capacity of those reserves) and the
second category - exploratory wells drilled in search of new oil
reserves. It is this second category to which we must look to
bolster declining production in existing fields. In this cate-
gory, new discoveries amounted to only 19% of consumption in
1981. Simply stated, we are using known oil five times faster
than we are replenishing it with newly discovered reserves.
The fact that we are not discovering oil at anywhere near
adequate rates does not completely describe the problem. Not
only are we not finding enough oil; a significant portion of
that oil which we are finding is extremely expensive to extract.
This expense is not only monetary. Recent estimates[47]
indicate that somewhere between the years 1995 and 2005 it will
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take more energy to get a barrel of our remaining domestic
reserves up out of the ground than the barrel will hold.
This implies that in order for us to continue to extract
oil from the earth, we shall first have to capture other forms
of energy (solar, coal, hydro), deliver the energy to oil
fields, and expend that expensively acquired energy to extract
oil. This, in turn, means that some of the most capital inten-
sive (solar, hydro, nuclear) and most environmentally rapacious
(coal) forms of energy must be used to produce an energy form
(oil) that has the redeeming virtue of portability. One can
easily see that such oil, if it is available at all, will be
extremely expensive.
As far as domestic oil is concerned, the United States is
running out - literally. Oil resources will exist beyond the
year 2000, but by 1990 supplies will have diminished markedly,
and that which remains will be wrested from the earth at an
exhorbitant cost.
The Energy Department forecasts that gasoline will cost
$2.00 per gallon in 1980 dollars by 1990, [48] or $4.00 in 1990,
assuming a 7% inflation rate. This means that we will either
increase our dependency on imported oil, or face serious strains
within our domestic economy. Clearly, viable alternatives must
be developed.
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Given that Franklin County is dependent on oil (both
imported and domestic) for about 80% of its energy, we can see
that in the next 10 to 15 years the county will either suffer a
serious economic shock due to interruption of oil imports or
rapidly rising costs, coupled with declining availability of
domestic oil, or both. Franklin County has 10 to 15 to switch
most of its energy infrastructure to another source such as
natural gas, coal or nuclear power.
Natural Gas
Imported and domestic oil provides 48% of our energy needs
in the United States. Natural gas is the country's third most-
used fuel, supplying approximately 25% of our energy. It is an
exceptionally clean-burning fuel which is often utilized where
other, dirtier, fuels cannot be used. For this reason, it is
prized among our energy resources. As a consequence, known
supplies of natural gas are aggressively depleted, in comparison
to other, less prized, fuels. There are two major concerns
about natural gas that need to be addressed: 1) availability,
and 2) price.
Regarding the long term supply of natural gas, there are
two schools of thought. The first, espoused by the Department
of Energy, most consultants, Exxon Corporation and gas pipeline
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companies, supports the theory that natural gas supplies are
limited to about 10 to 15 years' supply, regardless of how much
money is spent searching for new sources. Another camp believes
that there is a plentiful supply of natural gas, just for the
finding
.
One way to define these two viewpoints is to look at the
"finding rate." This rate is essentially a ratio of gas found
to each foot of well drilled. According to the American Gas
Association, the finding rate has dropped from 700 MCF (thousand
cubic feet) per foot in 1965 to 275 MCF per foot in 1980. [49]
"U.S. proven reserves of natural gas can maintain
current U.S. production levels of 20 trillion cubic
feet (20 MCF) for only 10 years. "[50]
"Although significant drilling activity is going
on... in 1980... with encouraging results .. .conventional
gas production in the lower 48 states will continue to
decline, the rate of decline being slowed by partial
or total gas decontrol ." [51
]
"Approximately 40% of United States anticipated
usage of natural gas in the 1990's must come from
reserves yet to be discovered. "[52]
The record clearly demonstrates that up until 1979 (latest
data available), gas production per well was declining.
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Average Annual Non-Associated
Gas Production Per Well [53]
Year-end Non-Associated Average
Producing Gas Production Per Well
Gas Wells (MMcf) (MMcf)
1970 117,000 17,115,026 146
1971 120,000 17,062,388 142
1972 121,000 17,693,057 146
1973 124,000 17,815,500 144
1974 128,000 17,091,147 134
1975 132,000 15,777,995 120
1976 137,000 15,608,112 114
1977 148,000 15,628,564 106
1978 157,000 15,734,388 100
1979 170,000 16,386,661 96
Another aspect of the inatural gas situation is that a gas
driller/ investor needs substantial assurance that a customer
exists for new natural gas at a profitable price before drilling
can begin. This differs from an oil driller, who can always
draw comfort from the fact that imported oil is going to be a
swing fuel to the industry - it will be immediately replaced
with domestic production if domestic production becomes avail-
able at a cheaper rate. Therefore, a domestic oil driller is
assured of a market for newly discovered oil; whereas the
natural gas driller faces a pipeline hook-up with long-term
contracts, a customer with long-term contracts, and no flexi-
bility to ship the product to other, more needy, markets.
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During Congressional hearings as recently as June, 1981, two
drilling companies testified that they had discovered new gas
sources, but plugged the wells due to lack of pipelines to
transport it. [54]
The transportation of natural gas is a very energy-inten-
sive process, burning up to 35% of the captured gas in the
process of transporting it 1000 miles. Thus, even if large
reserves are discovered and prove economically exploitable, if
the distance between the source and user is significant, the
initial resource volume must be 135% of the end requirement.
This volume adjustment should be factored into future natural
gas requirements.
Based on the above perspective, it is the official position
of the Department of Energy that domestic reserves will be drawn
down on at a rate of 8.6 MMBD equivalent in 1980 to 7.5 MMBD in
1990. This amounts to an annual decline of 2.6%. [56]
The second school of thought, led by the Natural Gas Supply
Association, maintains that there is a 150-year supply of
natural gas in the ground. Support for this position is found
at the Potential Gas Agency, an industry-supported group at the
Colorado School of Mines. They estimate natural gas reserves at
913 TCF, or 20 years' worth, not counting known reserves, nor
gas from western tight sands, eastern dovonian shales, and other
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locations requiring heroic efforts of extraction. By so
limiting themselves, they claim to be conservative. [57
]
Several prominent geologists in the employ of the Natural
Gas Supply Association claim that enough new natural gas has
already been discovered to supply natural gas at current levels
of supply for 150 years
.
[58] [59 ] These geologists contend that
one huge field - the Tuscaloosa Trend, extending beneath Texas,
Louisiana and the Gulf of Mexico, might contain 50,000 trillion
feet of gas which would, at our current usage rate of 20 tril-
lion feet annually, last 2,500 years. Recent reestimates of
this field indicate that 80, 000 trillion cubic feet may
exist .[60] It must be noted that these larger fields are
located 8 to 15 miles deep, in sandstone-like formations that
would be costly to exploit.
One of the major reasons this gap in expectations exists is
that the U.S. Government bases its conclusions on drilling
results of the past 15 years, whereas the Gas Association looks
at geological surveys and the last year of results. The key to
understanding this disagreement lies in the way gas is
discovered.
Natural gas is found in association with oil, often when
drilling specifically for oil. Such 'associated gas discover
ies represent a major contribution to the U.S. Government Data
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Base. Seldom has gas been the primary reason for drilling at a
specific location.
When a search is made for natural gas in areas where oil is
not expected to exist, it is called "non- associated" gas. The
position of the Natural Gas Supply Association is that until
decontrol of natural gas became law, there were not sufficient
incentives to search aggressively for non-associated gas, and
therefore, the 15-year drilling history based on associated gas
is not a valid predictor of actual reserves.
Support for those who believe that natural gas supplies
will increase dramatically can be found in the various publica-
tions of the U.S. Geological Survey, which indicate a 22%
increase in undiscovered natural gas over 1975 estimates. To
arrive at this number, the U.S.G.S. added potential drilling
fields lying deep under 2,500 meters (2 miles) of ocean
water. [61] Drilling would require 3 miles of pipeline for a
well one mile in depth. It is interesting to note that the
deepest underwater recovery efforts are currently in the Gulf of
Mexico, where the water is only 1,000 feet (300 meters)
deep. [62]
This difference in approach leads to substantial confusion
on the part of casual observers of the natural gas scene who
cannot decide which experts to believe, and thus cannot judge
whether or not we are running out of this fuel. As we will see
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in the warnings section, disagreement among experts is a major
cause of warnings not being received and recognized.
Costs of new and existing gas to existing customers . Natural
gas pricing has had two distinct histories; one for gas shipped
across state lines, and another for gas produced and consumed in
one state. Almost all interstate gas production and sales
arrangements were developed in the 1950's, when technology
capable of shipping natural gas long distances became available.
Intrastate shipments regulated by Public Service Commissions,
however, had been a fact of life from the early 1900's. In
1936, a court case led to the Federal regulation of gas prices
at the well-head for gas shipped over state lines. In the case
of gas produced and sold within one state, the law of supply and
demand functioned. This led to a wide discrepancy in prices
between the two types of gas production, with intrastate gas
running about twice as expensive as interstate gas. Consequent-
ly, gas companies preferred to sell their product within a
state, which led to shortages of interstate natural gas in the
Winter of 1976-1977. [63
]
As a result of the gas shortages, Congress convened a
series of hearings and inquiries, which arrived at the conclu-
sion that the control of natural gas prices for interstate
shipping had effectively halted exploration and drilling which,
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in turn, led to a lack of gas for consumption. This was follow-
ed by passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, which has
as its goal the removal of price controls on most natural gas by
the late 1980's. It is the stated intention of decontrol to
accelerate aggressive exploration for new gas supplies and
reverse the trend of gas being consumed at a higher rate than
new gas reserves can be developed, which has been so prevalent
in past years.
Before passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,
approximately two-thirds of gas produced in the United States
was under Federal price controls. After passage of the Act, all
domestic natural gas was placed under control. These controls
were to be temporary and scheduled to end by 1985. Controls
encompass all "new" (discovered post-1977) gas - gas which
amounts to 60% of current resources.
The way the Natural Gas Policy Act is written, natural gas
is presumed to be worth approximately what oil is worth per unit
of energy contained. Thus, it is presumed that natural gas, if
decontrolled, would float upward in price to the cost equivalent
of oil. In 1978, natural gas was priced on the interstate
market at the equivalent of $2.80 BBL (per barrel of oil), while
oil was selling for about $12.00 BBL (1978) and was presumed to
rise to $18.00 BBL in 1985. After January 1, 1985, the law
states that natural gas discovered after 1977 will be free to
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float to any level, thus creating incentive for drillers to
locate new supplies.
This logical sounding plan was passed into law in 1978, and
was promptly shredded by the rapid rise in oil prices in 1979-
1980, shooting oil up to $35.00 per barrel. This created a
situation wherein seven careful years of staged decontrol
resulted in natural gas prices rising to an $18.00 per barrel
equivalent. Oil is $35.00 a barrel in 1982, and is expected to
reach a higher level (around $50.00) by 1985. Since natural gas
is free to float after January 1, 1985, it can be assumed that
some time after January 1, 1985, natural gas prices will leap
upward to some level bounded only by the willingness of the
marketplace to pay, and restrained only by the ability of
customers to find cheaper alternative fuels. Since oil and
electricity will be more expensive, the only alternative will be
coal, bunker oil, conservation and renewables. Due to problems
in the ability of consumers to substitute other fuel forms
either because of capital shortages, environraenal constraints,
or technical infeasibility, it is likely that significant
numbers of customers will be tied to a fuel selling at prices 12
times higher than a decade earlier.
The degree of economic shock to the American economy as a
direct result of the increase in natural gas prices under the
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Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 seems to be in the range of $60
billion dollars annually, or about $600 annually per household.
[64]
While customers fear the direct impact of natural gas
decontrol, it is creeping up on millions of unsuspecting users
who receive their electricity from utilities that burn natural
gas in their generators. The burning of natural gas generates
more kilowat hours than does burning oil, using nuclear reac-
tors, or than that generated by hydroelectric dams, and produces
7% of all electricity in the United States. [65] Thus, electri-
city from this source can be expected to increase in price from
300 to 600% in the 1983-1985 time frame.
Another way that consumers will be caught by surprise by
the rapid increase in natural gas prices is the effect that
rising natural gas prices will have on manufactured goods.
Since industry uses 38% of all natural gas sold and furthermore,
one-third of all industrial consumed energy is natural gas, [66]
then any major rise in the cost of natural gas, such as the
1,200% we are discussing here, will have a significant effect on
consumer prices. This has broad implications for the entire
U.S. economy.
Because of the fact that oil prices rose so rapidly, many
gas industry representatives are seeking to completely decontrol
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natural gas immediately, instead of decontrolling 60% of the
supply over seven years, as the NGPA calls for. This move,
often referred to as accelerated decontrol, is one of the hot,
behind the scenes battles of the Reagan administration.
Industry representatives acknowledge that price increases
will amount to a blow of between $ 20 billion and $ 27 billion
dollars to the U.S. economy. [67] On the other hand, anti—
acceleration consumer advocate groups place the price tag at an
astronomical $ 370 billion to $626 billion dollars. [68]
The American Gas Association reports that accelerated
decontrol would raise the monthly natural gas home heating bill
from an average of $494 per customer in 1981 to nearly double
that figure - $897 per month in 1982. [69]
Currently, only one-half of the residential sector is
served by gas. [70] This poses a much more costly problem - the
problem of how to pay the capital cost of hooking up 60 million
households to natural gas when pipelines do not exist under
suburban streets or, in some cases, not even under city streets.
To calculate some of the economic impacts we are confront-
ing, it is instructive to consider the cost of just one natural
gas pipeline in Alaska.
A proposed natural gas pipeline to transport the 27
trillion cubic feet of proven reserves in Alaska's Prudhoe Bay
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region will cost at least $40 billion, spanning 4,800 miles -
all to access a volume of gas merely equal to one year of U.S.
consumption (20 TCF).
A Vice President of the Bank of America told Newsweek:
"The debt requirements of this project are likely
to test the limits of the world's capital markets. "[71]
Originally planned by gas companies to be financed by
private dollars, the cost of the project scared investors off.
Because private funds were not available, the backers put
together a 'construction work in progress' plan, which spreads
the cost among gas customers prior to completion of the pipe-
line. The new plan allows gas customers to be billed for
sections of the line completed, even if the line itself doesn'
t
work. This puts the risk of non-completion on the backs of
consumers, because they pay for it in bits. [72] The gas shipped
through the pipeline is expected to cost $9.25 per MCF upon
entry into the lower 48 states, and even more by the time it
reaches the consumer. [73]
One of the ironies of the Alaskan gas situation is that
transportation of the gas is so expensive that it can be
marketed only if it can be blended with cheaper gas, so that the
average cost of the blended gases would be tolerable. The
Alaskan pipeline was conceived prior to the passage of the
Natural Gas Policy Act, which sets the stage for cheaper gas to
38
be decontrolled and allowed to float upward to meet market
prices. This rise in cheaper gas prices destroys a necessary
precondition of being able to utilize Alaskan gas, unless prices
rise to unheard of heights. [74]
If Alaskan gas prices prove exhorbitant and cannot be
marketed successfully, the United States will lose approximately
5% of its forecast-proven requirements each year for the next 20
years. This will result in proven economically recoverable
reserves declining at a rate of 7% annually - far worse than
currently assumed. In May of 1982, the Alaskan pipeline project
was postponed for two years.
Regardless of how the ultimate cost is borne, the fact is
that $43 billion dollars for one pipeline when dozens are
required, stretches the limits of capital availability.
According to the President of the American Gas Association,
the gas industry will require $482 billion dollars in capital
investments before the year 2000 in order to pay for new pipe-
lines and gas field development. This amounts to $26.7 billion
dollars annually, or about $699 per U.S. family per year for 18
years. This figure will be assessed to pay for wells and
plumbing, and does not include additional funds to pay for the
gas itself. [75
]
About the best one can forecast is that sectors of the
nation with established gas infrastructures available to all
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residential and industrial facilities will see prices rise from
500 to 1200 percent in the period 1982-1985, with most of that
increase occuring in 1985. For the rest of the nation, it will
either have to bankrupt itself trying to pay for new pipelines,
or use declining reserves of oil which will be freed up by
availability of natural gas.
If the supply optimists are correct, we can look forward to
an era of plentiful supplies of natural gas at prices that will
be very hard to absorb into our economy - prices that will re-
stimulate inflation. If the more statistically-based supply
pessimists are correct, we will begin to run out of gas in the
late 1980's, sending prices soaring along with oil prices until
the economy resembles the embargoed economy of 1974.
In either case, as a country we can look ahead to renewed
inflation and great flows of money from consuming areas to
producing areas - starkly reminiscent of our oil situation. In
Franklin County, where a natural gas infrastructure is essen-
tially non-existant, switching over to natural gas would be
proh ibitive.
Coal
Post-1973 discussions of the United States energy situation
inevitably meander through nuclear power, oil and natural gas,
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and ultimately come to rest on coal. Our most abundant energy
resource, coal can supply us with thousands of years of energy
and substitute for much of the oil and natural gas burned in
stationary sources.
"Domestic recoverable reserves amount to 6,000
quads, part of a total domestic resource of about
80,000 quads... of this huge supply, we consume about
14 quads each year in the U.S., or less than 0.3% Of
domestic recoverable reserves of oil and natural gas
each year. "[76]
The promising role of coal in the energy future of the
United States has rested primarily on its growing use in tradi-
tional slots in our energy economy - slots such as electric
generating stations and newer technologies which produce gas or
oil from coal. These newer technologies to which Federal bud-
gets were allocating as much as $68 billion dollars in loans,
loan guarantees and subsidized purchases as recently as the
Carter Administration, has faded rapidly as the projects have
been cancelled or postponed due to staggering costs. [77] Of the
three synthetic fuel projects supported by the Federal Govern-
ment in the 1970's, only one small project survives. In the
arena of coal gasification, a similar decline of hope has
occurred.
In 1979, the United States consumed approximately 680
million tons of coal, or the equivalent of 7.2 MMBD of oil. A
National Coal Association forecast of demand for 1990 shows a
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mid to upper range of 1.2 to 1.4 billion tons, a level supported
by D.O.E
. studies and the National Academy of Sciences
.[ 78
]
In the traditional uses of coal, national energy policy has
called for doubling or tripling coal use by the year 2000,
substituting it for oil and natural gas. For a variety of
reasons, including the inability of the nation's railroads to
rehabilitate themselves fast enough to ship two or three times
as much as they do currently, this target may be difficult to
achieve.
The projected doubling of coal usage means that in the 17
years remaining until the year 2000, the entire coal infrastruc-
ture of the United States will have to double in size. For
every coal installation built since the mid-1800's, we will have
to build another by the end of this century. [80)
Putting aside the problem of expansion, far more serious
limits to the use of coal at present levels exist. More pres-
sing are the twin environmental problems of acid rain and the
so-called greenhouse effect. It is my belief that these two
issues are major problems in the energy future of this country
and will thus severely limit the part coal can play in this
future.
Acid rain . Of all the hydrocarbon fuels (oil, natural gas and
the like), coal stands alone in its ability to pollute the
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environment. It is dirty, and it is difficult to mine,
transport and burn.
Annually, the United States discharges approximately 50
million metric tons of sulfur and nitrogen oxides into the
atmosphere .[ 81 ] This represents 450 pounds per citizen, per
year - almost all of which comes from the combustion of coal.
Sulfur oxides and nitrogren oxides are very acidic. When these
oxides tumble around in the upper atmosphere, they mix with
moisture and fall to the earth as "acid" rain. In addition,
vast quantities of CO2 are released which remain aloft, which
will be discussed later.
Acidity is measured on a PH scale from 1 to 14, with a
value of 1 PH being about the same as battery acid, 7 PH neutral
(pure water) and 13 PH being very alkaline (similar to lye).
The scale is logarithmic, so a PH of 4 is ten times more acidic
than a value of 5 - and 100 times more acidic than 6. Acid rain
is rain with a value of less than 5.6, the normal value of
unpolluted rain.
On March 11, 1982, rain with a PH of 3.38 fell on western
Massachusetts. That is 2,900 percent more acidic than normal
-
about the same as vinegar. It was the fourth such precipitation
in 8 days. [82] One of the side effects of acid rain is the
release into a free state of previously bound up toxic metals
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such as lead, zinc, aluminum and mercury. These toxics are
absorbed into the food chain and ultimately damage the health of
humans. Throughout much of the eastern United States, collec-
tion of rain water for drinking is unsafe. [83] Not only does
acid rain affect fish and aquatic life, but research indicates
that it interferes with the nitrogen cycle, which has a poten-
tially adverse affect on agriculture. [84
]
The problem of acidic rain is affecting the entire world,
and it is not unusual for research to uncover that acid rain in
one location actually originated in coal-burning pollution over
1,000 miles away. For example, fifty-six percent of the sulfur
oxides deposited in Norway and Sweden originate outside their
boundaries. In North America, the problem is growing rapidly,
and is a significant cause of tension between the United States
and Canada. After extensive study, Canada released a document
on its acid rain difficulties which laid the blame squarely on
the United States for much of eastern Canada's acid rain
problem. Canada claims that coal-fired electrical generating
stations ranging from the Ohio Valley to the East Coast are
directly responsible for killing all the fish in many Canadian
lakes, the increase of free mercury found in living fish and
plants, a decline in lumber productivity in its forests, and
significant health degradation among its elderly population.
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"Hundreds of lakes in Ontario are now devoid of
fish because of acid rain and thousands more lakes are
threatened. In Quebec, more than 1,300 lakes are
reported to be acid stressed and in danger of being
des troyed.
"The Atlantic Salmon, which reproduces in fresh
water, is endangered by acid rain. Zinc acidified
rivers in Nova Scotia have been stripped of their
salmon populations and 11 more are threatened. A
similar dismal fate lies in store for rivers and lakes
in Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward
Island, if acid rain is not controlled. "[87]
Concern is so strong that the Canadian government has
mailed copies of their report to all U.S. Congressmen, Senators
and White House officials and is making abatement of the problem
a key ingredient in negotiations for the U.S. to purchase
Canadian natural gas, oil and electricity.
This problem is potentially more serious in specific geo-
graphic areas because local soils may contain few, if any,
natural alkaline substances to neutralize acid rain. This
phenomena of differing alkaline soils can result in one acid
rainfall affecting two separate lakes very differently. Unfor-
tunately, most of the eastern half of North America has little
ability to buffer acid rain. [88]
Researchers for the National Wildlife Foundation found that
15* of the 26 states east of the Mississippi River are "extremely
Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
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vulnerable" to acid rain. "Our inquiry should lay to rest, once
and for all, the claim that acid rain damage is confined to a
few hundred lakes in upstate New York," said Dr. Jay Hair,
former Vice President of the National Wildlife Association. [89
]
A study of Adirondack Lakes found that, of 849 lakes
sampled between 1975 and 1979, 25% were found to be at
critical PH levels and an additional 30% were "endangered."
[90] Officials in New York advised that children and pregnant
women not eat any fish caught in that state's lakes due to toxic
metal build-ups caused by acid rain. [91] It is estimated that
the annual cost of acid rain to New York and New England amounts
to $2.5 billion a year. [92]
This problem has finally attracted the attention of U.S.
policy makers. A Federal interagency task force on acid rain
prevention has been formed. This group is developing a long
term research plan to be financed under provisions of PL 96-294
(The Acid Precipitation Act of 1980). It is expected that these
results will be available in 5 to 10 years. [93] Some groups
feel that this problem is so serious that the nation cannot wait
10 years to begin to solve it. Under current legislation being
considered by Congress, commercial and industrial electric users
in 7 states face rate hikes of 61 to 79 percent to pay for
additional pollution control equipment required to reduce
somewhat (not completely) the sulfur outputs of coal plants in
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those states. While the legislation, as introduced, touches
only 7* states, many people feel it should be made a nationwide
requirement. [94]
Since the 1970 Clean Air Act has been in effect, it is
estimated that $100 billion dollars has been spent on reducing
airborne pollutants from coal production. This does not have
any effect on nitrogen oxides, which are not captured by
existing technology
. [95
]
The Environmental Protection Agency predicts that emissions
of sulfur dioxide by utilities, which are by far the largest
single source in the United States, will rise from 18.6 million
metric tons in 1975 to 23.8 million in 1995. According to the
E.P.A., sulfur and nitrogen oxides emissions are likely to
increase through the year 2000. Sulfur emissions can be expec-
ted to rise by 10 to 20 percent in the next 20 years - and
nitrogen oxides are projected to increase by at least 50%. [97]
While many engineers continue to tout coal as the fuel
which will save the United States from another energy crisis, my
own belief is that the serious environmental and health impacts
of its increased use will result in a renewed public outcry for
additional pollution controls. In the next 8 to 20 years,
Franklin County will suffer economically, either from a decline
Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Michigan, Tennessee, Virginia, and
West Virginia.
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in agricultural and forest products output, or the increased
cost of coal-derived energy pollution controls, or both.
The greenhouse effect . The second major problem stemming from
coal utilization is the so-called "Greenhouse Effect." This
phenomenon is the result of carbon dioxide gases, which are
released during combustion, rising up to the stratosphere, where
they gather in a layer. This layer traps infrared radiation
from the earth and won't allow it to dissipate, resulting in a
gradual warming of the surface temperature of the earth.
CC>2 is already at, or close to, saturation over the
equator. It can be envisioned as a contact lens placed on the
earth's equator, or a fat rubber band around a golf ball. When
newly produced CO2 is released, it drifts to the North and
South Poles, where it is still relatively scarce. Once in
place, it has the effect of warming the poles. In this way,
large unpopulated areas of the earth get warmer, where no one
observes the phenomenon. This, in turn, melts ice and snow, and
the dark earth revealed beneath attracts more solar energy,
setting up a feedback loop which cannot correct itself.
For several years, scientists tried to predict mean global
temperature increases by linking it to CO2 levels, but the
link was not demonstrable. This led to vigorous debate among
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scientists and confusion among the non-scientific community
which, understandably, could not decide if a problem existed or
not. [98]
The debate is tilting toward the conclusion that the
problem is at least as bad as first feared. It appears that the
melting of the polar ice cap consumes a large amount of heat, so
that as long as the ice caps exist in their present size, the
warming trend will become significantly masked. This occurs
because melting ice at 32°F. into water at 32° consumes large
amounts of heat. Researchers theorized that if observable CC>2
build-up was indeed limited to warming of the earth, but was
being masked by melting ice, demonstrable shrinking of polar ice
would be measurable. This now has been demonstrated to be the
case. [99
]
Two Columbia University researchers found that the Antartic
ice sheet had shrunk by almost a million square miles between
1973 and 1980 - an amount in agreement with predicted losses if
C02 levels rose as the ice shield vanished, in a
linked
fashion. [100]
A team of scientists from the National Aeronautic and Space
Administration Institute for Space Studies concluded that the
greenhouse effect raised the earth's temperature 0.2°C. between
1880 and 1960, and another 0.2°C. between 1960 and 1980. In
that time period, the air went from carbon dioxide being 290
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parts per million in 1880 to its present level of 340 PPM, and
is expected to reach 600 PPM during the next century. According
to predictions of the study, fossil fuel use would raise the
earth's temperature between 3.0°C. and 4.5°C. during the next
century. A temperature rise of 2°C. would melt much of the west
Antarctic ice sheet, thus flooding 25% of the land mass of
Florida and Louisiana, and dramatically changing conditions for
agricultural production. [101
]
Dr. James Hansen of NASA's Godard Institute for Space
Studies reports that global warming will be detectable in the
1980' s. He states that large climatic changes will occur in the
next century, beginning in the year 2000, even if coal burning
is phased out. Some scientists predict a displacement of all
the earth's climatic zones a distance of 400 to 800 kilometers
north and south, reulting in staggering disruption of food
production and huge climate upsets, and enhanced desertification
near the equator. Reducing high CO2 levels once they are in
the stratosphere cannot be accomplished artificially by any
known means. Natural reduction by diffusion is very, very slow.
This means that any increase in CO 2 levels, and their
associated affects, will remain with us for centuries. [103]
Since environmental damage won' t be recognizable until the
21st Century, it is not likely to spark enough public protest to
halt coal burning. However, dramatic and occasionally violent
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shifts in the weather might accelerate public pressure to halt
CC>2 emissions. Pressure will also come to bear as public
concern that "something is happening to the weather" grows.
It should be obvious from the previous discussion outlining
the drawbacks of national dependence on coal, that an informed
futurist would not urge the nation in this direction. Prag-
matically, it is going to be very expensive in the short term,
environmentally destructive via acid rain in the raid term, and
have a potentially devastating climatic impact in the long term.
Franklin County, currently without a coal infrastructure
such as coal yards, railroad sidings, etc., cannot afford the
short term expense. Furthermore, the county is already suffer-
ing from agricultural and aquatic impacts of the mid term acid
rain, and if convinced of the detriment of coal dependency, it
is not likely to accept the consequences. It must therefore
rule out coal as a future fuel source and look elsewhere for its
energy supplies.
Nuclear Power
There are 72 commercial nuclear power plants operating in
the United States today. In recent years, public acceptance of
nuclear reactors has withered, with the accident at Three Mile
Island playing a significant role in changing attitudes. Plans
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for new construction has dropped drastically - from 2,500
reactors planned for in the 1960's to 29 currently in the
planning stage. [104] Much of this precipitous decline can be
traced to three causes; fear of accidents leading to public
opposition, rising costs, and high interest rates. Of these
three, rising costs is probably the most decisive.
The nuclear industry is proud of its safety record, while
opponents of nuclear power cite 1,300 failures of equipment in
1979 alone, and 573 operating mistakes the same year. [104]
While many of these reported incidents were minor, many were
not, and these resulted in crippling the affected plants for
many months.
In the past year, two problems have surfaced in existing
reactors to cause uneasiness in the entire industry. These
problems are both related to pieces of the generating equipment
wearing out far earlier than anticipated, creating enormous
repair bills and potentially unsafe conditions.
The first generic problem with nuclear reactors concerns
reactors of the pressurized water reactor design.
Ginna Syndrome . Inside the reactor, uranium is surrounded with
water and held under pressure. The water heats up to form
steam, which is fed through a large radiator. The radiator
consists of a series of pipes through which the steam flows,
52
surrounded by water. It can be visualized as a bunch of soda
straws full of steam, dunked in a basin of water, which heats up
as heat from steam passes through the walls of the straw.
Inside the pressurized water reactors, the steam has etched
the walls of the boiler tubes so badly that many of the tubes
are springing leaks. Since the radioactive water inside the
reactor is under pressure, these leaks result in radioactive
water escaping the reactor. This leakage also lowers pressure
inside the reactor, which allows the water to boil, releasing
steam. This steam forms a bubble, which can theoretically
prevent emergency cooling systems from working, resulting in a
melt down. In this case, the melt down would cause radio-
activity to be released to the outside, through the damaged
tubes
.
This problem has been recognized as theoretically possible
since 1971, when the Atomic Energy Commission pointed out that
corrosion of boiler tubes was a serious problem, requiring
special attention. Four years later, the American Physical
Society stated that the problem could lead "to essentially
uncoolable conditions. "[105]
This problem (called the Ginna Syndrome, after the R. E.
Ginna plant near Rochester, New York, where the leakage finally
drew national attention) is now recognized as affecting 39 of
the nation's 72 reactors, and 20 of the 36 pressurized water
reactors abroad. [106]
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The cost of repairing these plants is awesome, with one
utility (Florida Power & Light) estimating that its Turkey Point
plant failure will cost $459 million dollars in lost revenue,
replacement power and repairs
. [107] This is for a two-reactor
unit, so the cost can be assumed to be $230 million dollars
each. Thirty-nine reactors, each incurring a $230 million
dollar repair bill, totals almost $9 billion dollars, most of
which will have to be spent in the next 10 years.
All of the above figures will pale, of course, if any of
these congenital defects actually cause a major breakdown. The
only reference point we have - Three Mile Island (which suffered
from a different problem) - is calculated to cost in excess of
$1 billion dollars to repair, and that for a reactor that did
not contaminate the countryside. [108]
Embrittlement . The second major problem facing nuclear power is
embrittlement. As many as 46 operating reactors (including some
of those suffering from the Ginna Syndrome), are showing signs
of premature aging resulting from radioactive bombardment of the
inside of the reactor. This bombardment has altered the mole-
cular structure of the reactor in such a way that it is very
brittle. This brittleness makes the reactor susceptible to
sudden cracking and radiation leakage when the plant suffers a
thermal shock such as occurs when the plant's emergency cooling
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system is triggered. Between 8 and 14 plants among the nation's
72 reactors will have to shut down for repairs of this problem
before the end of 1983. [109] The list is expected to grow
longer. Technologies and techniques of power plant repair are
still being developed.
In considering a viable future for United States energy
supply, a scenario which seems plausible is that one or more
generically faulty reactors will break down, causing sufficient
public concern that all other reactors with similar potential
problems would be forced to shut down, or at least operate under
reduced output. This would create an immediate demand for
replacement power. While some of the replacement power could
undoubtedly come from excess coal-fired generating capacity, a
fair amount of replacement power would have to be made up by
increased use of imported oil.
The above situation, if it occurs, is going to hit Franklin
County exceptionally hard, because many of the potentially
faulty reactors are located in the northeastern quadrant of the
United States. Therefore, any loss of nuclear generated
electricity is bound to cause shortages in Franklin County.
Summary
Based on the preceding assessment, we can see that the
traditional energy future of the United States is currently very
bleak
.
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• Imported oil, 18% of supply, is likely to be curtailed,
and our coping plans won't work. This dependency will
cost increasingly larger amounts of money.
• Domestic oil supplies continue to decline, in spite of
furious drilling activity, and continuing price
increases will be a fact of life.
• Natural gas supplies are uncertain at best, and probably
will decline seriously. In any case, the cost of gas
will rise dramatically by 1985. Capital needs to
exploit gas reserves total $699 per U.S. family per year
for the next 18 years, regardless of whether or not gas
is burned in the home.
• Coal is going to be used more and more to replace oil
and natural gas and will pose significant threats to our
ecology. Attempts to ameliorate this will be expensive,
thereby adding constraints to the use of coal which have
nothing to do with availability of raw materials.
• Significant numbers of nuclear power reactors are
probably going to break down in the next 1 to 5 years at
a repair cost that we may be unwilling or unable to
pay.
We can no longer ignore the need to effectively inform the
public of the necessity to develop alternative energy sources.
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Yet, as we have seen, warning efforts have largely been unsuc-
cessful. In order to achieve widespread awareness and accep-
tance of the alarming energy situation, it is important to
understand how the process of delivering warnings succeeds and
fails. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER II
ISSUING EFFECTIVE WARNINGS
From the period 1953 to 1970, the various Presidents
of the United States made more than 250 major disaster
declarations. [1
]
"Disaster means the impinging upon a structured
community of an external force capable of destroying
human life or its resources for survival, on a scale
wide enough to excite public alarm, to disrupt normal
patterns of behavior, and to impair or overload any of
the central services necessary to the conduct of
normal affairs or to the prevention or alleviation of
suffering and loss. Usually, the term disaster refers
to an episode with tragic consequences to a
substantial portion of the population. "[2]
For each of these 250 disasters, there was a period of
warning. Due to increasing use of mass communication devices,
the efficiency of gathering and transmitting warning data has
improved over the days before satellite weather surveillance,
two-way radio and television. However, there is little way of
knowing if the increase in efficiency brought about by this
hardware has been matched by an increase in e f fee t iv enes
s
. That
is, we may have many more technological means to get the message
to the public, but the message itself — how the warning is
delivered — may continue to be ineffective.
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The literature on the warning process is not extens ive.
Much of the solid field work has been done on calamities
affecting large groups of people. Most of the available
literature, therefore, deals with the sociology of disaster and
natural hazards — the behavior of people during hurricanes,
floods and air raid drills. The studies often describe crowd
behavior, rather than individual behavior.
None of the work reviewed dealt with the class of calami-
ties which the energy crisis belongs to - those calamaties with
long and subtle onsets such as the collapse of social systems or
famines. A useful description of the existing literature might
be that it concentrated primarily on short-term violent events -
I found nothing written about catastrophes with slower pro-
cesses. I therefore regret that the available literature is
incomplete.
Throughout the literature on warnings, the word "warning"
is generally used to describe a wide range of activities, making
it mandatory to carefully read the material for the implied
definition.
In this paper, "warning" will be distinguished from
"alert." An alert will mean such activities as sounding a siren
- blowing an air raid horn, etc. A warning has two components
-
a statement of the problem and proposed course of coping
behavior. Following the issuance of a warning, one enters a
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period of threat, during which a variety of decisions must be
made.
The
events
:
following stages are part of an overall sequence
0 . Predisaster Determining, to some degree, the
effect of and response to, impact.
1 . Warning Precautionary activity.
2. Threat Survival action.
3. Impact "Holding on."
4. Inventory Diagnosis of situation and decision
on action.
5. Rescue Spontaneous, local, unorganized
extrication and first aid; some
preventive measures.
6 . Remedy Organized and professional relief,
medical care, preventive and
security measures.
7. Recovery Individual rehabilitation and
readjustment; community restora-
tion of property and organiza-
tional preventive measures against
recurrence. [3]
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Dimensions of Disaster Agents
The number of variables which can be combined to describe a
disaster is significant. Each affects the nature of the warning
process.
1. Rate: Frequency of occurrence
a. has never happened before
b. has happened before
2. Physical characteristics
a. wind, rain, etc. (climatic)
b. heat, (fire), cold (weather)
c. silent
3. Speed of onset
a. rapid - avalanche, explosion
b. gradual - some floods, famine, drought
c. repetitive - some earthquakes
4. Length of forewarning (difference from onset)
a. short - bomb attack, explosion
b. medium - spring flooding, predicted based on winter
c. long - pollution build-up in food chain
5. Duration
a. short - explosion, etc.
b. medium - flood, some pollution
c. long - famine, pollution
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6. Scope of impact
a. one house, neighborhood
b. town, stadium
c. bio-region, nation
7. Destructive potential
a. high property damage, low life risk - (fire, slow in
spreading)
b. high life risk, no property loss (chemical leak, air
pollution, radioactivity)
c. variable - epicenter both a and b
8. Gross predictability
a. danger area can be predicted with some accuracy, but
not necessarily with a lot of forewarning time
(e.g., floods, hurricanes, "downwind" accidents such
as chemical releases)
b. no predictability - no forewarning (terrorism, auto
accidents, "freak accidents")
c. some forewarning, but no predictability (tornados,
disease spread)
9. Gross controllability (varies with speed of onset,
nature, amount of warning, or all of the above) [4]
These variables have obvious implications for those with
the grave responsibility of issuing a warning to large masses of
people. First, the scope of a disaster cannot be determined
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with any degree of accuracy. Will the disease bring death or
merely discomfort? How large a geographic area will it affect?
How fast will it spread? Will prophylaxis help? What is the
projected duration of the catastrophe? In sura: What should the
average person do? Without answers, confusion and anxiety will
result.
Specific Examples of Various Kinds of Warnings
Air raid . One of the best summaries of the public's response to
warnings, The Occasion Instant: The Structure of Social Response
to Unanticipated Air Raid Warnings
,
[5] found that such warnings
are remarkably ineffective. The study focused on three acciden-
tal soundings of air raid warnings in three locations at the
height of the cold war era.
Berkeley, California . The first accidental sounding
occurred in Berkeley and Oakland, California.
"On the morning of 5 May 1955, the United States
Air Force was unable to identify a squadron of bombers
flying over the Pacific Ocean. The bombers were
headed in the general direction of the central West
Coast of the United States. An order was given to
sound the alert warning sirens for a probable attack.
"Sirens sounded in Berkeley and in Oakland,
California. Radio stations went off the air in San
Francisco. Local warnings in schools and business
offices (which had internal warning systems) were
sounded almost immediately after 'warning yellow'.
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"It took the Air Force only a few minutes to
identify the bomber squadron as an American one. All
was back to normal in approximately ten minute. In
the same length of time, if the squadron had been
enemy-manned and undeterred, it could have delivered a
lethal blow.
"Oakland, California is the focus of this study.
The siren sounded there at 10:42 a.m.: Five minutes of
a steady blast, one minute of silence, and then five
more minutes of a steady blast. The official meaning
of the siren is to prepare for an enemy air attack.
(The second of these five-minute blasts was cut short
when the planes were recognized.) A study was under-
taken to learn about the general public's response to
the warning. "[6]
After the alarm, approximately 75% of the residents in the
area alerted had heard it. Response to the alert took five
bas ic forms . [ 7]
The Meaning of the Oakland Signal:
First Thoughts of Respondents
First Thought
Percent of
Respondents
Air Raid Alert
Practice Alert
Siren Sounded by Mistake
Fire, Ambulance
Disbelief, Doubt, Unspecified or Unsure
22
46
5
5
23
^Percent figures total greater than 100 due to a few
persons expressing a "combination" of first
thoughts
.
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In attempting to explain why so few people took the signal
seriously, the authors suggest that a basic concept in learning
theory might apply to this interesting phenomenon:
"Several factors may have affected the public's
definition of the situation. One obvious possibility
is the previous exposure to many practice alerts.
Oakland, unlike many other cities, had practice alerts
at various practice alerts at various times of the
day, and on various days of the week. (Chicago, on
the other hand, has practice alerts only at 10:30 a.m.
on Tuesdays.) The application of an elementary
principle of learning theory in psychology suggests
one reason why less than one-fourth of those who heard
the siren entertained the idea that an attack was
probably. The repeated absence of reinforcement for a
stimulus over time results in the extinction of any
meaning for the stimulous. "[8]
The study also indicated a relationship between educational
achievement and heeding warnings.
"One characteristic which we do know to be re-
lated to an individual's interpretation of the signal
is the amount of formal education he has. There is a
peculiar curvilinear relationship between education
and taking the alert seriously. The highest incidence
of protective behavior was among the group who held
high school diplomas, but had not gone on to college.
Both college-educated persons and those who were not
high school graduates were less likely to try to
protect themselves ."[ 9
]
Peer group reference played an important part in the
response pattern, as well.
"The most commonly-used technique of deciding
upon and defining the meaning of the situation was
firsthand observation of the behavior of others. Most
of the respondents in the sample reported that they
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remained calm and casual because nobody around them
seemed to be doing anything. It may also be of
significance that of those persons who either ignored
the siren or responded with casual curiosity, most
were in the company of others.
"Finally, it seems that people are most likely to
interpret the signal as a real air raid alert if they
believe that war is imminent. In response to the
question of whether they believed war was likely in
the next two years (and whether Oakland would be under
attack), more than three-fourths answered to the
negative. However, those who regarded war as imminent
and attack on Oakland as possible (less than 25
percent) were much more likely to define the situation
as serious and the alert as real. "[10]
The second example occurred in Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C. "At four-thirty in the after-
noon of 25 November 1958, telephone workers in
Washington, D.C. accidentally tied in the downtown
Washington circuit with the Montgomery County Civil
Defense System.
"Air raid warnings sounded immediately in several
parts of Washington, in the downtown area, and inside
several establishments which had internal air raid
systems connected with the central warning system.
Several thousand Federal government employees, among
many others, were thus suddenly exposed to an unan-
nounced and unexpected warning siren, a signal which
means literally to prepare for an imminent air
attack.
"The warning signal that sounded was the same one
that had been used up to that time only for previously
announced practice alerts. However, it should be kept
in mind that this was an accidental sounding of the
system. Consequently, there were no informed civil
defense leaders on hand who knew for sure that this
was not a real attack. "[11]
In the follow-up study done within 30 days of the acciden
tal alert, 1,691 people were interviewed for an hour, and asked
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to fill out a questionnaire. The significant findings were:
• 32% wanted more information before doing anything.
• 23% looked to see what others were going to do before
deciding for themselves.
• 25% continued on as if nothing had happened.
• 14% thought of going to the shelter area. [12]
The main reason given for not responding to the warnings
was, "'that signal' was only used for practice alerts." In the
words of the authors, "clearly these people had been so condi-
tioned as to render the signal used completely ineffective as a
warning of a real attack." The same could be said for. . .
(others). . . who stated flatly that they ignore all warning
messages not previously announced. [13]
Recalling that the subjects of this study were Federal
employees, it is instructive to note how various groups
responded.
"There were notable differences by organizations in
interpretations of the signal. Many employees in the
Veteran's Administration apparently thought immedi-
ately of withdrawing in some way, either by going to a
shelter or by leaving the building. This is a
striking contrast to the Weather Bureau, where only 3
percent thought of withdrawal. State employees were
also very likely to ignore the siren; more than 40
percent continued on with their jobs as though nothing
had happened. HEW was the most other-directed agency;
almost 30 percent first looked around to see what
others were doing. "[14]
It would appear that the working environment and its unique
kind of consciousness about the world one inhabits strongly
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influenced behavior. It would further appear that the warning
recipients sought to become part of a group.
"Going to a shelter was not associated with the
presence or absence of others at the time the signal
sounded. Being alone at the time of the warning,
however, was associated with the decision to withdraw
from one's office. Interestingly enough, one was more
likely to remain in one's office if he had no kin in
the Washington area. Whatever the content of the
reasoning, those who had kin in the vicinity were more
likely to take protective action.
"In 95% of the cases, some attempt was made to
validate or establish the nature and purpose of the
signal. "[15]
The role of the social group as a frame-of-reference is
underscored:
"At one point during the course of the warning
period, almost 60 percent of the employees in this
sample withdrew from their offices. Interestingly
enough, of those who did remain in their offices, 48
percent used their own group (or observation of the
immediate environment) as the first source of
guidance. This is to be contrasted with those who
withdrew from their offices, of whom only 22 percent
used their own group for guidance.
"The one factor which the largest single propor-
tion of respondents selected as most influencing their
behavior upon hearing the siren was the way other
people in their offices or building acted. The radio
was also an important source. In the Weather Bureau,
more than in any other agency, the radio proved to be
the most used source of informing personnel (40
percent) that the siren did not signal a real attack.
For the Commerce Department, radio was the clarifying
source for only about 20 percent of the people.
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"Proportionately more women than men (in four of
the agencies) were mostly influenced by others around
them in deciding what to do about the warning signal.
Proportionately more men used sources outside their
offices to evaluate the situation and to decide what
to do. "[16]
The third study on air raid warnings found similar
behavioral responses.
Chicago . "After forty futile attempts in forty
successive years, the Chicago White Sox finally won an
American League baseball title in 1959. The pennant
was clinched when the White Sox won a night game from
the Cleveland Indians on Sept. 22, 1959. The game was
broadcast and telecast from Cleveland.
"Just a few days earlier, the Chicago City
Council had ' . . . resolved that bells ring, whistles
blow, bands play and general joy be unconfined when
the coveted pennant has been won by the heroes of 35th
street. ' The evening of the ball game, the fire
commissioner (also acting director of the city's civil
defense corps) decided to sound the civil defense
sirens to add to the spirit of the city council's
proclamation.
"The baseball game ended at 9:50 p.m., Chicago
time. Live telecasts and broadcasts from the dressing
room of the victorious team were received for about 15
to 20 minutes immediately afterward. Then at 10:30,
some forty minutes after the game had ended, the air
raid alert signal went off. A steady blast for a full
five minutes sounded, a signal which means that an air
attack is possible, but is not expected for at least
31 minutes.
"Prior to his sounding of the siren, the
commissioner properly notified the police and fire
departments, the public utilities, and all radio and
television stations and newspapers. But only a very
few minutes elapsed between the arrival of this notice
and the sounding of the siren. Thus, the public had
no warning of the event. "[17]
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Two hundred-fifty
geographic scattering,
fairly representative
following:
people were interviewed, drawn from a
and some attempt was made to insure a
sample. The sample revealed the
"Among those individuals who, at one time or
another, believed that the siren signaled a real air
alert, the most likely method of verification or
validation was turning on the radio or television, or,
if it was already on, paying sharper attention to it.
The next most frequent action reported was looking out
the window. Likewise, these are the two most
frequently listed activities of verification reported
by respondents who thought that the siren signaled a
fire, a disaster, or a practice air raid alert. The
third most important form of verification consisted of
asking the opinion of someone else in the same room
with the respondent.
"The telephone was used as a source of verifica-
tion for some 10 percent of those who thought it might
be an air raid alert. Six percent of these calls went
to a public agency, and four percent went to friends
and acquaintances.
"As to the sequence of the acts of verification,
the most frequent first action consisted of either
discussing the situation with someone in the immediate
environment or of looking outside to see what was
going on. Turning on or paying stricter attention to
the radio or television closely followed the above two
as a first reaction. Those who reported a sequence of
three activities of verification, generally went out-
side in stage three. The typical sequence was thus to
turn to someone near you for an opinion, then to turn
on the radio, then to go outside.
"Only two percent of the entire sample took what
might be considered protective action. Of those who
thought that the siren might have signaled an air
attack, six percent took protective action. Six cases
are far too few to justify any meaningful cross-
tabulation.
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"Persons were asked why they decided to do
nothing. Three kinds of responses were given to this
question: First, there was disbelief that it was an
air raid alert; second, the respondent reported that
there was no corroboration from other sources (i.e.,
no support from radio, people were in streets, etc.);
and finally, there was the complete feeling of either
futility or ignorance of what to do. These responses
were divided rather evenly, approximately one-third
each, although disbelief was expressed by 41
percent. "[18]
Again, the educational factor appeared.
"As in the Oakland research, one of the more
striking findings in this study is that the middle-
educated group (high school graduates, but no college)
tended to be the more apprehensive, and the most
likely to interpret the siren as a signal for a real
attack. The relationship between education and fear
is here curvilinear. The groups with either high or
low achievements in formal education were less likely
to express fear, and less likely to interpret the
siren as a signal for an air raid alert. If we com-
pare the highly educated group with those of low for-
mal education, there is little difference between the
two groups in their response to the meaning of the
signal. "[19]
Attempts were made to find the commonalities in each of
these three alarm response patterns, and in all three cases, it
was found that belief in the imminence of war was directly
associated with taking the warning seriously. Those who
believed the international political situation to be tense were
much more likely to interpret the situation as a warning for a
real attack. This is one of the few variables which could be
traced through each of the research projects, and it is
therefore significant that the findings converge.
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In the two studies where sex was reported as a variable
(Washington and Chicago), women took the warning signal more
seriously than men. Women were more likely to believe that the
signal was a warning for a real attack, and they were much more
likely to express fear, concern, irritation and excitement.
This seems to be especially true of women with children.
Further, women were more likely to attempt to validate the siren
by looking around in their immediate environment for some kind
of evidence.
In both Oakland and Chicago, researchers found that the
middle-educated group (high school, but no further education)
was most likely to regard the siren as a warning of possible
attack. If this had been a finding in only one of the studies,
it would have been interesting in itself, but more easily
dismissable as an anomalous finding. That the same pattern was
discovered in both of the cities where education was used as a
variable lends credence to the hypothesis of a curvilineal
relationship between "serious concern" and "education. "[20]
Flooding studies . In a study on flooding in Denver, Colorado,
five characteristics were used to depict the unique nature of
the event:
1. It was unfamiliar (less than 10% had experienced
flooding in the last 30 years).
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2. It was sudden - from first indication to actual water
hitting the town was 5 hours.
3. It was totally unexpected
,
and the rain which precipi-
tated the flood did not fall on the town which was
flooded, but fell upriver.
4. It was localized - flooding confined to a narrow band
along the river banks.
5. The warning contexts varied a lot. Due to the varying
density of the population, some were contacted directly
by police, some by relatives via phone, and some by
mass media.
When they did evacuate, families left as units . . .
about three- four ths of the families left together . . .
of those families united at the time of warning, 92%
left together
.
[21
]
Families who received warnings from relatives very
frequently evacuated their homes . . . often the warn-
ing was accompanied by an invitation to evacuate to the
warner's residence. [22]
In a separate study on the same Colorado flood, [23] the
research conceptualized the warning process into three
categories
:
1. Warning by authorities — (defined here to mean police
and fire departments)
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2. Warning by peers - friends, neighbors and relatives,
often transmitted through the infor-
mation network by the wire.
3. Warning by mass media - an important variable in the
efficiency of this process was that
that the warnings were received by
several groups or family members
s imultaneously
.
"Family reactions were significantly related to
the type of warning process . .
.
persons warned by
authorities were much more likely to immediately
evacuate, or at least confirm the warning
seldom were such warnings discounted. " [24]
"Mass media warnings urging evacuation of general
areas were interpreted quite differently than authori-
ties warning evacuation of one's own home or immediate
neighborhood ... In this respect, the data clearly
indicated that families urged by the police to
evacuate did not have any clearer idea of the flood
threat than those warned by the mass media. Hence,
willingness to evacuate following police warnings
appears to have been as much due to the perceived role
relationship with the police as it was to specific
information given . . . Thus, while many mass media
reports and peer warnings urged evacuation of
specified areas, they were not interpreted in the same
way as a police officer indicating that a specific
house or block should be evacuated. "[25]
Sixty-one percent of all families made some effort to
confirm the warning. [26]
Three general patterns emerged:
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1. Appeal to authority - (9% tried to call police direct-
ly, 45/ referred to the statements or authority as
relayed by mass media).
2. Appeal to peer — (in 43% of these cases, the consulter
had less information than the consultee)
3. Observational confirmation (watching neighbors leave,
viewing the river)
In general, the researchers found that no matter what the
method used to deliver the warning, the recipient checked its
validity by using one of the remaining two avenues by which he
could have received the warning. [27]
A study of the effectiveness of the warning process atten-
dant to floods at Marysville and Yuba City, California in
December 1955, revealed that:
"In spite of intensive mass media coverage,
Weather Bureau forecasts of flood danger were either
ignored or actually not received by substantial por-
tions of those interviewed in the disaster areas.
Furthermore, thirty-nine percent of those who remem-
bered receiving such reports indicated that they did
not fully believe them."
The investigators found the following reasons, also suppor-
ted by other studies, for disbelief and reluctance to act upon
flood warnings:
"Lack of past experience with disasters, the
delusion of personal invulnerability (the feeling
that, 'it won't get me'), the inability to adopt a new
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frame of reference so as to expect unusual events,
dependency upon protecting authorities, and the
willingness to seize upon reasuring communications or
to deny or disregard communications predicting
disaster . . ."[28]
A study done on five communities which had water related
problems (either periodic flooding or pollution) showed that
public "power actors" ("those individuals within the community
leadership pool who control the resources which aid or abet
attempts to solve problems") [29] tended to omit water problems
from lists of local problems they were asked to cite. This was
true even with "power actors" from towns experiencing damaging
floods yearly! The only time "power actors" cited flooding was
when it had historically affected them personally. [30] In other
words, people with day-to-day responsibility for a town which
had yearly flooding did not list it as a problem unless it was a
problem for them .
Analysis of the data from another angle showed us when the
"power actors" were asked to rank order a prepared list of 10
problems, including water. In this exercise, water related
problems ranked high. The apparent incongruity was laid to rest
by a third exercise, which asked the same group to indicate the
degree to which each of the 10 problems were subject to local
remedy. In this case, a low percentage of respondents (22.5%)
felt that the problem had a local solution. [31
]
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In other words, responsible public officials in five
communities seemed to ignore a major public threat unless two
conditions were met: (a) it had to affect them personally, and
(b) they had to feel they could do something about it. Lacking
either of these, no public problem solving behavior was going to
be initiated.
Alcohol and heart studies . Contrary to the other studies
reviewed on warnings, factual data did not have a lot to do with
a "warning" advertisement's effectiveness. "The five top
ranking advertisements (based on an advance ranking in eight
dimensions) all appeal to emotion rather than to reason. [32]
A study of 25 advertisements used as part of a campaign on
highway safety involving alcohol and driving showed that:
"To attract readership, as well as fleeting attention,
however, it appears that brief copy, dramatic com-
panies, and the posing of a threat have definite bene-
fits. To elicit action (or at least a statement of
intent to act), specific recommendations seem far
superior to more general ones. "[33]
This particular study is very interesting because it was an
attempt to alter public behavior about a danger most of the pub-
lic would feel to be a random one - getting injured by a drunk
driver. You will recall that earlier, this paper outlined the
kind of events one can be warned about: inexorable dangers (oil
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shortages), dangers over which one may have control (smoking),
cyclical dangers (flooding) with which one may have experience,
etc. This study on advertisements dealt with events over which
one has no specific control and no anticipation of it. Its
analog in time of crisis of a large scale might be an L.N.G.
explosion, a nuclear power plant failure, or a chemical
accident.
The survey showed that the issuance of warnings in this
case produced no significant changes regarding attitudes or
reactions to the problem, save one: The proportion of respon-
dents agreeing with a statement, "no matter how much effort is
invested, there is not likely to be much effect on the drunk
driver problem," rose from 39% pre- information presentation to
46% after being subjected to the warnings
. [34
]
In other words, repeated exposure to warnings in this
particular case (and category) increased the recipients 1 sense
of hopelessness . This tends to support the descriptions of
behavior in the panic literature of trapped people who know
there is nothing they can do. They become passive and
hopeless. [35]
Advertisements, however, are passive agents of warning.
They can only attempt to change people's behavior through verbal
appeals. But even action-oriented prevention measures have not
had much impact or success on their target populations.
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An article in the Readers' Digest
,
quoting from the
Coronary Club Bulletin
,
recounted the following:
"A serious attempt was made to rid 1,817 adults
of the risk factors that predispose to heart attacks -
elevated cholesterol and triglyceride levels, hyper-
tension, smoking, diabetes and obesity. An educa-
tional program was offered to 1,250 of the volunteers
and the rest were allowed to follow their own ideas.
Alas, after a year the prevelance of the risk factors
was the same in both groups.
"In Canada, 230 steel workers with hypertension
took part in a trail to see if compliance with regi-
mens to control the disorder could be improved. Some
were treated by their family doctors outside working
hours and some by industrial physicians during work
shifts. The same men were randomly chosen to receive,
or not to receive, an educational program instructing
them about hypertension and its treatment to prevent
heart disease and stroke. Again, neither the conven-
ience of receiving treatment at work nor the benefit
of health education increased the likelihood of the
men's taking the medicine. "[36]
Experience and Its Role in Receiving a Warning
We have seen that small town officials reacted to threats
when it was a matter of personal concern, and that seat belt
owners tend to buckle up more if they had had friends injured in
accidents. This personalization of the threat - the reverse of
"it can't happen to me," seems to hold true in other kinds of
warning implementation, as well.
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"No more than two-fifths of the residents of
Lower Cameron Parish evacuated before Hurricane Audrey
struck in 1957. The next year, 75 percent evacuated
in the path of tropical storm Ella, even though
Weather Bureau advisories did not at that time advise
evacuation. When Hurricane Carla occurred in 1961,
96.6 percent of the persons interviewed had evacuated
the area.
"Moore, et al . . . were able to collect informa-
tion in Texas and Louisiana on whether people evacu-
ated or not and whether or not they had experienced a
disaster prior to Hurricane Carla. The area had had
much experience with hurricanes and more specifically,
had been seriously devastated by Hurricane Audrey in
1957. The evacuation behavior during Hurricane Carla,
compared with previous disaster experience, indicates
that previous disaster experience is associated with
willingness to evacuate in future disaster situations.
It is also interesting to note that those with
specific hurricane experience did not evacuate as
frequently as did those with other types of disaster
experience.
"Moore, et al, were also able to test the hypo-
thesis that those who survive earlier disasters repeat
what was rewarding behavior in the previous situation.
Individuals with disaster experience were asked
whether they had evacuated in previous disasters. The
data support this thesis.
"Lachman, et al, found that during a Tsunami
which hit Hilo, Hawaii, residents with previous disas-
ter experience evacuated more frequently. The differ-
ence, however, was as slight as 39 percent of those
without previous disaster experience evacuating, as
compared with 48 percent with previous disaster
experience evacuating. "[37]
This does not, however, guarantee that previous experience
with crisis of a different nature will be helpful in dealing
with present or future crisis situations. Again, referring to
the Dynes summary:
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Other types of disaster experience were quite
different in quality and did not seem to the people
involve to be particularly relevant when dealing with
the present disaster. The data indicate little
relationship between the previous experiences these
people had had and their reactions to this disaster.
In other words, the fact that past experience with
tornadoes on the part of the populace might be
correlated with more adaptive behavior in future
tornadoes, does not imply that past experience with
tornadoes would lead to more adaptive behavior in a
crisis with an unlike pre— disaster warning
system. "[38]
Areas often hit with crisis of a similar nature tend to
develop a coping behavior, called "disaster culture."
"There are two limitations to a disaster culture.
(1) It tends to be oriented to a specific disaster
agent, and (2) it is often based on the particular
model of disaster which is set on the basis of the
worst disaster in recent memory.
"A disaster culture includes norms which indicate
how the threat is to be perceived, what individual
action is to take place in a specified condition, how
organizational members are supposed to act, e.g.,
report for work immediately, etc. It includes know-
ledge about how warning cues are to be interpreted,
the potential destructiveness of the disaster agent,
and the efficiency of particular types of action. It
includes a technology such as a warning system, and
tools to avoid the worst consequences, (i.e., hooks on
the ceiling on which to hang furniture in flood condi-
tions, taped plywood covers for windows, shelter sites
picked out and stocked, etc.). Such disaster cultures
emerge in communities with considerable experience in
repetitive situations. They gradually learn that
certain events are repetitive, and perhaps even pre-
dictable. On the basis of their previous experience
and preparation, such communities are able to cope
with events on a routine basis that years before would
have been considered disastrous. In this sense, over
a period of time, a community builds its capabilities
to meet the demands it has previously experienced.
Evidence of disaster culture is clearly seen in
certain parts of Texas, Louisiana and Florida, which
often experience hurricanes, and areas of the Midwest
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subject to tornadoes. Many communities, in such
localities "specialize" - so to speak - in handling
these frequently occurring natural disasters. Similar
disaster cultures also develop in mining areas where
accidents are somewhat routine. "[39 ]
In such situations, the warning may fall on receptive ears,
if—Lf fits prior experience . If it does not, the existence of
the disaster culture may heighten the disregarding process, due
to the vested interest of the participants in holding on to
their world view.
Studies on Panic
The warning literature shows a strikingly high number of
instances where public officials temporized, or delayed the
issuance of a warning out of fear of causing a panic. Occasion-
ally, this fear seems to have caused the officials to couch the
warning in cautious, or comforting terms. This tone is at odds
with the content of the warning, and confuses the listener. In
essence, the official has violated some of the communications
guidelines for an effective warning: To be clear, unambiguous,
and to have no disagreement about the severity of the
situation.
While the literature on panic is acknowledged to be inade-
quate and often lacks an empirical basis, researchers in the
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field do agree on the point that panic is very rare, has essen-
tial pre-conditions, and that effective warning communications
are a detriment to panic - not a cure. [40]
In a survey of the literature on the problem of panic done
in conjunction with flood warnings, a review of the five leading
works on panic concludes, "that panic is very rare, and that in
the specific disaster reviewed, no evidence of it existed at
all. "[41]
Since the concern about panic is of obvious import to
public officials, some discussion is in order. For the purpose
of this discussion, panic is defined to mean behavior people
undertake in an effort to preserve themselves or their loved
ones, which hurts themselves, or others, in the process. [42]
One key to the reticence of public officials to issue
straightforward warnings may lie in the following description:
"Panic, rather than being antisocial, is non-
social behavior; ordinary social relationships are
disregarded and pre-existent group action patterns
fail to be applied.
"Thus, panic flight represents very highly
individualistic behavior. In involves completely
individual, as against group, action in coping with
the problem of escape from a danger. In the case of
panic, there is no unity of action, no cooperation
with others, no joint activity by the members of the
mass; there is a total breakdown of corporate or
concerted behavior. In short, panic flight is the
very antithesis of organized group behavior. " [43]
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One could theorize that public officials stand to lose a
great deal in a panic situation: Their identity. If the social
cohesion collapses, their role is lost. In other words,
officials may fear using their power (to warn) for fear of
losing it.
An interesting perspective that is gained is one redefining
panic to mean only a mass of individuals acting individually in
a time and space-bound circumstance.
"If the term panic refers to the individualiza-
tion of activity under stress, then according to the
definition of every major theorist, panic is not col-
lective behavior. Individuals who share a focus or a
condition may act similarly, without regard for each
other, and without conforming to an emergent norm. In
this sense, panicky behavior is simply the individual
behavior of many people under stress in a small place.
For each individual in such a situation, other people
are not person; rather they are objects much like
furniture, to be dealt with during the emergency ." [44]
Implicit in this is a prescripton for the avoidance of
panic: That the message containing the threat also contains the
guidance for appropriate behavior. Panic will not occur unless
people lose their sense of membership. It would seem, then,
that the phrase, "we are all in this together," strives to deny
a pre-condition of panic.
When contemplating the problem of panic, one useful dis-
tinction for public officials to grasp is the difference between
anxiety and fear.
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"Fear, rather than anxiety, is the effective
component of the panic reaction. Along one dimension
at least, fear and anxiety may be thought of as poles
of continuum. This is in regard to the specificity of
a threat from the viewpoint of the individual. The
fear-stricken individual perceives some highly ego-
involved value greatly endangered. The threat is
something that can be labeled, localized in space, and
therefore potentially can be escaped from. The threat
is specific. In contrast, there is no such recogni-
tion and judgment by the anxiety-stricken person.
Anxiety is marked by an inability to designate any
object in the environment to account for the diffuse
sense of foreboding, or even dread, the individual is
experiencing. This inability prevents any attempts at
flight, for physical withdrawal requires a specific
object or situation from which an orientation can be
taken. " [45
]
One situation might be created which would not fit the
above description: The real or imagined dimunition of supply of
a vital, or thought to be vital, commodity. A recent example of
a "panic environment" would be the way in which people treated
each other during the 1973 gasoline shortage, where no physical
entrapment occurred. From personal observation, I (and others)
can attest to the fact that fellow seekers of fuel became
objectified and were "dealt with like furniture" in pursuit of
the fuel. Similar accounts exist in the descriptions of the
"bank panic" of 1929.
The historic view of panic tends to be that panic is
irrational, based on hysterical belief, a contagion of emotion.
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Recent sociology challenges this description. One of the most
quoted experts, Wolfenstein, has listed phenomena which occur
during a panic situation:
"Intense personal terror, fear-induced behavior
that is useless or destructive, unnecessary group
flight from a danger felt as imminent and overwhelm-
ing; a group situation, in which others are seen as
rivals or obstacles to escape; and a group situation
in which people hurt or destroy others in the effort
to save themselves. "[46]
Other sociologists (Smelser, et al) conclude that a
necessary pre-condition of panic is entrapment:
"Based on the above summary, there are four main
factors which are characteristic of the panic-pro-
ducing situation.
1. Partial Entrapment
There is one, or at best, an extremely limited
number of escape routes from a situation
dominated by:
2. A perceived threat
The threat may be physical or psychological,
or a combination of both, and it is usually
regarded as being so imminent that there is no
time to do anything but escape.
3. Partial or complete breakdown of the escape
route
.
The escape route becomes blocked off, or
jammed, or it is overlooked.
4. Front- to- rear communication failure.
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The false assumption that the exit is still
open leads people in the rear ... to advance
toward it. .
.
people . . . infer the direc-
tion of escape . . . from the fact that
other people are moving in a specific
direction. " [48]
A key ingredient to avoiding panic is preparedness by pub-
lic officials concerning appropriate responses in fear-provoking
situations. Failure to act in a decisive fashion may have
serious implications.
"Persons in panic feel powerless to bring the
threat itself under control, but they do not despair
of getting out of danger by fleeing.
"Very often, the feeling of personal powerless-
ness is greatly reinforced by social interaction. At
first, prople may feel individually powerless and be
greatly afraid. Yet, they may expect or hope others
will be able to cope with the danger. When the
responses of the others, however, indicate that they,
too, are powerless or have even suffered the conse-
quences, panic becomes probable. "[49
]
The Proper Dosage of Fear
If one wishes to warn about a dangerous circumstance, it is
important that the fear level raised in the recipient be neither
too high, nor too low. There exists what is called, "The Proper
Dosage of Fear."
"To produce successful emotional inoculation, it
is necessary to interfere with the person' s spontane-
ous efforts to ward off his awareness of the signs of
impending danger. "[50]
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Public officials reluctant to issue warnings for fear of
frightening the public could draw comfort from a study of the
state of preparedness of people undergoing surgery. The study
indicates that three general categories of patients existed:
1. Those who were extremely anxious before and after
surgery. These people felt vulnerable to body damage.
Their post-surgery behavior was a continuation of their
general life-attitude - one of anxiety.
2. The very calm. They minimized the danger, denied the
possibility of pain and suffering. Their post-surgery
behavior was angry, upset and resentful. Most of this
group had been told little of what to expect, and were
psychologically unprepared.
3. The moderately fearful. They solicited, and received
information about what to expect. Post-surgery
discomfort was no surprise. [51
]
This was verified in another study, which concluded that,
"greater anticipatory fear is not consistently related to
greater tolerance of stress. Instead, both high fear and low
fear are associated with low tolerance for stress. And . . .
high tolerance for stress is located in the middle of the fear
continuity. " [52
]
A theoretical concept has evolved, called, "The Work of
Worrying.
"
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We can see more easily what the work of worrying accom-
plishes if we look at what is likely to happen if a person fails
to undertake it.
~ little or no anticipatory fear
- no mental rehearsal of impending danger
- feelings of helplessness when the danger
materializes
- disappointment in protective authorities
- increased expectations of vulnerability
- intense fear and anger
Failure to carry out the work of worrying can be expected
if a stressful event occurs under any of the following condi-
tions: (1) If the person is accustomed to suppressing anticipa-
tory fear by means of denial defenses, by over-optimism and by
avoiding warnings that would stimulate the work of worrying; (2)
If the stressful event is so sudden that it cannot be prepared
for; and (3) If an adequate prior warning is not given or if
strong, but false, reassurances encourage the person to believe
that he is invulnerable.
Other studies on the psychological effects of severe ill-
ness, of community disasters and of combat dangers, provide many
bits of evidence consistent with the findings of the surgery
research described above. They suggest that, if a normal person
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is given accurate prior warning of impending pain and discom-
fort, together with sufficient reassurances so that fear does
not mount to a very high level, he will be less likely to
develop acute emotional disturbances than a person who is not
warned. [53]
A public official, then, does a greater injustice to the
public by withholding information than by giving an accurate
appraisal of the situation.
Coping; Good and Bad Warning Recipients
In September, 1975, the American Health Foundation held a
symposium on preventative medicine. [55] Presentations reviewed
the various attempts made by the medical profession to alter
hazardous behavior on the part of smokers, drinkers, drivers,
overweight people, cancer-prone populations and hypertension
sufferers.
After reviewing the rather depressing results of many
attempts to warn members of the above groups, the following
summary of the non-compliers (people who do not hear or act on
warnings) was compiled:
"1. Seat belt users are better educated, more recep-
tive to new products, and approve of modern
medicines
.
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2. People who have "a significant number of others"
who want them to stop smoking, will. This also
includes parents of children who stop out of a
concern for their children.
3. Having a friend injured (but not killed) in an
auto accident has a beneficial effect on the use
of seatbelts.
4. Patients with health ailments related to smoking
are better able to quit than those without related
ailments. Patients with less severe medical prob-
lems are more likely to follow advice than those
with more severe illnesses.
5. Seat belt users tend to avoid risk in other
situations . "[55 ]
It might appear that some of the factors noted in the air
raid warning studies (compliance, if one had significant
others), the panic literature (too serious a situation breeds
situation breeds fatalism) and in the flood literature (it is
not a problem if it is not a problem for me) appear in the above
studies, also.
In the American Health Foundation summary (referred to in
the section on warning literature), the effect of one's sense of
control over one's life is again apparent:
"Those smokers who were able to stop smoking had
a less fatalistic attitude about life when compared to
non-smokers. Smokers who try to give up the habit
tend to have high aggressive needs, and low deference.
Those who succeeded also have low affiliation, low
change and high achievement needs. "[56]
Interestingly, it would seem that a predilection should
exist among elected policy makers, officials, etc., to heed
warnings
,
since they would seem to fall more often into the
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general categories for a "good" warning recipient than the
general population, It should be noted, however, that this
generalization is drawn from one example (smoking) when the
alternative behavior is known (not smoking) and the behavior
change is within the power of the individual to accomplish.
"One study . . .done in 1953, showed that those
individuals who felt unable to manage and control
their own personal affairs were unable to think of
several ways of meeting emergencies; they had little
confidence in the likelihood of others controlling
larger affairs, had less information about national
events because, they said there was nothing they could
do in such matters. These people paid little atten-
tion to what was available in the news about threats
to society at large. "[57]
In addition to considering oneself "able" to respond to a
situation, people seem more inclined to hear warnings of
problems when they already know of solutions.
In 1973, while teaching in the Global Survival Program at
the University of Massachusetts, I and several other faculty
members observed an interesting phenomenon. Many students in
this program, which was intended to introduce selected freshmen
to the range of issues impacting upon global survial, began to
drop out. These students, including many of the best informed
and dedicated Freshmen attending the University, explained that
they were overwhelmed with the complexity and hopelessness of
the issues. "I just can't handle it." was the common refrain.
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So serious an issue did low attendance become, that the
faculty of the program launched a special, informal investiga-
tion into the possible solutions. What emerged was a strong
recommendation that each time a problem was framed, one or
several solutions should be posed at the same time. After
several false starts, this model was firmed up, and has since
been used successfully. It is apparent that the teaching of
future studies, ecology, bio-sciences and other fields providing
survey-depth acquaintanceship with complex problems of
threatening nature must devote some considerable energy to
framing individually implementable solutions, so as to enable
the students to "hear" the problem at all.
Summary
A "good," or receptive warning recipient, then, would be
one who:
® Has a high school diploma
• Has high self-esteem and high achievement needs
• Has had personal experience with a similar or
related problem and has coped effectively in the
past
• Is married or has a "family" to be responsible
for
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• Has access to officials to verify data
• Feels that one's actions can affect a situation
• Has a strong sense of control over his own life
A "bad," or unreceptive warning recipient:
• Is either very poor or very rich, highly educated or has
had little education
• Never has experienced a problem similar to the one he is
being warned about
• Has few skills useful in this particular crisis
• Has little access to authoritative sources for verifica-
tion (the poor and uneducated), or if such access
exists, a bewildering array of opinions are available
which contradict each other (the rich and highly
educated)
• Feels "nothing I do will make any difference"
• Tends to be either a fearful individual in other
situations, or a "macho" type who ignores all warnings.
Strategies for Effective Warnings
According to Janis, a useful strategy to consider when
designing a warning implementation scheme would be one which
forced the recipients to have to act as if the situation were
real. For example: Janis took a group of female smokers and
101
put them through a role-playing sequence having to do with lung
cancer
.
"Five scenes were acted out. In one, the
'physician' pointed out the X-ray indications of a
malignant mass in the patient's lung as he gave her
the bad news that diagnostic tests indicated the
presence of lung cancer.
"In the last scene, the 'cancer victim' was asked
to think over the news while waiting for the physician
to arrange for her hospitalization to undergo lung
surgery. She was asked to express her spontaneous
personal responses, just as if the situation actually
confronted her.
"Role-playing proved to be an extraordinarily
disquieting experience, but the subjects apparently
were able to to tolerate a high level of fear without
mobilizing resistances.
"In a follow-up study conducted 18 months after
the role-playing episode, the experimental subjects
continued to report a significantly greater decrease
in the number of cigarettes smoked than did the young
women in the control group. This long-term outcome
indicates that a single, one-hour session of emotional
role-playing can have a profound long-term effect upon
smokers who initially have no intention of cutting
down on cigarette consumption. And the results
suggest that significant changes in smoking habits may
persist for years. "[58]
It must be noted that this finding contradicts the findings
of the effectiveness of air-raid warnings referred to earlier,
where subjects reported that asignal associated with an air-raid
drill was not a signal for an air-raid - it was a signal for a
drill. However, we should also note that the nature of the
problem was different - smoking is an individual decision
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over which one has a certain amount of control, whereas avoiding
an air-raid puts one in a very reactive position, giving those
involved little time to make decisions and little control over
the outcome of events.
An extremely cogent recommendation concerning ways of
communicating information with high anxiety-producing content
was produced for the Civil Defense effort of the '60' s. Civil
Defense officials suggested the use of positive incentives, when
possible, such as making people aware of the damages they could
possible avoid by heeding the warning. Alternately, they
suggest that negative incentives might be used effectively when
the warning recipient has some familiarity with the the negative
outcome
.
"Learning usually is more effective when positive
incentives can be used. In civil defense, we have
customarily used the threat of punishment. Communica-
tions about civil defense usually emphasize the
dangers of being blinded, rendered sterile, or of
being obliterated. To avoid these threatened dangers,
people are expected to learn complex instructions
about civil defense; to invest their time, energy and
money in elaborate precautions; and to steel them-
selves for the holocaust. It is very difficult to
teach such complex, highly skilled responses under the
threat of punishment.
"If threat of punishment is to be effective, the
source of punishment must be localized in space and
time. Spankings are effective in preventing children
from playing in the street because children can see
the street and they know that one step too many means
quick punishment. The threat of atomic disaster is
not so concrete; you cannot see it, have never experi-
enced it, and consequently, can make believe it does
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• When questioned or challenged, have firm, positive
accurate responses and don' t panic or show uncertainty
• Sought, and obtained the help of major employees in the
area in establishing models of appropraite behavior and
training programs
• Give the public a realistic assessment of the situation
and do not attempt to "hide" information or "protect"
the public.
"Worst Case" disaster scenario .
The problem :
• Never happened before, at least not in the impacted
region; no area familiarity or body of coping
experience
« Has no forewarning and a very rapid speed of onset
© Is repetitive, with a short time between repeats; the
worst exposure occurring first, causing no effective
coping behavior; subsequent occurrences are close in
time
• Has a long duration
• Affects a major geographic area, at least a bio-region,
but because of its unique nature, few resources exist
for quick mobilization. The maximum confusion exists
among overlapping political jurisdictions
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• Is invisible, has maximum life hazard, low property
hazard
• Is unpredictable in its range, scope, spread, speed
Has no known means of control
• Requires skills beyond those of the average person or
beyond the community's immediate resources.
The Officials :
• Cannot come to any agreement among themselves about
nature, size, impact and seriousness of problem and
therefore issue contradictory, fragmented alerts which
contain no coping instructions or contain harmful ones
• Cannot agree on coping behavior
• Have no experience with the problem, or anything
similar; or if they have had any previous experience,
they failed at coping, and never found out why
Failed to brief media, held them at arms' length; when
questioned, appeared rattled, defensive and uncertain
• Neglected all existing social leadership in issuing
coping instructions - put an unknown in the position of
authority
• Issued soothing, rather than informative, statements
(particularly trusted media figures).
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Warning Recipient :
® Is very highly educated, or has a low educational level,
attends no church, is affiliated with few social groups,
and is less than 15, or older than 50
• Lives alone, or with peers, with either all women or
none in unit
•
Works far from place of residence in a small organiza-
tion which is unrelated to problem; employer has not
taken alert seriously, and discourages employees doing
so
• Has no experience with the problem, or anything
resembling it
• Has a world view which has little or no room for the
problem (disaster alert) in it
• Has neighbors who disregard the warning publicly
® Received the warning from a source they are suspicious
of
• Has no experience-base upon which to base any coping
behavior
Is with peers when warning is received.
106
Summary
Messages that contain an implied bit of bad news (such as
an energy conservation message) are different in kind from mes-
sages that simply exhort or cause one to aspire to a different
station in life. For example, a new car advertisement appeals
to many motivations in us all, such as pride, "keeping up with
the Joneses," "sex appeal," etc., because no threat occurs.
If the message contains a threat (such as implied warning
about higher utility bills), then it evokes a mental defensive
mechanism in the recipient that causes them to block hearing
it.
In other words, within certain bounds, the more threatening
the problem, the less likely the recipient is to hear the
message .
A variety of strategies and methodologies exist to counter
this tendency. Messages containing bad news are effective if
they:
® Contain authority figures of three kinds (Political -
Technical - Uniformed).
• They must be in agreement.
• The message should not be delivered in places of work,
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but should go to the home, church or other areas where
families gather.
• Decision makers will act out of protecting loved ones
who depend on them - not to protect themselves. Appeals
to family are critical.
• Each warning must contain an individually implementable
action that will help the recipient cope. It does no
good to say that electric prices will go up and that the
government will solve the problem. The warning will be
repressed. The correct formula must include a directive
such as, "Turn down your hot water heater and wrap it in
insulation." The warning will be retained only to the
degree the listener feels empowered to by the message.
One of the major thrusts of any campaign should be to
emphasize that conservation means the saving of money
,
increased
comfort and other positive attributes, and debunk the unfor-
tunate feeling that conservation means sacrifice or suffering.
No pictures of dignitaries in sweaters or turning down thermo-
stats should be used. Instead, the emphasis may be, for
example, on how much more comfortable and less drafty the house
is since storm windows were added, and how the electric bill
went down, as well.
We have created a set of assumptions about the optimal
conditions for delivering warnings. Our next effort is to test
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these assumptions. If these assumptions prove viable, they can
be treated as guidelines to be used in Franklin County to help
it cope with the energy problems we have described earlier.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYZING ENERGY WARNING CAMPAIGNS
The previous discussion of the issuance of warning
information provides a useful framework with which to evaluate
attempts to cope with various aspects of the energy "crisis."
Having once conceptualized a formula for delivering
warnings, the next step is to apply the process to the energy
problem and evaluate the effectiveness of the process. I
selected television and radio commercial campaigns on various
aspects of energy as a way to see if the inherent warning in the
commercials was retained. Only campaigns that had documentable
evaluations were used in drawing conclusions.
The communication efforts chosen for evaluation are elec-
tric utility advertising campaigns designed to warn consumers
about the coming of high electric rates, and/or to urge
conserving energy as a way of coping with rate increases.
If this review of the warning commercials supports the
warning theory discussed in the last chapter, then I feel
confident in using the guidelines to develop and present an
alternative future for Franklin County, and have reasonable
confidence it will be implemented.
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Campaign Visibility Indices
The following terms are presented to allow comparison of
campaigns. These terms provide a statistical procedure to
discuss certain aspects of the campaign.
Reach . Refers to the total number of people to whom you deliver
a message. It is an important gauge with which to measure
success in the promotion of new concepts and products.
Frequency . Refers to the number of times a message is delivered
within a given period (usually a week). Six deliveries are the
threshold which must be reached before frequency is considered
significant enough to be counted. Frequency is most important
with established products or concepts.
Continuity . The number of weeks a message is continuously
aired.
Gross rating points . Gross rating points is the reach, times
the frequency, for a given week. It is possible to compare
media strategies by comparing the gross rating points per
dollars invested in each plan. Advertisers usually prefer a
minimum of 100 to 150 GRP per week.
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Focus group . A small group, composed of representatives of
target audience members which are shown draft commercials or
written advertisements. A trained group leader leads the
discussion to elicit spontaneous comments on the proposed spots.
Tape recordings are made and analyzed. The results help shape
the subsequent redesign of the advertisements.
Analysis of Campaigns
"You Have the Power to Save" - Florida Public Service
Commission . A series of radio and television commercials were
produced for the Florida Public Service Commission during 1981
to warn citizens of skyrocketing electric bills if conservation
was not practiced. The FPSC had mandated all utilities in
Florida to implement Residential Conservation Service type audit
programs to teach energy conservation and wanted the campaign to
generate audit requests. The three TV and six radio spots
(Spring '81) did amazingly well in motivating consumers.
Using the tag line, "You Have the Power to Save," the spots
used the concepts described in the second chapter. The commer-
cials featured family groups. They emphasized saving money and
people looking out for each other. Each spot taught a different
energy conservation tip (change air conditioning filters, turn
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down and wrap water heaters, etc.), and demonstrated effective-
ness of the tips, using family members
. . . thereby empowering
viewers with individually implementable solutions to the energy
problem.
An evaluation form was given to each auditor, for comple-
tion by the homeowner during the audit. Over 5,000 audits were
requested, and of the 865 evaluation forms returned after the
two-month campaign, 380 (44%) had requested their audit as a
result of the commercials, and 413 (47%) had taken the action
suggested by the commercial. [1
]
"Waste Watchers 11 - Potomac Electric Power Company . PEPCO had
four spots produced which use a "Waste Watchers" theme. Using
professional performers, the spots teach simple do-it-yourself
tips. The spots end with an offer of a free brochure. Accord-
ing to PEPCO's chief of advertising, Mr. David Boyce, [2] the
campaign is extremely successful. Within one-half hour of
airing, the spots generated about 50 requests for the instruc-
tional booklet. The campaign is designed with a reach of 90 and
a frequency of 9.
According to Mr. Boyce, non-statistical research (such as
focus groups), reveals that:
• Unaided recall of the spots is 53%. This means that
about one-half of the people they asked remembered the
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spot without prompting. This is exceptionally high.
• People who saw the spot said they liked the utility
better immediately. This was traced to what PEPCO
describes as "Defeating the Monopoly," by teaching
people how to have control over a previously
uncontrollable situation; thus lowering the potential
for anger.
• People who had seen the tips and acted on them were an
educated group. They generally had a greater knowledge
of relevant information than the norm. This fits in
with the Dissemination of Innovation Theory
, [3] which
posits that adoption of innovative practices in a
society begins with "risk takers" and moves to "early
adopters," who are better educated. Going through this
phase is essential to widespread penetration.
Water Widget and Snug Plug Campaign" - New England Electric
Company . The New England Electric Company (a holding company
composed of Massachusetts Electric, Granite State Massachusetts
Electric and New England Power) developed a campaign involving
customers receiving premiums. Based on customer response, the
campaign is considered highly successful.
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The spots demonstrate how to take an action that will save
energy. After demonstrating the action (installation of a flow
restrictor, installation of a wall outlet gasket), the announcer
indicates that New England Electric will send the necessary
gaskets or flow restrictors, free for the asking. New England
Electric has one million residential meters in place. In the
instance of the flow restrictor, 505,000 were requested (or
roughly half of their customers), as the direct result of an
eight week campaign designed with a reach of 77, and a frequency
of 6. During the Fall of 1977, the spots ran three times a week
on TV, and 10 to 15 times a week on radio. The response was
phenomenal
.
During the "Snug Plug" campaign run in the Fall of 1978,
again eight weeks long - with a reach of 80 and a frequency of 6
- 263,000 people requested the free snug plugs. Again, an
awesome response.
I judge these two spots to be the most effective of their
kind, in large part for two reasons: First, after issuing the
warning, they empowered by teaching. Secondly, they empowered
by providing the item related to the action demonstrated on the
spot. In other words, they fit the criteria outlined in Chapter
2.
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"Low Cost/No Cost" ~ U.S. Department of Energy . The "Low Cost/
No Cost" campaign of DOE is, in my judgment, the best and most
researched of the Federal Government campaigns. As a result,
the evaluations are so comprehensive and dense with information
that abstracting was not effective. I quote here liberally from
the evaluation summary. [5]
"The Low Cost/No Cost Energy Conservation Program
was developed by the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) to
inform New England homeowners of 11 inexpensive
actions they could take to save up to 25 percent on
their residential energy bills.
"During the month of November, 1979, DOE conduc-
ted the Low Cost/No Cost Program in Massachusetts,
Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maine, and New
Hampshire. The purpose of the program was to motivate
consumers to take the recommended low cost/no cost
actions which save energy and help control increasing
energy costs. The $2.6 million dollar program
consisted of a strong multi-media marketing effort
with the following components:
• An integrated, $1 million dollar paid adver-
tising campaign, including television, radio
and print. Approximately 90 percent of the
New England population was reached during the
Low Cost/No Cost campaign.
• Direct distribution, through the U.S. Postal
Service, of the Low Cost/No Cost Energy Savers
Booklet and a water flow controller for use in
the shower to 4.5 million New England house-
holds .
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• Strong public awareness activities, including
press conferences with Governors of five of
the six states, television and radio public
affairs talk shows and newspaper articles and
editorials
.
"The program was initially developed by the DOE
during the Spring of 1979 in response to the projected
shortage of heating oil stock in New England and the
likelihood of higher heating oil prices. The six New
England states were chosen to test the program because
of the region' s heavy dependence on heating oil and
the severe winter weather. If a typical New England
household followed the 11 low cost/no cost actions
referred to in the booklet, DOE estimated they could
save up to 25 percent of their home energy bill. Yet,
all of the low cost/no cost actions could be completed
for less than a total of $100; some actions could be
completed without any cost."
Using a variety of statistical techniques, the evaluation
suggests that:
• A significantly greater percentage of New England house-
holds reported completing several low cost/no cost
actions, compared to a control sample of households in
New York.
• A significantly greater percentage of Low Cost/No Cost
Booklet readers reported completing six low cost/no cost
actions, compared to non-readers in New England.
• A larger number of households in New England who read
the booklet live in homes heated with fuel oil than
would be expected in the sample.
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Although not statistically significant in comparison to
the control group, many households in New England
reported taking low cost/no cost recommended actions
after the program began.
• An exposure rate (frequency) of three to four television
advertisements per week was correlated with a greater
number of low cost/no cost actions completed by
households
.
• Viewers of the low cost/no cost television advertising
rated the ads as comparable to commercial advertising.
It should be clear from the above summary of the evaluation
results that the Low Cost/No Cost Energy Conservation Program
did affect the reported conservation behavior of New England
households. In addition to providing an evaluation of program
effectiveness, the research provides insight for planning future
efforts
.
"First, it appears that the shower flow control
device provided positive incentive to households to
adopt the low cost/no cost action. This is one of the
few times (if not the first) that a conservation cam-
paign has provided the actual product to the customer.
It appears that this strategy acted as a trigger to
getting the households to implement other actions.
(emphasis added)
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"Second, Advertising is important, but it is also
important to place the ads in such a way that the
right number of exposures is ' achieved to produce
maximum impact. This means that making media-buy
decisions, using the gross ratings points criterion
alone is an inappropriate strategy. Buying breadth of
coverage with a specific exposure rate in mind appears
to be a better strategy.
The evaluation consisted of:
• Telephone surveys of 1,207 single family New England
households compared with a control group of 604 western
New York State households.
® Day-after-recall tests of a sample of 305 household
determine the memorability of television advertising
The Low Cost/No Cost integrated marketing campaign was
successful along the parameteters used to evaluate the
program, including:
• Memorability of the media advertising.
• Readership of the Low Cost/No Cost Booklet.
• Recommended actions reportedly taken since
November in New England in comparison to a
control group in New York.
"As a direct result of the Low Cost/No Cost
Program, 29 percent of the New England households
sample reported they had installed water flow control-
lers, compared to only 2 percent of the control group
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of households in New York State. In addition, com-
pared to the control group, 19.4 percent more New
England households made furnace efficiency modifica-
tions during November, and 16.1 percent more house-
holds in New England checked for gaps in their fire-
places. These are based on questionnaire responses
weighted for population distribution in New England
and New York.
"According to the strict research methodology
that was used for the evaluation, only the percentages
indicated above can be directly attributed to the Low
Cost/No Cost Program alone. However, many of the
other tips were carried out by large numbers of New
England households during November. For example, 30
percent of the households set back their water heater
thermostat, and 44 percent checked for outside air
leaks.
"An estimate of dollar savings was derived from
three of the recommendations (installing the flow
controller, making furnace modifications and insula-
ting ductwork) selected on the basis of raw score
score significance. Dollar savings were estimated at
$69 million this year, or $345 million dollars over a
five-year period. These dollar savings result from an
estimated energy savings equivalent to 2.6 million
barrels of oil per year, of which 1.6 million is a
direct reduction in oil use. The estimated annual
return on the government investment for these actions
taken as a result of the New England Low Cost/No Cost
Program is approximately $25 saved for every $1
spent. "[5]
"You Only Pay for What You Use" - Gulf Power . Gulf Power had
two campaigns underway, each instructive in different ways.
The first campaign, focusing on the theme, "You Only Pay
for What You Use," is a "shut it off if you're not using it"
campaign. It does provide instruction in the form of simple
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tips, similar to the Florida PSC campaign discussed previously,
but on a more elementary level. Since Gulf Power is experi-
encing rate increases due to construction, this campaign is part
of an attempt to defuse some of the resulting hostility.
In a spot check run on this campaign's effectiveness, the
phrase, "You Only Pay for What You Use" scored highest in
recognition of all Gulf Power's list of phrases, in spite of
relatively little comparative air time. This supports my notion
that empowering people with individually implementable solutions
enhances memory.
In the second campaign, Gulf Power used utility employees
as spokespersons to deliver the messages. This achieved two
goals. First, the viewer is being asked to conserve by someone
who obviously works at the operations level of the company (the
"expert"). This gives the viewer a sense of hearing directly
from "the inside." Second, the spokespersons are identifiably
Southern - hometown, competent folks. It is the most effective
use of identification (the relationship between viewer and
on-air talent) that I saw.
"Fuel Oil Conservation Campaign" - U.S. Department of Energy.
The Department of Energy, Office of Building and Community
Systems, ran a campaign called, "Fuel Oil Conservation Marketing
Program. "[7] In preparation for the campaign, eight focus
125
groups were conducted. Since the campaign focused on oil con-
servation, many questions about the relationship between the
fuel oil supplier and the oil customer existed. During the
focus groups, favorable attitudes were expressed toward govern-
ment (Federal or State) as a source of unbiased information.
Other findings of the focus group:
• Consumers indicated they would like more information on
exactly what would be done during the advertised oil
burning test.
• A proposed personal letter from the fuel oil dealer to
the customer drew the most response.
•
Dealers over-estimated the effectiveness of their
previous campaigns (which they had not evaluated).
• In this particular case, since local dealers were
available, direct mail and local newspaper advertise-
ments were probably most effecive, and it was felt that
the ads should be localized by including dealers' names
and perhaps be paid for jointly.
Authority figures were important.
The campaign did not run smoothly and little evaluation was
done. Of the ten states, only Massachusetts conducted any re-
search and that was discontinued early. The campaign literally
defied evaluation.
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"The original consumer advertising objective
of the FOCM Program was to inform consumers about the
benefits of the energy efficient modification."
"While this objective is legitimate, it could
have been made more directive by building in a
specific goal statement. For example, a revised
version might read as follows:
"To establish awareness of energy saving modifi-
cations by 50 percent by 1985, and to achieve a level
of 15 percent of total target audience participating
in home efficiency tests by 1985.
"This objective has the following effects: It
mandates consumer research to etablish base awareness
and to track changes; it also directs the advertising
by influencing media strategy to emphasize reach and
frequency of the message versus continuity of the
campaign. By restating each program objective in
terms which require performance measurement, the total
program would become more specific and would better
serve as a demonstration for other projects.
"One other aspect of this program's problems can
be traced to a lack of unified long-term planning
direction. A consulting firm, an advertising agency,
a public relations firm, ten state energy offices, ten
state-level Fuel Oil Jobbers' Councils and two differ-
ent management teams at BCS/DOE all had input at
various planning levels. The need to satisfy this
many people created a marketing program distinguished
by its lack of single-mindedness. "[8]
"Mass Save" - 50 Cooperating Massachusetts Utilities . [9 ] "Mass
Save" is a Massachusetts statewide consortia of utilities, both
gas and electric, that banded together for the purpose of imple-
menting the Residential Conservation Service. They hired a
company to implement the audit program, which in turn, hired an
advertising firm to design a campaign to announce the program.
127
The advertising firm, Harold Cabot Co. (also responsible for the
New England Electric Campaign discussed elsewhere) did very
rigorous professional advertising development, including focus
groups, pre- and post-testing, etc.
The campaign is a slick series of 10— and 30— second spots
around the notion that conservation audits save consumers
money. The campaign involved PSA spots for television and
radio, as well as pamphlets distributed through a variety of
channels
.
In terms of use of motivation technique, the 10- second
spot on the demonstration tape weaves together family, saving
money and taking responsibility. Because this is a PSA
campaign, reach and frequency figures are not available.
However, the utilities report that significant requests for
audits resulted from the campaign.
"Save It, Florida 11 - Governor's Energy Office of Florida. A
campaign that demonstrated very skillful use of a
professionally-prepared media package intended for public
service distribution was undertaken by the Governor's Energy
Office of the State of Florida. [10]
The spots consist of a series of shots of a huge oil tanker
on the open sea. Dramatic music and an authoritative, almost
"military," voice says that people who waste energy hurt our
side and help theirs. The spots are very well produced.
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I tested reactions to these spots in a workshop of media
relations people in California in early August, 1981. The short
responses were significant: "Frightening," "Shut me down,"
"Makes me angry," "I feel insecure - out of control," "There is
no hope," "War will come," "I feel at someone's mercy," "Dumb,"
"Slick piece of propaganda." The consensus was that no one
would choose to watch it, if given a choice.
This again supports the findings of the warnings chapter,
in that sounding an alarm without providing a proposed action to
cope with the problem resulted in rejection of the message, and
no compliance.
"Solar Awareness and Commercialization" - Western Sun . Develop-
ed as part of Western Sun's State Special Projects, this direct
mail test campaign[ll] was an ambitious attempt to utilize mass
marketing and communications techniques to impact the level of
solar awareness and commercialization in the key Southern
California market.
Parker/Dodd conducted a direct mail test campaign of 99,917
pieces, mailed on March 20, 1981. The goal of the campaign was
to test response to a mailer that explained several tax incen-
tives for the installation of solar hot water heating systems.
In addition, the mailer invited people to attend local public
education seminars and asked them if they would like to receive
more information about solar heating systems.
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The brochure was mailed to sample groupings from 16 differ-
lists in order to test the response rate from audiences with
widely varying demographic characteristics.
The response pattern indicated that people on mailing lists
associated with empowerment of individuals (buyers of "How-To"
books, etc.) did respond at a much higher rate than those on
mailing lists of non-self empowering mailing lists.
Summary
Although few campaigns were systematically evaluated and
some organizations considered the results of their campaigns
proprietary, I was able to identify several important factors by
analyzing those campaigns for which an evaluation and copies of
the advertisement were available.
First, campaigns that offer a premium - a free energy con-
servation item such as a flow restrictor or free information
booklets, were very effective. This was especially the case
when the premium was coupled with a demonstration of a simple
action the viewer could take to save energy and money. It was
obvious that empowerment of individuals brought high response.
Second, areas with a strong regional identity were
apparently more responsive to messages delivered by on-the-air
talent with similar characteristics. Spots which coupled
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appeals for consumer responsibility with suggestions for actions
to be taken are also effective. In general, spots which give
the viewer a sense of of his or her own power to effect the
situation are considerably more effective than those which only
describe the problem without any demonstration of a useful
response to it.
Appeals to patriotism, helping the utility or scare tactics
are not nearly as effective as direct guidance on how to save
money and maintain the security of one's family.
This confirms the theories advanced in previous chapters
regarding the format of warnings. We have seen that tradi-
tional energy sources will not be availableor affordable to the
United States in desirable quantities by the year 2000. We have
found that many Americans do not believe this to be true. We
have developed ways of communicating the message so its chances
of being heard are high. Now the task is to develop the mes
sage. A key factor is that each warning should contain an
individually implementable action to help resolve the problem, a
major step is to define a heretofore "national" problem in a
more manageable size - a problem where people can grasp the
dimensions, and their role in the solution. For this I have
chosen Franklin County, Massachusetts and its energy problem
as
a prototype.
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CHAPTER IV
ONE COUNTY'S ENERGY CRISIS*
Description of the County
Franklin County, located in northwestern Massachusetts, is
extremely rural in character. Only one of its 26 towns has a
population greater than 10,000 people. The 1975 population of
63,337 persons represents 1.1 percent of the state total.
Between 1950 and 1975, the county population increased by 20
percent. However, for the same period of time, the number of
persons per household decreased from 3.25 to 2.74. About 64
percent of the households in the county are classified as low to
moderate income. The 1970 median income was $7,987 for families
and unrelated individuals, which was seven percent lower than
the state average. Approximately 75 percent of the housing
stock in the county was constructed before 1950. Sixty-six
percent of the 1970 housing stock was single family, and only
since 1965 has there been any volume of multi-family housing
construction; between 1970 and 1975, 54 percent of the building
permits issued were for multi- family construction. [1
]
*This chapter was originally researched as part of the Franklin
County Energy Project Team, under the day-to— day supervision
of Mr. David Pomerantz, with myself responsible for overall
project supervision. In order to utilize the findings, I have
drastically edited the paper and updated some figures in order
to utilize them. The original work contained herein was mine
in conceptualization and direction, but others did the
research. Responsibility for editing is mine alone.
132
133
The economic base of the county is comprised of basic
industries which export goods and services outside the county.
The firms employing the largest number of people are those which
manufacture taps, dies and tools. Employment in manufacturing,
agriculture and other industries has declined since 1950, while
employment increases have occurred in the service sector, retail
trade, finance-insurance-real estate, and construction cate-
gories. Other important activities which support the county's
economy are forest product, tourism, recreation and private
education. The county produces 30 percent of the state's maple
syrup and provides forest products such as timber, wood products
and furniture. [2]
Historic Energy Use Patterns
In order to develop an energy use scenario for the year
2000, 1975 was selected as the pivotal point between the past
and the future. Energy consumption by sector, by end use and by
cost, was calculated for the period 1950-1975. Energy purchased
by the end-user rather than that consumed by the producer was
considered in order to present trends and patterns more clearly.
In examining consumption, the residential, commercial, indus-
trial, transportation and utility sectors were examined; but
after that, the utility sector was dropped, as it was accounted
for in energy use consumption.
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No actual county data was available for 1950-1960. Con-
sumption was estimated by extrapolating back from 1960, using
energy data from the Federal Energy Data Series (FEDS) [3] at an
average annual growth rate of 5.3 percent.
To determine energy use during 1960-1975, county figures
were derived by extrapolating Franklin County's "fair share" of
the FEDS Series from Massachusetts' total energy use, by taking
county population as a percent of state population. Between
1950 and 1975, the county consistently had 1.1 percent of the
state's total population.
To check the accuracy of the extrapolation method, 1975
consumption figures were compared to data developed by the
Franklin County Energy Conservation Task Force. They developed
a county energy profile for 1975-1978 by soliciting consumption
information from energy suppliers including utility companies,
natural gas and coal companies, and the Massachusetts Energy
Office. [4] Figures for 1975 matched very closely.
Consumption trends .
• Residential sector consumption rose from 2.0 trillion
BTU's in 1950 to about 3.6 trillion BTU's in 1972, and
dropped to 3.1 trillion BTU's in 1975.
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• Commercial sector consumption grew from 2.0 trillion
BTU's in 1950 to a peak of 4.7 trillion BTU's in 1973
and registered 2.8 trillion BTU's in 1975.
• Industrial sector consumption grew from 1.0 trillion
BTU's in 1950 to a maximum of 2.0 trillion BTU's in
%
1969, dropped to 1.7 trillion BTU's in 1972 and 1973,
and leveled off at 1.5 trillion BTU's in 1975.
• Transportation sector consumption grew from 1.0
trillion BTU's in 1950 to 3.5 trillion BTU's in 1973,
dropped to 3.3 trillion BTU's in 1974 and peaked at 3.4
trillion BTU's in 1975. While Franklin County resi-
dents drive more fuel efficient cars than the rest of
the nation, there was a large increase in registered
vehicles between 1970 and 1975.
•
Overall energy consumption went from 6.5 trillion BTU's
in 1950 to 14.5 trillion BTU's in 1975.
Historic Energy Costs
For the period 1950-1975, energy costs were calculated for
the following categories: Cost per million BTU's used; cost in
millions of dollars per sector; gross county cost for all
sectors and energy costs to households.
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TABLE 2
ENERGY USE HISTORY
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS
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• Cost per million BTU's: Rose from $1.32 MMBTU in 1950
to $1.79 MMBTU in 1970; jumped to $3.95 MMBTU in
1975. [5]
• Cost per sector: Each sector showed a moderate
increase in energy costs between 1950 and 1970, and a
%
sharp escalation between 1970 and 1975.
• Gross county cost: Total energy costs rose from $8.2
million in 1950 to $28.2 million in 1970 (+$20 million
in 20 years); from 1970 to 1975, the county's energy
bill increased to $47.7 million, a $19.5 million dollar
increase in five years.
• Energy costs to households: The total cost paid for
energy by everyone living in the county was estimated
to be $23.2 million in 1975 (energy cost to households
equals all residential sector costs plus 75 percent
transportation sector costs. Costs to households rose
from $4.1 million in 1950 to $14.5 in 1970 (for an
increase of $10.4 million dollars in 20 years). From
1970 to 1975, the costs rose $8.7 million. The average
energy bill paid by each household was calculated to
be: $259 in 1950; $529 in 1960; $741 in 1970, and
$1,004 in 1975. Comparing median household income to
household energy costs, it appears that between 1950
and 1970, county residents paid between 9 and 11
COST
IN
DOLLARS
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TABLE 3
ECONOMICS OF ENERGY HISTORY
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS
1950-1975
COST PER MILLION BTU'S* USED
*1 BTU = THE AMOUNT OF HEAT REQUIRED TO RAISE
THE TEMPERATURE OF 1 LB. OF WATER 1°F.
MILLIONS
OF
DOLLARS
139
TABLE 4
ECONOMICS OF ENERGY HISTORY
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS
1950-1975
GROSS COST FOR COUNTY
ALL SECTORS
47.7
YEAR
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TABLE 5
ECONOMICS OF ENERGY HISTORY
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS
1950-1975
ENERGY COSTS TO HOUSEHOLDS*
*COSTS INCLUDE PURCHASED ELECTRICITY, PLUS 75%
TRANSPORTATION COSTS, PLUS RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
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percent of their income for energy and for 1970-1975, they
paid 14 percent. [6]
One way of looking at the household energy bill was to
compare household energy costs to the payrolls of major county
employers.' It turned out that the top ten employers in the
county (primarily manufacturing firms) paid their employees only
slightly more than the total household energy cost bill for 1975
($24.5 million in payrolls, compared to $23.2 million in house-
hold energy costs). Conceptually, one might consider that the
top ten employers existed solely to help county residents meet
the costs of their energy needs. The top ten employers
accounted for approximately 25 percent of the 1975 county work
force.
Franklin County's Traditional Energy Future
In order to calculate the future costs of energy to
Franklin County, it is necessary to make several assumptions
about the amount of population growth, future energy and energy
cost
.
The Franklin County Planning Department anticipates that
the county population will increase from the 1970 level of
59,210 to 70,500 by the year 2000. To meet that increase, the
housing stock will grow to 27,500 units. [7] It was assumed that
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the number of persons per household in the year 2000 will remain
at the 1975 level of 2.74
It is difficult to forecast an economic growth rate for the
county. With the absence of local data concerning economic
growth projections, it is unreliable to apply national or state
growth projections to a small, specific region. Economic growth
in the county leveled off during the last decade and certain
business sectors showed a decline in activity. While
Massachusetts is now experiencing a boom in manufacturing
activity, the county is following the national trend of having
manufacturing activities replaced with service-oriented estab-
lishments. Based on interviewing the economic development
officer of the Franklin County Chamber of Commerce, [8] the
assumption was made that economic growth would be slight to
moderate in the county between now and the year 2000.
A survey of ten energy forecast models was done. For the
purpose of this report, I will focus on the most probably one
(based on U.S. energy use since 1973), the so-called Institute
for Energy Analysis Model. [8] In this model, energy use is
presumed to grow 1.4 percent yearly.
Future growth models analyzed . The following models were
examined. Obviously, the one used was conservative.
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AVERAGE ANNUAL ENERGY GROWTH RATE
YEAR 2000
1.1% Ford Foundation - 1974 Study
1.4% Institute for Energy Analysis
Low Model - 1976 Study (model chosen)
1.9% Ford Foundation - 1974 Study
2.0% Energy Research and Development -
1975 Study
2.0% Project Independence Evaluation System
High Conservation Case - F.E.A.
1976 Study
2.1 % Energy Research and Development -
1976 Study
2.3% Institute for Energy Analysis -
1976 Study
3.0% Project Independence Evaluation System
Base Case - F.E.A. 1976 Study
3.1% Bureau of Mines - 1975 Study
3.2% Energy Resarch and Development -
1975 Study
3.4% Energy Research and Development -
1976 Study
3.4% Ford Foundation - 1974 Study
3.9% Project Independence Evaluation System
S 1 3/ bbl Base Case - F.E.A. 1976 Study
Applying the 1.4 percent annual consumption increase of
14.5 trillion BTU's, plus the anticipated population increase,
to the County's base consumption in 1975, yields an annual
consumption of 20 trillion BTU's by the year 2000.
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TABLE 6
ENERGY USE FORECAST
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS
1950-2000
BUSINESS AS USUAL
INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY ANALYSIS, "LOW" MODEL
1.4% YEARLY CONSUMPTION INCREASE
(INCLUDES POPULATION GROWTH ASSUMPTION)
YEAR
YEAR
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
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TABLE 7
ENERGY ECONOMICS FORECAST
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS
1975 - 2000
TRILLIONS
OF BTU'S COST PER ANNUAL COST
CONSUMED MMBTU IN MILLIONS
12.00 $ 3.95 47.40
12.16 4.25 51.68
12.33 4.50 55.49
12.51 5.08 63.55
12.68 8.06 102.20
12.86 11.67 150.07
13.04 12.00 156.48
13.22 12.38 176.88
13.41 12.75 170.97
13.59 13.13 178.43
13.79 13.52 186.44
13.98 13.93 194.74
14.17 14.35 203.83
14.38 14.78 212.53
14.58 15.22 221.90
14.78 15.68 231.75
14.98 16.15 241.92
15.20 16.63 252.77
15.41 17.13 263.97
15.62 17.65 275.69
15.84 18.18 287.97
16.06 18.72 300.64
16.29 19.28 314.07
16.52 19.86 328.08
16.75 20.46 342.70
16.98 21.07 357.76
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TABLE 8
ENERGY ECONOMICS FORECAST
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS
1950-2000
TRADITIONAL ENERGY SUPPLY
GROSS COST FOR COUNTY (ANNUAL)
ALL SECTORS
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
YEAR
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-?.
rice increase forecasts
. Between 1975, when energy coat
Franklin County $3.95 per million BTU's, until 1980, when it
rose to $11.67 per million BTU's, the County suffered a grave
economic shock. This was caused by the soaring oil prices of
Jr
1977-1978, when the Iran-Iraq war, coupled with OPEC reactions,
caused shortages on the world market. The predictable result -
a tripling of oil prices.
For the purpose of this paper, energy is calculated to cost
$11.67 per million BTU's in 1980, with a rise in price of 3
percent per year, in real terms, thereafter. This is an ex-
tremely conservative assumption, as reference to earlier
chapters will verify, and translates to gasoline and fuel oil
cost increases of approximately four cents a gallon annually,
for the next twenty years.
Multiplying the 1.4 percent consumption increase by the 3
percent price increase will yield the anticipated total cost of
Franklin County's energy supply, in constant dollars, for any
given year up to the year 2000.
Summary
The combination of a 1.4 percent growth in energy consump-
tion from 1975 to the year 2000, coupled with a 3 percent real
price increase (calculated here from a 1980 base of $11.67 per
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million BTU's), yields an annual county energy bill of $434
million dollars in the year 2000. If we assume that the same
percentage of fuel used in homes in 1975 will be used in the
year 2000, then, the energy bill for residences will be deter-
mined on a base of 48 percent multiplied times $434 million, or
a whopping $209 million (in 1980 dollars). To leap from a fuel
bill of $23.2 million in 1975 to $209 million in the year 2000
requires an annual increase in wages in the county of $7.43
million dollars - approximately equal to the combined payrolls
of Ervin Paper Mills and Greenfield Tap & Die. Since only a
modest population growth was assumed, this would have to be
simple wage increases - not new jobs. In other words, the
county would have to raise payrolls $7.43 million dollars every
year, just to stay even with the cash flow needs for county
res idents
.
Since such wage increases seem to be out of the question, a
solution worth investigating would be to secure the county's
energy supply from within the county, either by reducing con-
sumption by practicing local conservation, or by using energy
supplies which are locally available. Unfortunately, the county
does not possess oil or natural gas, so our inquiry is limited
to using renewable fuel. Using such locally available energy
sources would stop the outflow of dollars paid for imported
energy and would stabilize the local economy.
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CHAPTER V
Franklin County's Renewable Energy Future*
From a financial feasibility standpoint, it is safe to
assume that Franklin County's energy needs cannot be satisfied
by traditional fuels. We must investigate a substitution plan -
a plan which will identify opportunities for cost effective
conservation and use of renewables. The desired result of this
plan will be a smaller amount of energy demand to be satisfied
than originally forecast. In part, this satisfaction should
come from renewables.
By examining each sector and using assumptions about
conservation potential based on documented experience, we can
derive forecasts for future energy needs.
Residential Sector Conservation
The first step in calculating a future residential energy
demand was to assess what technical fix and conservation
*Portions of this chapter were originally researched as part of
the Franklin County Energy Project under the day-to-day super-
vision of Mr. David Pomerantz, with my overall project super
vision. In order to utilize the findings, I have extensively
edited the text and updated the figures. Although calculations
were made by others, the original work was conceptualized by
me, directed by me and responsibility for editing is mine
alone
.
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measures could be implemented. For reduction in space heating
needs data, the findings of the Energy Conservation Analysis
Project (ECAP)[1] of the University of Massachusetts Cooperative
Extension Service[l] were applied. By conducting numerous home
%
energy audits in Franklin County, the ECAP teams discovered that
if homeowners followed prescribed procedures for insulating and
weatherizing their homes, they could realize an average reduc-
tion of 40 percent in energy demand for space heat. ECAP recom-
mendations included installing insulation to meet the following
standards: R-22 in the ceilings, R-ll in the walls, and R-19 in
the floors. Other key recommendations were to reduce air infil-
tration to .5 air changes per hour by double-glazing all windows
and installing storm doors.
It was also assumed that:
• Appliances in all new and existing housing units will be
replaced or improved to meet the CONAES standards for
efficiency, as discussed under Scenario B of the CONAES
Study; [2]
• New resident construction after 1975 will employ passive
solar design and other energy-efficient planning and
construction techniques;
^ New resident units will be built and insulated to
per
form as well as houses retrofitted to ECAP standards.
This measure will effect a 40 percent reduction in space
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heating demands. Passive solar design will reduce space
heating requirements by another 20 percent.
• New residential units constructed after 1975 will not
use electric resistance heating or electric stoves.
• Per capita energy consumption for lighting, appliances
and other items with electric motors will remain con-
stant between 1975 and 2000.
• Hot water heaters in new residential units will be
located in living spaces, as opposed to the basement, in
order to minimize heat loss.
• To supplement heating requirements, as many refrigera-
tors as possible will be equipped with heat scavengers
to reclaim lost heat.
Future residential demands . Possible future energy demands for
residential sectors were determined by examining space heating
apart from all other end-uses. This method was used because
heating represents the greatest cost to homeowners and because
more can be done in this area to conserve energy.
In 1975, 23,115 dwelling units consumed 3.4 trillion BTU's.
This averaged out to an approximate consumption of 92 million
BTU's per unit for space heating. Space heating accounted for
63 percent of the total energy demand for that year. In
calculating future space heating demands, it was assumed that
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reductions in demand could be attained for the reasons already
mentioned. Space heating demand estimates for the year 2000 are
based on new and existing single and multi-family housing.
Because of the advantage of district heating and cogeneration,
future multi- family housing will probably be constructed in
clustered developments, thus making it possible to realize a
reduction of another 20 percent in space heating demands.
Taking all of these factors into account, total space heat
demand is calculated to be 1.34 trillion BTU's. This is a
substantial savings, in comparison to the 1975 demand of 2.1
trillion BTU's. (See Appendix I for detailed calculations)
To determine energy demand for appliances, including; hot
water heaters, stoves, refrigerators and freezers, air condi-
tioners, clothes dryers, lights and other small appliances,
energy intensity coefficients of the CONAES group were used. [3]
These energy intensity coefficients were applied to the
1975 energy demands for appliances to arrive at a year 2000
demand for existing housing stock. It was assumed that, due to
normal appliance replacement, all existing appliances will be
replaced with more efficient models that meet the CONAES
efficiency standards by the year 2000.
For new housing units, it was assumed that all installed
appliances would be the most energy efficient possible and would
meet CONAES energy intensities. In addition, because effective
154
passive solar design would negate the need for air conditioning
units, none would be installed in new dwellings.
Energy Demand for Existing Appliances
Appl iance
1975
Demand
(Trillion
BTU's)
CONAES
Energy
Intensity*
2000
Demand
(Trillion
BTU's)
Water Heating
.51 .75 .38
Air Conditioning .03 .65 .02
Stove
.17 .70 .12
Clothes Dryer .05 .75 .04
Refrigerator/ .24 .50 .12
Freezer
Lighting .17 .70 .12
Other**
.05 .75 .04
Total 1.22 00
*Energy intensity is the reciprocal of energy efficiency.
All intensities are normalized to 1.0 in 1975. An
intensity of 0.75 implies a 25% energy savings over the
1975 figure.
**0ther is based on average product use equivalent to one
television, two clocks, one toaster, one fan
,
one mixer,
one drill, one circular saw and one washer •
Total residential sector demand in 2000.
Space Heating: 1975 Stock 1.27 Trillion BTU' s
Post 1975 Stock .07 Trillion BTU' s
Appliances: 1975 Stock .84 Trillion BTU'
s
Pos t 1975 Stock .09 Trillion BTU's
Total 2.27 Trillion BTU's
TRILLIONS
OF
BTU'S
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TABLE 9
RESIDENTIAL SECTOR ENERGY DEMAND
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS
1975-2000
YEAR
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Cost of residential conservation
. A number of communities have
initiated comprehensive conservation efforts for their house-
holders - with dramatic results. The campaigns often take the
form of neighborhood block conservation programs, where organi-
zers supply equipment, supplies and training to citizens, who
proceed on a designated "work day" to plug energy leaks in every
household in the neighborhood. The materials cost between $25
and $80 per household. This cost is either borne by the resi-
dent or paid for by a grant such as C.D.B.G. or U.D.A.G. In
some cases, the municipal utility paid for the materials.
Implementation of these programs realize savings to the
homeowner in the range of 20 percent annually in the North, and
10 percent annually in the South.
The City of Santa Monica, California, mounted a program
which furnished 60 percent of the town's residents with $80
worth of free conservation equipment. Labor was supplied by
city employees. Proper installation of this equipment will save
each homeowner approximately $25 annually, yielding a program
payback period of 3.2 years, or 27 percent annually. The funds
for this program are furnished by the municipal utility of Santa
Monica. The equipment furnished includes: A low flow shower
head, a water heater insulation blanket, pipe insulation and a
photo voltaic sensor on outdoor lights. [4]
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Carbondale, Illinois, developed a program called 'Project
Case, in which it conducted 129 self-help energy workshops,
taught by volunteers. These workshops were attended by 1,874
residents. Conservation kits costing $31 were provided by a
community action grant to low income households, and were
purchased by others. Fuel savings were reported to be between 5
percent and 20 percent. Post-testing conducted by the Illinois
Institute of Natural Resources
, [5 ] revealed that willingness to
undertake additional conservation projects was very high.
Closer to Franklin County, an extremely successful
weather ization program was launched in the town of Fitchburg,
Massachusetts. Sixty percent of the town's residents reported
energy savings after participation in a program which used an
average of $20 worth of supplies. The program saved 14 percent
on annual fuel bills and savings realized in the first year of
the program totaled $600,000 in a town of 14,000 households . [6
]
The town of Northampton, Massachusetts, initiated a
"Button-Up-Northampton" (BUN) campaign, which succeeded in
training 14 percent of the households in basic home conservation
techniques. The average participant was able to reduce fuel
consumption 20 to 25 percent, with two hours' work and $25.40
worth of materials. Training sessions were held in neighborhood
schools and churches. Participating citizens received coupons
good for 25 percent off conservation supplies purchased in local
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stores. This was arranged by the Chamber of Commerce. A second
phase followed - aimed at insulating attics, using professional
insulation crews. The jobs were packaged into lots of 10 and
let out for bid. This resulted in costs 50 percent below prior
experience and reductions in energy use of an additional 25
percent. Paybacks on the costs were one year, or less. A
participant in both programs saw reductions in usage of 40 to 50
percent. [7
]
Similar programs are currently underway in thirty towns
across America. Strong local leadership and simple 'hands-on'
techniques, coupled with a modest investment, are yielding very
satisfying results.
A number of recent studies have examined the cost of
residential conservation on a larger scale. Universally, they
found that it is possible to reduce energy consumption
dramatically for a rather modest 'per house' investment. The
following summarizes major findings:
• New residential construction can be done in such a way
so as to use only one—sixth of the 'normal' amount of
energy used in Massachusetts Housing. The cost would be
an additional $400 in construction. [9
]
• The National Bureau of Standards took a typical
Washington, D.C. home, spent $650 on conservation, and
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reduced fuel consumption by 60%. This amounted to $3.33
per MMBTU, or a savings of $20 BBL of oil. [10]
• After a five-year study of the cost of residential and
commercial conservation, the Princeton Energy Group
concluded that a 50% reduction in energy use could be
attained by investments equal to $14 BBL of oil, or
$2.41 MMBTU. [11]
It would seem, then, that the scenario outlined here is, in
fact, technically conservative. Rather than presuming a tech-
nically possible reduction in heating demand for new house
construction of 84%, 60% was assumed. Rather than assuming the
50% or 60% reduction in energy use found by the National Bureau
of Standards, 40% was assumed.
The research indicates that the cost of these reported
successes is about $14 - $20 BB oil equivalent, or about $14
5.8 MMBTU = $2.41 to $20 5.8 MMBTU = $3.44 per million BTU.
Commercial Sector Conservation
The commercial sector includes such public buildings as
schools, hospitals and municipal buildings; and these buildings
are a major source of energy inefficiency due to lack of capital
improvement budgets.
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There are approximately 50 schools in the county ranging in
size from small single-story town school buildings to large
complexes such as Greenfield Community College and include
private residential prep schools. Energy consumption depends on
size, and wide variations are possible. However, no specific
size breakdown was available for this analysis, so all schools
were considered to be the same size. This assumption yielded a
load of 11.4 billion BTU's per school year for space heat and
1.2 billion BTU's per year for hot water heating for the average
school
.
The heating load for educational structures in Franklin
County is thus calculated to be .57 trillion BTU's per year for
space heating and 60 billion BTU's annually for hot water
heating. This equals about 25% of the commercial energy load.
The number of industrial and commercial establishments as
they are reported to the Massachusetts Division of Employment
Security has not significantly changed in recent years and
hovers between 1,000 and 1,050 firms in Franklin County.
According to a survey conducted in 1975 by the Franklin
County Planning Department, the majority of business leaders in
the county do not foresee any growth in the number of commercial
establishments, although some businesses may expand their labor
force or their physical plants.
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However, assuming a no-growth rate is not the same as
assuming no commercial sector activity at all. While the net
number of establishments may remain the same, the ratio of
older, existing buildings to newly constructed firms may change.
It was assumed that a percentage of the commercial stock would
experience decay and destruction, and that these buildings would
be replaced with new ones. It is not unreasonable to expect
that the new buildings will be constructed to meet the highest
standards possible of optimum design efficiencies for the
physical structure and the energy systems that will control the
interior environments of the buildings.
There was no specific data as to the turn-over rate for
commercial buildings that is expected to occur in Franklin
County between now and the year 2000. It was assumed that the
turn-over rate for commercial buildings in Franklin County would
be 15 percent between 1975 and 2000, or 3 percent every five
years
.
In order to translate the turn-over rate of buildings to
energy demand, it was assumed that the .6 percent per year
turn-over rate in structures equaled .6 percent of the energy
demand that would be affected in terms of reducing demand
through the implementation of technical fixes. Therefore, it is
postulated that energy demand for the commercial sector could be
reduced in the following manner: Fifteen percent of the 1975
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commercial building stock would be replaced by new buildings by
the year 2000, and certain standards would be applied to the new
buildings which would reduce demand; 85 percent of the 1975
commercial building stock would still be standing in the year
2000, and other conservation and technical fix standards would
.be applied to those buildings to reduce energy demand. Adding
the two components together would provide a total energy demand
for the commercial sector for the year 2000.
The next step in determining a future energy demand for the
commercial sector was to apply various technical fixes and
conservation measures to the commercial stock. To derive a
future energy demand, recommendations from a "strong conserva-
tion case" from the Brookhaven National Laboratory study[12]
were used as a foundation and were expanded upon by including
specific types of energy conservation measures from a variety of
other sources. The Brookhaven recommendations were as follows:
Action Resul
t
1 . Reduce energy demand in
existing buildings, lower
thermostats, improve oper-
ating procedures, reduce
lighting, etc.
1. Twenty-five percent energy
demand reduction (between
1975 and 1985; 35% energy
demand reduction (between
1975 and 2000)
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2. Improve efficiency in new
buildings, design total
energy systems, improve
air conditioning methods,
improve lighting, etc.
2. Any new building construc-
ted between 1975 and 2000
will consume 50% less
energy than its 1975
counterpart.
The assumed reduction in commercial energy consumption is
rather conservative. For example, it is assumed that all the
new commercial space constructed between 1975 and the year 2000
(30% of year 2000 commercial demand) will use 50% less energy
than existing buildings. This is less savings than was shown
possible by recent research undertaken by the Federal Government
in support of a proposed National Energy Constructions
Standard. [13 ] In this exercise, 168 buildings representing the
full spectrum of designs of commercial space were analyzed to
determine possible energy savings. By redesign, using off-the-
shelf technology and modest professional 'coaching, 1 the results
indicated a 40% reduction in energy usage was possible. This
savings did not include available savings from some technology
commonly used that the planning computers were not programmed to
incorporate.
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The cost of conservation savings was often no cost at all,
with the ability to cut an average of 30% of energy costs from
the 168 buildings, while simultaneously lowering construction
costs. This was accomplished because such low cost measures as
window orientation, weatherstripping and insulation permitted
the reduction of high cost items - items such as heating, light-
ing and cooling apparatus for the new buildings. In other
words, a modest investment in conservation resulted in major
savings in construction costs - up to the 30% conservation
level. After reaching that level, conservation efforts added
costs to the initial construction costs, from 7% to 12% of
previously estimated building costs. However, due to lower
energy costs, the monthly payments for the combined construction
and energy costs were still lower over the life of the
building. [14]
The IBM Corporation launched an energy conservation program
in 1973 in response to the oil embargo. By 1977, consumption
was reduced by 39%. Two thirds of the savings were achieved
with little or no capital investment. [15
]
The American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air
Conditioning Engineers consensus standard for energy conserva-
tion strategies (which was the baseline assumption used in this
section) is called ASHREA 90-75. The process of creative con-
sensus removed any controversy from claims of efficiency and
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cost benefit for the improvements, and this standard is scorned
by many as being a very weak attempt at saving energy. Even so,
research indicates that buildings built to ASHREA 90-75
specifications will use 40 to 60% less energy and still cost
less to construct than conventional buildings
.
[16]
When the various conservation energy reduction measures
assumed earlier are coupled with a .6 percent per year turn-over
rate in the commercial stock and applied to the 1975 total
energy demand of 3.8 trillion BTU's, the following projected
energy demand curve was generated (see Appendix II for detailed
calculations)
.
Category Demand % Total
Space Heating 1.90 TBTS 75
Water Heating .10 8
Air Conditioning .07 4
Lighting & Other .33 13
2.40 100
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Cost of commercial energy conservation . An Office of Technology
assessment study, [17] completed in 1982, found that a potential
nationwide energy savings of 7 quads (1 quadrillion BTU's) is
possible in the commercial sector by the year 2000.
According to the study, there are three major levels of
conservation and renewables investment found in the existing
urban commercial and residential buildings. These levels are:
• Those with simple paybacks of less than two years.
• Those with simple paybacks of two to seven years.
• Those with simple paybacks of seven to fifteen years.
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This translated into a cost of conservation of:
• Up to $14.00 per million BTU's saved annually .
• Annual savings of between $14.00 and $49.00 per
• million BTU's saved annually.
Savings of $49.00 to $105.00 per million BTU's saved.
These results assumed that energy costs $7.00 per million
BTU's, which was equivalent to the cost of fuel oil in 1980.
This same study found that one—half of all energy used in com-
mercial facilities in 1980 could be saved, exploiting currently
available technologies. Of the one-half, 80% could be saved
with investments in Categories 1 and 2, with the majority of
opportunity falling into Category 1.
Franklin County is more dependent on oil and electricity
than the national average and its cost of energy in 1980 was
$11.67 per MMBTU instead of the $7.00 assumed by the Office of
Technology study. This fact alters the payback periods of
Categories 1 and 2 to 0 to 4.2 years, resulting in an average
cost per MMBTU saved of $3.50.
Transportation
To determine transportation demand for the year 2000, a set
of key assumptions was developed:
Methodology for passenger car fuel requirements
Assumptions
.
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• Car ownership remains at .73 per capita.
Miles driven per vehicle per year saturates at 10,000
miles in 1977.
• Average miles per gallon of fleet increases to Federal
•
new car standard of 27.5 mpg in 1985.
• Phase-in of fuel-efficient cars in the county will meet
new car mpg for fleet by 1985, and 37 mpg by the year
2000 .
• County will adopt high fuel efficiency cars faster than
the rest of the nation.
• To meet fuel efficiency standards between the years
1976 and 2000, a mix of fuel efficient cars greater
than the standard will be required to counter-balance
older, less fuel-efficient models.
Passenger Car Fleet Fuel Requirements =
Number of Cars x Miles Driven Per Car Per Year
Fuel Efficiency (Miles Per Gallon)
Year No. Cars
Miles
Dr iven Mpg
Fuel Requirement
(Millions of Gals.)
1976 41,543 10,000 16.1 23.9
1980 42,990 10,000 20.0 20.1
1985 44,166 10,000 27.5 16.0
1990 44,950 10,000 27.5 16.3
1995 46,604 10,000 27.5 16.5
2000 46,601 10,000 27.5 16.7
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The savings in motor vehicle fuel is calculated to be
(23.9) - (16.7) = 7.2 million gallons in the year 2000.
Translated to trillions of BTU's, this is 7,200,000,000 x
138,000 = 1.0 trillion BTU's.
The main constraint on motor fuel usage is the fact that
people dan spend only so many hours behind the wheel of a car
and that seems to be at saturation. The Federal Government is
mandating fuel-efficient cars and it is assumed that the cost of
energy conservation in the personal transportation sector is
TABLE 11
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR ENERGY DEMAND
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absorbed in replacing autos as they wear out. For this reason,
I have not allocated a dollar amount to the cost of
transportation conservation, as it seems impossible to quantify
and even harder to implement. Unlike building conservation,
which cat} be done gradually, one either buys a new car, or one
doesn' t.
Industrial Sector
Due to the industrial sector's intrinsic ties with
economics, numerous studies have been conducted concerning
energy conservation in industry. Some of the major implemen-
table conservation measures and resulting energy savings
discussed in the studies are presented below:
• Housekeeping-type moves, such as improving insulation,
instituting basic lighting management programs and
adjusting thermostats can produce immediate energy
savings of 5 to 10%.
• Electric use can be cut 30 to 50% in plants, offices and
other segments of industry.
• Efficient cycles for industrial power and steam opera-
tion can save 14 to 30% of fuels.
Industry uses compressed air extensively for various
functions and electricity is commonly used to produce
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and dispense the air. Shutting down equipment when it
is not in use can result in reductions in the use of
electricity of 5%.
• Energy for process heating applications can be cut by
10% by shutting off electric motors or electric ovens
when not in use and/or by sizing all electric motors to
the power needed.
• Savings of 5 to 10% in fuel consumption can be realized
when steam systems are properly maintained.
• Fuel savings of 20% can occur from the use of
cogeneration and heat recuperators.
Other pertinent industrial conservation studies and their
findings are:
• The Federal Energy Adminis trat ion [ 18 ] reports that
improvements in process efficiency could reduce total
energy consumption to 20% by 1980 and another 10% by
1990.
• The National Bureau of Standards [ 19 ] stated that
industrial energy use could be reduced by 15 to 30
percent with conservation.
• The Ford Foundation's energy study[20] claimed that
short-term, low cost conservation measures could reduce
energy use by 10 to 15%.
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• Seattle City Light [21] noted that electricity savings of
32 percent could be realized within the industrial
sector by 1990.
Conclusions of the various studies clearly indicated that
overall energy savings of 5 to 30 percent could be reached and
that electricity consumption could be reduced 5 to 50 percent.
For the purpose of this study, we chose average energy reduction
figures of 20 percent for all fuels and 25 percent for
electricity
.
Future industrial growth and energy consumption . In a recent
draft report, the New England Energy Congress[22] stated that
total energy use in the industrial sector changed little from
1960 to 1975, but that the proportion of electric usage steadily
increased. Congress felt that the use of electricity would
continue to increase, since industry is switching from natural
gas to electricity through the introduction of heat pumps for
clean heat.
Future energy demand within the industrial sector would be
computed by examining the following variables: The projected
number of new industrial establishments apart from those firms
replacing retired units; the number of existing industrial units
that will be retired, and the percentage of those retired which
are replaced with new establishments; and energy reductions via
conservation in existing industrial units.
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^ industrial establishments . Franklin County has
experienced a net loss of industrial firms over the last 25
years. Industrial activity decreased by 22 percent between 1950
and 1970, and increased by 5 percent from 1970 to 1975. [23] In
9
the last two years, the only physical changes in the industrial
sector occurred when one existing firm expanded.
While a multitude of national growth projections exist for
every aspect of economic activity, no real projections have been
developed for the county. Franklin County seems to have
followed the national trend - a trend of loss or leveling off of
manufacturing activity which has been replaced with
service-oriented activities.
The only way the number of new industrial firms could be
estimated would be to calculate the relationship of
manufacturing firms to gross county product. There are
currently no estimates of future gross county product for
Franklin County. Examining present and future Massachusetts
gross products and holding the relationship between current
state and county gross products constant for the future, was
deemed too speculative. It was, therefore, assumed that new
industrial establishments would be developed which would provide
various products, but did not factor any new industrial firms
into the total future energy demand for the sector. The CONAES
assumption [ 24 ] that new industrial plants would consume 40
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percent less energy than their existing counterparts was
adopted.
Retired and new industrial establishments . CONAES assumed
9
that 50 percent of the current industrial establishments would
still be operating after the turn of the century, and that there
would be a two percent per year retirement rate for plants
on-line in 1975.
Based on a 22 percent decline in industrial activity in
Franklin County over the last 20 years and the fact that a 50
percent reduction in industrial firms over the next 25 years
seems too high, a reduction rate of 25 percent was chosen. Of
the 26 firms that would be retied by the year 2000, it was
assumed that half of those (thirteen) would be replaced by new
industrial establishments. The total number, therefore, of
industrial establishments in the county in the year 2000, not
including totally new growth, would be 92. The total of 92
firms does not include any of the industrial growth that might
occur concerning economic growth, related to the implementation
of renewable energy resources, or the development of
establishments to manufacture renewable energy systems.
Cost of industrial energy conservation. Discussions with the
head of the U.S. Department of Energy Industrial Conservation
TRILLIONS
OF
BTU
'
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TABLE 12
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR ENERGY DEMAND
2.0
C/3
1.5
1.0
1.5
.5
0
1 1
1950 1960 oOO05o05 1990 2000
YEAR
PERCENT
CATEGORY DEMAND TOTAL 1975
SPACE HEATING .004 TBTU's .4 .14
WATER HEATING .004 .4 .14
ELECTRICITY* .11 11.0 .16
DIRECT PROCESS HEAT .73 74.0 .82
LIQUID FUELS** .14 14.0 .21
TOTAL .99 100.0 1.50
*ELECTRICITY IS FOR LIGHTING AND OTHER
**L IQUID FUELS IS FOR INDUSTRIAL VEHICLES
TABLE
13
COST
OF
CONSERVATION
(IN
1981
DOLLARS)
176
H
Z CO
5
ooooooooooooooooooooooooo
00 v0 '4-CMO 00 \04 MO 00 vO 4 MO 00 'O 4 NO 00 vC'}CMOMinOO-Hsj’vOONNlAOOOnvOONM^IvOdvOCO'H^NO
<^OONN\OlO<tsft,UNtM^HOONa'OOr^rwOiA<ts)TOCvj(MMm®H«j-NOcovOff\Nin(iooc'>'00\NiriOOH,}isorri\Ots|OOini-(N<)'OvONCMn'HOO^O'OcOOMAMOO<t'-lfs
HHNO'imsfiniri^O'ONQOOOO'OOHHNMPV^l/VA
OUWH K w
o >
25 zM M
oooooooo
0000000000000000(NMCMMMMMM
ON ON ON On CT ON ON ON
CSCNCNCNCMCNCNCN
VO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
</>
ooooooooo
oooooooooocooooooo
CSICNCnICSCSCNCMCMCM
OnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOn
CnIcnJCMCNCNCMCnICMCS
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
oooooooo
ooooaooooooooooo
CMCNCNCNCNCNCNCN
On On On On On On On On
CNCNCsICNCNCsICNCN
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
H
COO
o
ooooooooooooooooooooooooo
OOOOOOOOOOQOCOQOOOOOOOQOQOOOCOQOOOQOOOOOQOOOQOOOOO
cococooocooococococococococorococococococococococn
</>
Z
32
H H
Z C
W W
05 CO
o z
z oM O
CO
O'-'
z o
^ H> PQ
<J H
co^
nOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnDn£>nOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnDnOnOnOnO
ioiouvoimniAioiAininininmiAmininicuriiflif\inirnn
nOnOnOnDnOnOnOnOnDnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnOnO
LO \D r- 00 ON o f—H Ovl CO NO oo ON o CM CO <} m nO r- oo ON
r^ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 oo 00 00 ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON On
ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON On O' ON ON On ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON OnH •—
1
•-H H *—
<
—
H
rH •—
1
i-H
4.1400
$15,732,000
176
Program[ 25 ] reveal that the first 20 percent of energy conser-
vation in industry can be attained on investments with a simple
payback of two years, or less. This equals a 50 percent rate of
return.
#
After the first 20 percent, savings become progressively
harder to attain and are often bound up in replacing production
equipment. Unlike the residential and commercial sector, rela-
tively little energy is utilized in space conditioning in the
industrial sector. Therefore, equipment modifications must be
made. Recognizing this, it has been assumed that the cost of
the 34 percent in consumption reduction planned for will consist
of 20 percent at $3.79 MMBTU's and 14 percent at $6.00 MMBTU's.
This yields an average cost per MMBTU of (20 percent x 1.5
TBTU's x $3.78) and (14 percent x 1.5 TBTU's x $6.00) = $4.69
MMBTU
.
Cost of Conservation
I have determined that the three sections that can be
directly affected by external investment in conservation have
costs per million BTU in the same range.
Res idential Cost per MMBTU $3.44
Commercial Cost per MMBTU 3.50
Industrial Cost per MMBTU 4.69
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Since different sectors require different size investments to
attain the called-for savings, an average cost per MMBTU can be
calculated.
Residential Svgs. @ 2000 (TBTU) = $1.13 x $3.44 = $3.88
Commercial Svgs. @ 2000 (TBTU) = $1.40 x $3.50 = $4.90
Industrial Svgs. @ 2000 (TBTU) = $ .51 x $4.69 = $2.39
$3.04 ^ $11.17
= $3.67 MMBTU
This yields an average cost per MMBTU of conservation of $3.67
per MMBTU. To be conservative, it is assumed to cost $3.80
MMBTU ' s
.
Renewable Energy
In order to supply the economically appropriate amount of
locally produced energy to the 7.96 trillion BTU's required in
in the year 2000, it will be necessary to tap potential from the
four renewable energy sources in the county. They are: Wind,
hydroelectric, solar and biomass. The first step is to assess
the resources.
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Biomass Potential
Biomass is the terra used for organic matter and biomass
conversion refers to the production of energy from organic
matter. Biomass can be burned to provide heat, or to drive a
steam-electric plant, or it can be converted to liquid or
gaseous fuels. Biomass fuels can be obtained from the following
sources.: Municipal sewage and solid waste; agricultural
residues and manure and wood residues. Sewage can also be
grown specifically as an energy crop.
Franklin County is heavily forested and relatively lightly
populated, so we will ignore the potential in utilizing human
waste and sewage, agricultural residue and garbage, and just
focus on the potential found in the forests.
Approximately 78 percent of Franklin County is forested and
96 percent of the forested land (329,600 acres) is classified as
commercial. Between 1952 and 1972, forest land increased by
three percent due to a decrease in agricultural land. Since
1972, the trend has been reversed as a result of new powerline
construction, new highways and agricultural land clearing. [26]
The volume of standing timber in Franklin County increased
by nearly 60 percent in the past 20 years as a result of fewer
trees being harvested, an increase in tree size and in growth
from pole timber to sawtimber. In 1972, 68 percent of the
179
county was covered with soft-woods and hardwoods in the 40- to
60-foot class. Much of the forest is bunched in the small
sawlog - large pole stand size due to forest blow down in the
1938 hurricane. The overall stand characteristic is what
#
accounts for the large increase in sawtimber volume in recent
years. These increases will continue, as large volumes move
from pole size stands, where they have zero volume, to saw-
timber, where volume is counted. Sawtimber volume is not
counted on softwoods smaller than 9 inches diameter-to-breast
height and on hardwoods smaller than 11 inches diaraeter-at-
breast height.
According to data in the 1970 Continuous Forest Inventory
Survey[27] conducted only on state forest lands, the net annual
growth rate for forest land in eastern Franklin County was 30.5
cubic feet per acre per year, and 24.9 cubic feet per acre per
year for the western portion of the county. The Massachusetts
Division of Forests and Parks has estimated that, by removing
cull or rotton wood material, thinning and weeding and employing
general forest management practices, growth rates could be
increased to 40 cubic feet per year on state forest land. Forty
cubic feet per acre per year is the equivalent of one-half cord
per acre per year. With the sampling techniques now used by the
U.S. Forest Service for estimating growth per acre per year,
the county's forests are now currently estimated to be producing
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one-half cord per acre per year, and that is the figure used in
calculation. [28]
Annual growth of growing stock on commercial forest land in
Massachusetts, minus mortality and removals, is estimated to be
110.4 million cubic feet. [29] However, this figure excludes
volumes from the following categories: Tops; materials less
than 5 inches diaraeter-to-breas t height; materials on non-
commercial forest land; non-commercial species; and mortality
and removals. Using U.S. Forest Service data, some of these
figures can be developed, while some are unavailable.
If commercial forest land in Franklin County is approxi-
mately 12 percent of the commercial forest land in Massachu-
setts, then average annual net growth in Frnklin County is about
13.2 million cubic feet, or 165,000 cords. With an average
heating value of 20 million BTU's per cord, that equals 3.3
trillion BTU's.
The upper-stem portion of a tree is synonymous with the top
of a tree. The upper-stem portion of sawtimber trees in Massa-
chusetts is calculated to be 261.7 thousand cubic feet. If
sawtimber stock equals 49 percent of the total growing stock,
then the upper-stem portion of growing stock for Massachusetts
would be about 523.4 thousand cubic feet. For Franklin County,
tops would comprise 62.8 thousand cubic feet, 785 cords, or
.015
trillion BTU ' s
.
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POTENTIAL
Category
Mill Residues
Logging Residues^
Land Clearing
Undesirable Wood
Rough/Rotton
Overstocked
Mortality
Sustained Yield
Total Wood Energy Pote
WOOD ENERGY
Yearly 1978-2000
(Trillions of BTU's
.09 b
.90 b
.39 b
.76
.16
.50°
3 . 30 d
itial 6.10 e
aIncludes wood harvested for lumber and left in
forest as waste
bAs sumes no increase in volume, although this is
unlikely, since forest management could triple yields
cAs sumes same amount is harvested per year for
twenty-year harvest period
•^Sustained yield equals the total amount of wood
available on a continuous, annual basis after
substracting rough/rotton and mortality; including
tops
e Includes all categories, with exception of materials
less than 5 inches DBH, material on non-commercial
forest land and non-commercial species
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Due to a lack of forest statistics, it was impossible to
calculate the amount of materials less than five inches in
diameter-to-breast height, materials on non-commercial lands and
*
non-commercial species. This has been estimated in the table on
the following page.
Solar Energy Potential
A rule of thumb useful in New England is that one square
foot of solar collector replaces one gallon of fuel oil every
year. [30] Since solar energy is potentially useful primarily in
the commercial and residential sectors, the size of the attain-
able solar resource could be determined by setting a goal of
solar contribution, in percent of BTU's used to provide heat and
hot water to those two sectors, and assume a penetration of the
market place. This would yield a square footage required of
solar aperture.
Not all buildings are suitable for solar energy due to
building location, or orientation. A number of buildings used
will opt for using biomass as their fuel source; therefore, it
is assumed here that 25 percent of the predicted heating and hot
water needs forecast for the year 2000 will be supplied by solar
energy
.
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Amount
in TBTU's
Commercial Heating 1.90
Commercial Water Heating
.10
Residential Heating 1.34
Residential Water Heating .38
3.72
3.72 x 25% = .93 TBTU's
Hydroelectric Potential
The potential energy of water flowing into the county was
estimated by using gauging stations monitored by the U.S.
Geological Survey and eyeballing geological maps to scale the
measured flow rates and to estimate the elevation of places
where various rivers enter the county. Maximum average power
from water from external sources was calculated to be 162,600
kilowatts
.
[31
]
Total possible average power was estimated to be 270,600
kilowatts. During the course of a usable portion of a year, the
total amount of power provided would be 2.37 billion kilowatt
hours. [32]
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Existing generating plants and large, undeveloped sites.
Currently, 19 percent of available hydroelectric energy is being
converted to electric power. If hydroelectric sites larger than
5 megawatts were developed at some point, energy production
could increase to 821.9 million kilowatt hours per year.
Energy potential at existing dams without generating equipment .
There were 128 other sites identified in the county which either
have or had dams on them and which might be suitable for power
generation. An inventory by the Franklin County Energy Conser-
vation Task Force contains the best available estimates of the
gross head of the dams and the drainage area of the river or
streat at the site. The figures were used to estimate annual
average flow for the 128 sites. Annual energy production at
these sites was estimated to be between 50 and 68 million
kilowatt hours. [33]
Energy potential of never developed sites . By careful examina-
tion of geological survey maps, it was possible to estimate flow
rates from drainage areas and identify locations where the slope
of the land is sufficiently great so that the use of the streams
for power production might make sense. Fifteen sites were
located in a 15 square mile area. The total average estimated
power at the sites measured approximately 250 kilowatts. If
an
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equivalent amount of power availability could be found in areas
of similar size in the county, there might be an additional
12,000 kilowatts of available energy, which at a 50 percent
conversion efficiency, would result in an additional 52 million
kilowatt hours of energy. [34]
Summary of Hydroelectric Potential
Category
Amount
(MMKWH)
Potential production at
existing, unused sites 50-68
Potential production at
sites larger than 5 raega-
wats 378.6
Potential production at
older (pre-1925) or small,
never developed sites* 52
Total potential production 498MMKWH** (5 TBTU's)
*The primary reason many of these sites may be ripe for
development is because there are small turbines now
available which did not exist in the past and which can
utilize low flow-high head. These
tentative.
**Each KWH contains 3,409 BTU's
Wind Potential
estimates are highly
Three factors were considered in calculating potential
contribution from the wind: How much wind power is in the
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county and where is it located; how much wind energy can be
extracted, and how can it be done; and the costs and
ramifications of the extraction process.
Wind availability . Using national wind assessment data from
the Department of Energy[35] it was determined that the county
lies in an area where sites could be located with winds ranging
from nine to 15 miles per hour. Since there has been very
little actual measurement of wind speeds in the county, initial
assessments were made, using wind data from several locations in
the county and from areas surrounding the county (fire towers,
airport, nuclear power plants, state forests). The data
analyzed did show that a substantial wind resource exists in the
county.
From topographical maps, approximately 150 sites that look
particularly promising for wind power generation were located.
Most of these are on hilltops or ridges facing northwest. Wind
Regime I (14.5 mph average wind) would be found at the best
sites, or those with acceleration of winter winds. Wind Regime
II (8.3 mph average wind) might be found at the less windy, but
still potentially useful, locations. Approximately 40 locations
have been identified which should be in Wind Regime I, and are
suitable for a 219-foot diameter, 1,500 kilowatt wind machine.
The other 110 sites would likely have a Wind Regime II profile,
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allowing 278-foot diameter, 1,500 kilowatt machines to be used.
The total annual energy generation would be about 800,000
megawatt hours from these sites, or about two times the current
electric power consumption of the county. Due to the intermit-
tent nature of the wind, large amounts of storage probably would
be required if the installed capacity of the wind generators was
to exceed 20 percent of the total utility generating capacity.
Until such a degree of saturation is reached, however, storage
is unlikely to be a problem. [36] More detailed analysis clearly
is required to evaluate the effective capability of wind genera-
tors in any proposed county-scale electric utility system, but
it seems reasonable to assume that wind could provide a large
volume of the total elecric requirements of Franklin County.
Summary of Renewable Potential
We have seen here that the annual renewable energy resource
base of Franklin County is rather substantial:
Biomass 6.10 TBTU's
Solar Energy .93 TBTU's
Hydroelectric 5.00 TBTU's
Wind 5.00 TBTU's
17.03 TBTU's
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Since the resource demand is only 7.96 trillion BTU's, it would
be necessary to capture only 41 percent of the renewable energy
potential available to make the County self-sustaining. Since
most renewable energy projects grow markedly more expensive the
closer to 'need satisfaction' the project gets, it would prob-
ably be reasonable to set an upper limit of renewable resource
utilization at 40 percent of the demand after conservation has
been practiced.
Since we can further assume that only about one-half of the
buildings will be equipped with renewables, we can multiply by
20 percent to calculate a renewable contribution. Obviously, if
traditional fuels become unavailable, the contribution would be
higher - 20 percent of 7.96 TBTU's = 1.59 TBTU's. This utilizes
only 9 percent of available renewable potential.
Should someone believe that this scenario calls for signi-
ficant suffering and denial on the part of the average county
resident, it should be noted that the Franklin County energy
consumption per capita in the year 2000 (to be supplied by a
combination of renewables and non-renewables) is 112 MMBTU's
(7.96 trillion BTU's ? 70,500). This compares to a 1950 county
per capita consumption of 124 MMBTU's. The quality of life in
1950 was not one of deprivation, and a considerable case can be
made that the 112 MMBTU'S will provide a higher quality of life
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than the 124 (or 1975' s 228 MMBTU’s) due to the widespread use
of insulation, transistors, radial tires, interstate highways,
flash freezing, etc., which makes energy use go farther. No one
should think that the reduction in imported energy use called
for here is extreme. It should be noted that this reduction
represents a 2% annual reduction from 1975 levels, over 25 years
- scarcely a hardship level.
TABLE 14
FRANKLIN COUNTY GROSS ENERGY USE - YEAR 2000
1975 2000
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CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF TWO FUTURES
One of the chief obstacles to the early adoption of conser-
vation and solar energy lies in the fact that typical customers
generally do not know the real cost of the energy they consume.
Marginal Cost Dilemma
Some energy comes from old, established sources paid for
long ago, such as old oil fields or hydroelectric dams. Such
energy is relatively cheap. Other energy comes from new,
expensive sources, such as North Sea oil or newly built nuclear
power plants. The energy company (either an oil company or an
electric utility) adds together the cheap energy cost and the
expensive energy cost and passes it on to consumers for the
average price of the two. Therefore, any signal of rapidly
rising prices is effectively muffled by the time it reaches the
consumer. Thus, consumer response to price increases in the
cost of new energy lags years behind actual rising energy costs.
For example: If Apex Oil Company sells fuel oil to Mr. Smith at
$1.00 a gallon, all from U.S. sources, and sells 1,000 gallons
per year, the price to the customer is $1,000 annually. If U.S.
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oil availability declines such that Apex Oil needs to buy 200
gallons of oil from Saudi Arabia at $2.00 per gallon in order to
be able to deliver 1,000 gallons, then Mr. Smith's bill becomes
(800 x $1.00) + (200 x $2.00), or $1,200. Mr. Smith will
undoubtedly register annoyance at the 20 percent increase in oil
cost. However, the effect of averaging in high priced oil and
cheap oil together, prevents him from realizing that the price
of oil has now risen 100% for oil at the margin - that is to
say, new oil.
If Apex Oil were told it could use solar power to produce
energy at $1.75 per gallon equivalent, it would look good,
indeed, compared to the marginal cost of new supply ($2.00 per
gallon). Therefore, Apex, who sees the marginal cost, would
probably choose solar power. However, if Mr. Smith had a door-
to-door salesperson trying to sell him a solar system at $1.75
per gallon equivalent, Mr. Smith would be likely to reject the
offer, because the average cost of energy at $1.20 per gallon
does not compare favorably with a marginal cost of solar energy
at $1.75 gallon equivalent.
In order to create a situation where the economic ground
rules of society are altered to allow for Mr. Smith to make an
investment in a source of supply priced at the margin (conser-
vation and renewables) instead of at the av e rag
e
(oil), a social
invention is needed which does one of two things: Either show
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him the true marginal cost, or disguise the marginal cost of
conservation and solar energy to the same extent, or more, as
the competing fuel is disguised. This, in popular terms, leads
us to either subsidization or differential pricing. This is the
rational for tax credits and other subsidies. A third alterna-
tive is to plan on the adoption of conservation and renewables
onl y when the marginal cost of these methods are equal to or
lower than the overall cost of traditional fuels. This is the
method used here.
Cost of Renewable Future
In the early years of the 25-year span, it is likely that
renewable energy will be utilized only in its cheapest forms -
wood stoves and passive solar. These can be purchased for less
than the cost of comparatively priced traditional fuels. As
fuel prices increase, the range of renewable energy technologies
that are competitive increases, and it can be expected that
industrial biomass, active solar, wind and hydro become cost-
effective; even though they cost more than other forms of
renewable energy.
Renewable energy investment will track non-renewable costs
only up to the point where non-renewables mature as an industry.
Therefore, it can be assumed that renewable energy costs will
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hit a plateau in constant dollars, after which costs will rise
little, if any.
Lovins [ 1 ] found in a survey of the economics of renewable
energy technologies that, with the exception of liquid fuels
from biomass, all the renewables delivered energy at $10.00 per
MMBTU, or less. Since his survey covered renewable technologies
not yet sold widely enough to be subject to economies of scale,
it can be safely assumed that the cost of renewables will go
down, not up, as their usage grows more widespread. This is
particularly true in solar energy, where mass production and the
use of new plastics is expected to have a dramatic impact.
Another area where usage is expected to rise is wind power,
where mass production and revised, simpler designs are emerging.
TVA[2] found similar cost, for the most part. For this reason,
it has been assumed that the cost of renewable energy peaks at
$12.50 per MMBTU and stays fast thereafter, as traditional fuels
continue to escalate in cost as they become more scarce.
We can assume that most investors would not be willing to
invest in renewable energy unless the cost is 20 percent less
than conventional fuels. We know the price of conventional
fuels for the 25-year period. Therefore, the total capital
required for the conversion of renewables is found by summing
up the annual renewable contributions in MMBTU s and multiplying
by eighty percent of the traditional fuel costs.
TABLE 15
YEAR
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
* ASSUMED TO
TECHNOLOGY
ASSUMED TO
2000, WHEN
TECHNOLOGY
COST OF RENEWABLES
COMPARED TO TRADITIONAL FUELS
RENEWABLE
FORECAST ENERGY
TRADITIONAL INVESTMEN1
FUEL COST THRESHOLD
(MMBTU ' s
)
(PER MMBTU]
3.95 3.95
4.25 4.25
4.50 4.50
5.08 5.08
8.06 6.44
11.67 9.33
12.00 9.60
12.38 9.85
12.75 10.20
13.13 10.50
13.52 10.81
13.93 11.14
14.35 11.48
14.78 11.82
15.22 12.17
15.68 12.54
16.15 12.54
16.63 12.54
17.13 12.54
17.65 12.54
18.18 12.54
18.72 12.54
19.28 12.54
19.86 12.54
20.46 12.54
BE 80% OF TRADITIONAL FUEL COST UNTIL
MATURES, EXCEPT 1975-1978, WHEN IT IS
EQUAL TRADITIONAL FUEL COSTS, AND 1990-
THE RENEWABLE FUELS PLATEAU AS THE
MATURES.
TABLE
16
COST
OF
RENEWABLES
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Adding together the cost of conservation and renew-
ables, (Tables 13 and 16, respectively) yields a number
which, when compared to the cost of traditional fuels, un-
derscores the merits of making the transition. For example,
in the year 1999, to purchase traditional fuels would cost
’$77 million dollars, whereas the use of conservation and
renewables costs only $32 million dollars to furnish exactly
the same amount of energy services. (See Tables 17 and 18,
respectively).
Cost of Traditional Future
Comparing the two options, one can see that in 1999,
the $32 million dollars spent on conservation and renewables
yields local employment and dollars accruing to the economy,
in addition to the $77-$32 = $44 million which will not
leave the county. This effect is true every year from 1975
through 2000, and is cumulative.
Employment Impacts
Several studies have looked at the relative employment
impact of an equal investment in renewables and other forms
of energy.
TABLE
17
COST
OF
TRADITIONAL
FUELS
DISPLACED**
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YEAR
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
TABLE 18
COMPARISON OF COST OF TWO FUTURES
ANNUAL INVESTMENT
CONSERVATION AND
RENEWABLES
$ 880,480
1.780.060
2,695,540
3,647,908
4,686,772
5,909,440
7,149,280
8.405.020
9.681.020
10,978,100
12,294,896
13,632,680
14,992,088
16,373,640
17,746,412
19,173,236
20.600.060
22,026,846
23,452,708
24,880,532
26,307,355
27,734,180
29,161,004
30,587,828
32,014,652
$ 388 MILLION
(ROUNDED)
ANNUAL
INVESTMENT
TRADITIONAL
FUELS
$ 905,340
1,879,440
2,910,840
4,075,176
5,922,528
8,597,292
11,347,692
14,185,188
17,107,488
20,116,884
23,215,668
26,408,424
29.697.444
33,085,020
36.573.444
40,167,300
43,868,880
47,680,476
51,606,672
55,652,052
59,818,908
64,109,532
68,528,508
73,080,420
77,769,852
$818 MILLION
(ROUNDED)
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"It is apparent that if all conventional power were
replaced by solar units, labor requirements would be multiplied
by a factor of 2 to 5. "[3]
Noted solar author and researcher Skip Laitner suggests
that renewables produce two to five times the jobs for an
'equivalent investment in nuclear power. [4]
The California Employment Development Department found in a
study of the proposed Sun Desert Nuclear Unit that renewables
would provide twice the jobs than an equivalent investment in
another energy source. [5]
It must be emphasized that not only are a larger number of
jobs created per dollar invested, but the majority of positions
are local
,
instead of abroad or in oil exporting states.
Various studies have determined that conservation invest-
ment yields one job-year per $10,000 invested (in 1975 dollars)
and renewables yield one job-year for each $34,000 (1975
dollars) invested. [6] Since the conservation and renewable
investments called for over the 25-year span are essentially
equal, we can determine that each $22,000 invested ($10,000 +
$34,000 = $44,000 ? 2) (in 1975 dollars) yield one job-year.
Escalating the 1975 dollars at eight percent annually to 1982
dollars, we find each job requires a $35,000 investment.
This is consistent with a New England specific study which
calculates that each billion dollars of investment in renewabls
yields 33,000 jobs, or $33,333 per job-year. [7] (in 1981
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dollars). By dividing this number into the annual investment,
we can determine the number of jobs created annually.
Summary
The preceding analysis demonstrates that a program using
conservation and renewables to replace traditional fuels in
situations where a minimum of 30 percent rate of return can be
achieved will reduce traditional fuel consumption by one-half of
projected usage by the year 2000. From an economic point of
view, the county will be enormously better off than if it had
continued to use only traditional fuel. However, since the
combined annual costs of conservation, renewables and tradi-
tional fuels is higher each year than the preceding year, the
cost of energy services continues to drain the pockets of county
residents, although at a significantly slower rate.
The techniques outlined here could be expanded to foster
greater conservation and use of renewables, thus actually
spending less each year as a county than the previous example.
As discussed, there is no meaningful technical limit on the
conservation and renewable energy potential, since conservation
savings of twice what was used in our calculations are feasible,
and the renewable resource base containes five times the poten-
tial we called for using. Such an expansion could be designed
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to set a desirable monetary level for energy service expendi-
tures, including conservation, renewables and traditional fuels.
A conservation and renewable program could also be designed to
achieve the desired level of impact. This program would
’ probably be about 50 percent larger than the one outlined here,
and much of the increase would occur in the post-1985 time
frame. This would require a larger, more active role for the
county government than contemplated thus far, but would carry
commensurately larger rewards.
No matter how big a goal the county adopts, it is necessary
to understand how to create financing schemes which will over-
come the major barrier to the use of conservation and renewables
- the new initial capital outlay.
Even if a conservation measure costing $12.00 yields
savings at a cost of $3.50 per MMBTU and pays for itself in 3.42
years, thus earning a rate of return of 29 percent tax free, if
one cannot obtain the needed capital outlay - in this case
$12.00 - conservation will not be practiced. Thus, in order for
this concept of an alternative energy future to be perceived as
attainable, real and individually implementable, (refer to the
Warnings Chapter) a plan of capitalization which yields at a
minimum a payment plan whereby the borrower pays for the loan
and the remaining traditional fuels needed at a cost no higher
than the previous fuel bill must be created. Developing such a
plan requires the use of various financing tools, which is the
subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VII
FINANCING THE RENEWABLE ENERGY FUTURE
«
Transformation of the energy supply and consumption of the
United States to renewable energy by the 2000 requires enormous
outlays, of capital, and untold transactions between buyer and
seller. Each of these transactions involve an exchange of
money, but only a small percentage will actually be cash
purchases. The rest will be financed in some fashion.
The financing of energy conservation and renewable energy
is a new field, as energy practitioners are slowly growing
familiar with a mix of established financial procedures and
innovative practices.
The conservation and renewable energy field has much of its
origins in small business, and/or social activism. Many of
these people lack training in finance, and a few are ideologi-
cally opposed to working with the capitalist system. For these
reasons, many of the most fervent supporters of a future based
on renewable energy are frustrated by an inability to foster the
desired growth. This lack of knowledge about financing possi-
bilities is a major deterrent to the adoption of conservation
and renewables, which must be overcome.
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Given the lessons of earlier chapters about warning people,
it is clear that simply issuing dire sounding proclamations
about coming shortages is not enough to cause substantial
evasive action to be effective. The warning must allow indivi-
dually implementable solutions to be practiced. In this case,
because few have adequate capital to make the investment even if
they were persuaded, a way for individuals to pay for major
capital investments must be created, and articulating this
creation must be part of the warning process.
When individuals decide to make capital purchases, such as
buying a new car, a host of factors enter into the decision.
Depending on one's circumstances, one might choose a sportster,
a station wagon or a small pick-up truck. It might be new or
used, bought on time, via automobile dealer financing plans,
paid for with cash or paid for with a bank loan. In most cases,
the decision is not justified as a wise investment which will
pay the canny purchaser big dividends via improved mileage per
gallon. Rather, the service of transportation is purchased and
that is considered reason enough for the expenditure.
The same kind of rationale (or lack of one) is evident when
bathrooms are renovated. Perfectly serviceable rooms which
provide space for cleaning our bodies and removing its waste are
often modified by adding new appliances, different carpets, etc.
One does not amortize the investment over the number of flushes,
.
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or delightful baths. One simply "improves" one's dwelling. If
financial justification is requested, often it is satisfied by a
. vague statement of recovering the investment upon sale of the
dwelling.
Unfortunately, decisions to insulate one's attic are seldom
arrived at so randomly. Most energy conservation investments
are very carefully weighed. After 10 years of attempting to
warn people about the energy problem, I have concluded that the
root of endless questions about rate of return, payback period
and similar attempts to quantify the benefits of energy invest-
ments come from lack of other, obvious benefits and feedback.
Lacking aesthetic reward, or status reward, the only other
appraisal left is either psychological satisfaction about being
more secure or counting the money invested and reassuring
oneself that it was a "good buy." For this reason, the finance
method of evaluating conservation and renewable investments
becomes a primary sales tool.
In every financing scheme, subsidized or not, there are at
least two parties - the source of the capital and the borrower.
From this base transaction there are literally infinite
permutations. Lenders can be private individuals, banks,
pension funds, insurance companies, limited partnerships,
government or quasi-government agencies, etc. The loans can be
made more secure by loan guarantees, second mortgages, leins,
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personal guarantees against loss, underwriting and a host of
other devices. Borrowers can pay back loans in a fixed schedule
of payments, at fixed interest, or variable interest or varying
payments, for various lengths of loans, or repayment based on
rate of return on investment generated.
In t}ie case of energy financing, to this mix is added tax
credits, interest deductions, variable escalating costs of fuel,
uncertain supply and in some cases new, relatively unproven,
technologies
.
If the scheme involves subsidies, they can come from third
parties (government, utilities) or the source of the capital
who, for some reason, might be willing to lend money for less
than they might otherwise receive.
To calculate the value of the investment, a plethora of
methods exist, including internal rate of return, simple payback
and discounted rate of return.
Aside from energy problems, this complex set of tools has
existed for many years, and a field of specialists in finance
has arisen to manipulate the variables to bring about financing
of projects. In the case of energy conservation finance, these
tools are not yet well-used, due to several factors.
First, most energy projects are, by traditional financial
criterion, small - between $10,000 and $250,000 per project.
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This small size makes it difficult for financing professionals
to make enough income on any given deal to justify their invest-
ments of time. Secondly, those individuals interested in energy
conservation tend to come from the ranks of technically trained
or social service providers, and often lack the background to
use the complex tools of another profession.
Third, many members of the financial community to whom
advocates of a soft path future might turn for advice are,
themselves, not familiar with various state and Federal tax
incentives and loan guarantee programs specifically for energy.
This lack of knowledge, coupled with a suspicion of the
technology involved, means projects fail to go forward.
In this chapter, I review various energy conservation and
renewable energy subsidies and financing techniques in use
around the United States. I will explain how they work and
lessons that have been learned in the process. This will be
followed in the last chapter by a scenario for the design of
Franklin County's own financing effort, building on the observed
lessons and the county's unique legal, financial and political
features
.
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Calculating Cost Benefit
In considering various financing schemes, it is necessary
to agree on a commonly understood set of terms which describe
how much benefit is gained for how much investment. Several
different ways of describing financial outcomes exist. They
are:
.
• Simple Payback
• Rate of Return
• Discounted Cash Flow
• Life Cycle Costing
Simple payback . Simple payback is the number of years it takes
for a project to pay for itself in energy cost savings, not
counting tax credits, depreciation or escalating fuel costs. It
is a quick method for screening viable projects from those not
yet viable. By ignoring the tax credits for escalating fuel
costs, it gives a conservative answer. For example, if an attic
insulation job cost $400 and saved $200 annually, the simple
payback of the project is two years.
Rate of return . Rate of return is a statement of what percen-
tage was earned on an investment. For example, if someone puts
$1,000 in a savings bank and at the end of the year is credited
with an interest payment of $52.50, they earned a 5-1/4-^ rate of
return.
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Using our previous example of an attic insulation job
costing $400, which saves $200 annually, the rate of return
would be 50%. Since this represents a savings in new tax free
dollars to the homeowner, it would be called a tax free rate of
return of 50% (equal to a before tax rate of return of 67% for a
taxpayer earning $23,500 per year and in the 34% tax bracket).
Most rate of return calculations do take into account the
credits, depreciation and fuel cost escalation.
Discounted cash flow . In this method, the investment made is
assigned a cost in addition to the outlay. If the investor
possessed the capital, then by spending it on attic insulation,
he loses the opportunity to earn money elsewhere. This is
deducted from the benefits. If he has to borrow the funds, then
the cost of borrowing is factored in.
In addition, the stream of costs and benefits over the life
of the project, including the tax benefits and fuel escalation,
are factored in, and reduced (discounted) for inflation. This
results in a sum of future costs and benefits expressed, not in
inflation affected dollars, but in dollars worth what they are
in the year the project is proposed. This method is usually
used by corporations.
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Life cycle costing. In accounting, it is not uncommon to cost
justify capital investments of some magnitude over the expected
useful life of the investment. Such an analysis is often made
when a choice must be made between two investment options -
first, low initial cost with high operative cost, and second,
high initial cost and low operative cost.
For example, let us suppose someone needs to buy a car to
drive 20,000 miles a year, and is confronted with two choices:
• A $500 car that gets 10 miles to the gallon
at $1.50 per gallon.
• A $2,000 car that gets 40 miles to the gallon
at $1.50 per gallon.
Assuming a useful life of one year, the operating cost of Option
1 are $500 + (20,000 -r 10) $1.50 = $3,500. The cost of Option 2
would be $2,000 + (20,000 -t 40) $1.50 = $2,750. Only by
comparing the initial cost and the operating cost over the life
of the investment would someone know that Option 2 is cheaper.
Such economic comparisons are frequently used to discuss
the cost of energy conservation and solar energy compared with
continued use of oil, as in the case of a homeowner trying to
decide if it made sense to add a capital investment to their
home to realize a reduction in operating costs.
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As such, the investment is an addition to the property
owner's equity - unlike buying stock or betting on horses, it is
an investment that is totally in their control.
When considering the cost of a solar or conservation addi-
tion to a dwelling, or other personally-owned property many
decision makers forget to consider the value of the equity
increase. They simply divide the cost of the investment by the
immediate benefits, and conclude the energy to be expensive.
In Massachusetts, the state has passed a law requiring life
cycle costing calculations to be applied to all new publicly
financed buildings.
Federal Energy Tax Credit (individual)
The IRS gives a variety of tax breaks to homeowners and
tenants via income tax credits for conservation and renewable
energy investments in their dwellings. A tax credit is not the
same as a tax deduction. A tax deduction is taken away from
gross wages to arrive at net taxable income, whereas a tax
credit is subtracted from the taxes due. If someone earned
$23,400 annually and was therefore in the 34% tax bracket, a
$10.00 tax deduction is worth $3.40 in tax savings, whereas a
$10.00 tax credit would be $10.00 someone did not need to send
to the tax collector.
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The annual tax credits are:
• Fifteen percent of any money spent on conservation up to
a total credit of $300, if claimed before 1986. It can
be carried forward if you don' t owe tax money in the
year you make the investment. If someone moves, the
process begins again. The credit cannot be claimed by a
landlord for rental property. [1]
• A 40% tax credit for residential installations up to
$2,000 credit covers wind, active solar or geothermal
equipment. [2
]
Federal Energy Tax Credit (Business)
For business use, two laws, [3] [4] combine to provide tax
credits for various specific technologies. The dates for which
the energy tax credits apply varies.
Technology
Amount of
Credit
Date of
Expiration
Boilers, Burners and other
Equipment to Use Renewable
Fuels
10% 1982*
Co-generation Equipment 10% 1982*
Hydroelectric Equipment 11% 1985
Ocean Thermal Equipment 15% 1985
Conservation Equipment 10% 1982*
Solar Electric Equipment 15% 1985
Solar Thermal Equipment 15% 1985
Solar Industrial Process Heat
*Could be renewed
15% 1985
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A wide variety of other accessories are also covered; this list
is not definitive. The energy tax credits cannot be used if tax
exempt bond financing (described below) is used, as the law
contains a "double dipping" provision.
Federal Investment Tax Credit
All business investments made which meet conditions of the
Economic Recovery Act of 1981 are eligible to receive a 10%
investment tax credit and depreciation over an accelerated time
frame, which is generally five years, with buildings falling
into the 15-year class. This is considerably shorter than
previous practice, which had items depreciated over their useful
life, which often stetched 30 years and beyond.
The combined effect of business and energy tax credits,
along with accelerated depreciation, can produce dramatic
results. For example, a company could come out ahead by
investing in a $20,000 solar industrial process heat system,
which produces energy at a cost equal to conventional sources by
borrowing the money from a bank for 10 years at 15%. The
following table shows the result:
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TABLE 19
EFFECT OF TAX BENEFITS ON INVESTMENT
YEAR
ENERGY
SAVINGS
(ACTUAL)*
ANNUAL
PAYMENT TAX DEDUCTION
1 $3,864 $3,864 $4,000 CREDIT +
2 4,250 3,864
$3,000 DEDUCTION
(DEPRECIATION
$4,400 DEDUCTION
3 . 3,675 3,864 $4,400 DEDUCTION
4 5,142 3,864 $4,200 DEDUCTION
5 5,657 3,864 $4,200 DEDUCTION
6 6,223 3,864
7 6,845 3,864
8 7,530 3,864
9 8,282 3,864
10 9,111 3,864
*Presumes a 10% Cost Escalation Rate
**10% I.T.C. + 10% E.T.C. + 5 Year Depreciation
(15%, 22%, 21%, 21%, 21%)
In this example, the company could afford to pay a
substantial ($4,000) down payment, which it would recover as
a tax credit, and would wind up sheltering other income, via
deduction, for 5 years, and get a secure source of energy,
while saving money on energy costs each year.
State Income Tax Credit
The State of Massachusetts has passed an income tax
credit for renewable energy that works in tandem with the
Federal Residential Tax Credit. Under this law, 35% of the
net cost of the solar system, after the Federal tax credit
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is taken, can be deducted from Massachusetts income taxes,
up to $1,000. This means that 57.5% of the cost of an ac-
tive solar system purchased in Massachusetts for use in a
residence will be paid for by the combination of Federal and
State tax credits. It should be remembered that if subsi-
dized financing occurs, the Federal tax credit is lost. [5]
Section 210 of PURPA
Congress determined that facilities which produce
electricity by cogeneration, and/or are under a certain
size, are to be called qualifying facilities. As such, they
are exempt from Federal regulation previously under the Fed-
eral Power Act. This relaxing of Federal regulations does
not remove State Utility Commission regulation. In addi-
tion, PURPA 210 mandates that utilities must buy electricity
from qualifying facilities and must pay for it at a rate
equal to the purchaser’s marginal cost of power - generally
the highest cost power a utility has. Qualifying facilities
can also be depreciated over five years. In addition, under
PURPA 210, qualifying facilities are exempt from the Public
Utilities Holding Company Act, which law covers Security and
Exchange Commission aspects. All in all, PURPA 210 guaran-
tees small power producers a market for their product at a
good price, with a relative minimum legal hassle.
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At this writing, PURPA is being reviewed by the courts and
Congress. It is expected that its basic intent will not change,
but that it will be simplified. [6]
Property Tax Abatement
Property tax exemptions and credits are used in 30 of the
50 states.
Generally, the states have followed one of the three
approaches of property tax exemptions: (1) Solar systems will be
exempt from any property tax increase (15 states); (2) The
individual property owner is given an exemption equal to the
assessed value of the solar system (7 states); or (3) the solar
house is to be assessed as if it has a conventional heating
system (4 states). [7]
Increasing property taxes may result from local assessors
increasing the value of property to which a solar system has
been added. For example:
If a homeowner in Greenfield, Massachusetts is contem-
plating buying a solar water heater for $3,000 and property
taxes are $38.80 per thousand, [8] then the annual tax bill
becomes $116.40 for the solar system. If this system saves 60%
of the cost of heating water electrically for a family of four
at 6. 5^ per kilowatt[9] then the annual savings will be $172.80.
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When the tax bill is added to the purchase payment, the
homeowner sees a net loss.
In recognition of this fact, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts has passed a law which states that renewable
energy equipment will not be subject to property tax for 20
years. This waiver expires December 31, 1983, unless extended.
Sales Tax Abatement
Sales tax is defined as a tax levied on the sale of goods
and services that is usually calculated as a percentage of the
purchase price and collected by the seller. It may come under
either State or local jurisdiction, or both. Sales tax
normally increases the cost of solar system by 3 to 6 percent of
the material cost. At least nine states have passed sales use
tax incentives. Two approaches were used by these states. The
first is to exempt the taxes due for design, purchase and
installation of a solar energy system at the time of sale. The
primary advantage of this approach is that the incentive is
available immediately to the consumer. The other approach is to
administer the incentive as a rebate. This approach allows
participation by the do-it-yourself solar builder, who may have
gathered his construction materials from a wide variety of
sources, then submitting receipts for their purchase. [9]
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The State of Massachusetts has passed a sales tax waiver
law (Chapter 64H, Section 6,D,D,) of the first type. [10]
Since not charging taxes (real estate or sales) won't help
people acquire capital to buy renewable energy equipment and as
a consequence of the lack of availability or local tax-derived
funding, many cities have tried to finance energy conservation
programs by obtaining grants. Such a strategy was used in
Holyoke, Massachusetts, where:
"A pool of nearly $1.8 million is being used to
help small business in Holyoke finance energy
conservation improvements.
"The program is being funded partially by a
$750,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development. The HUD grant will be used to
provide free energy audits to over 100 industries and
to administer a revolving load fund that will provide
financing for energy conservation measures at below-
market loan rates.
"The city will hire consultants to perform ther-
mological infrared scans of the buildings and manufac-
turing processes of businesses that qualify for the
guidelines. About 110 of Holyoke's 160 manufacturers
will qualify for the program.
"Once the energy audits are completed, the con-
sultants will advise the company managers about
improvements they could make in the companies'
buildings, manufacturing, processes, and heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning systems to use
energy more efficiently. The consultants will help
the manages calculate the payback period of each
suggested improvement, after which the cost of energy
saved will exceed the cost of the conservative
measure. "[ 11
]
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Portland Energy Conservation, Inc . The City of Portland,
Oregon also used the grant approach, applying for and receiving
a $1,000,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (U.D.A.G. grant) which it is using to finance energy
audits for the business sector. The U.D.A.G. grants require
that every $1 of U.D.A.G. money yield $10 in private investment.
The program has two elements. First, the city's conserva-
tion arm, Energy Conservation, Inc., makes zero- interest loans
for audits aimed at identifying actions or improvements which
will pay for themselves in one year. In cases where the audit
results in a series of one year payback recommendations which
are then implemented, the cost of the audit is "forgiven" the
client and paid for from the U.D.A.G. grant.
The second program element consists of a $9.7 million
dollar fund created by local banks, which will be loaned out at
market rates to implement energy savings recommendations from
the audits. When all the conservation measures identified in
the preliminary audit are completed, the audit loan is forgiven.
The measures identified must have a five-year simple
payback. [12
]
These programs did work, and provided valuable lessons.
However, the total magnitude of the task far outstrips the pool
of grant funds. For example, the Federal Community Development
Block Grant Program, which is the largest Federal program
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available to finance everything from housing programs to mass
transit done by local government, had a disbursable budget of
$3.4 billion in 1982, down from $4.4 billion in 1980 [13] and the
total amount of money given for all purposes by all foundations
in 1981 was $3 billion dollars. [14] This compares with an
estimated $10 billion dollars spent on energy conservation in
1980 and a forecasted need for $50 billion in 1990, and every
year thereafter. [15]
Since it is obvious that there are other, equally meritori-
ous claims on the pool of available grant monies, only asmall
portion of the needed capital can come from these sources. If
political entities are to make a transition from non-renewable
energy sources, they must develop other sources.
Tax Exempt Bonds
The main reason political entities would get involved in
issuing bonds for energy projects is that they possess an
ability to provide a subsidy. Using this ability to subsidize
encourages energy projects, preserves jobs and halts the flow of
dollars out of the community, thereby increasing the tax base
and local transaction (sales) tax revenue to the city.
This subsidy is created by Section 103, a provision of the
Internal Revenue Code which states that the interest paid to the
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purchasers of a municipal bond is exempt from income tax. For
example, if people put their savings in a money market fund,
they might receive interest payments of 13% annually. If
someone earned $23,499 annually and received an interest payment
of $1.00, the Federal Government would take 34$ of that final
dollar. [16] If that last $1.00 was tax exempt, it's worth 34$
more than a taxable dollar. Accordingly, the interest rate on
tax exempt bonds paid to the bond holder is lower. In this
case, our bond holder could receive as low as 9.8% tax free and
still be ahead. In other words, the political entity can pay
people it owes money less interest because, according to IRS,
the recipient can keep it all, instead of paying taxes on it to
the government.
Because the city can pay bond holders back at relatively
low interest, it can also loan the funds derived from bond sales
out at low interest. This ability to loan money at approxi-
mately three-fourths of the normal market rate is the subsidy.
In effect, the subsidy is provided by the Federal Govern-
ment, which has agreed to forego receiving income it otherwise
would have. If the state involved has a state income tax, this
may also represent a loss in income to them. Both of these
groups provide a subsidy to the local political entity issuing
the bond who, in turn, passes it along.
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It can be worth a lot of money to a person or factory
trying to implement a project. For example - Acme Frisbee wants
to install new energy conserving equipment, and compares the
project's costs under two financing sources - a bank and an
industrial revenue bond (IRB). The hypothetical terms are a
$100,000 loan with a 10-year payback schedule.
Bank Loan IRB Capitalized Loan
Principal Due: $100,000.00 Principal Due: $100,000.00
Monthly Payment @18% Monthly Payment @ 13.5%
= $ 1,801.86 = $ 1,522.75
Total Repaid: $216,223.00 Total Repaid: $182,730.00
The use of the industrial revenue bond saved the borrower
$33,493 over ten years.
This tool need not be limited in its application. For
example, a financing package could consist of a portion of the
money being raised by bond issue, and a portion being raised
from banks or other tradition sources, combined. The interest
rate will still be lower than traditional financing.
The simple existence of lower than market rate loans for
energy conservation does not guarantee their utilization. A
study of innovative bank loan practices in support of energy
conservation done in 1977 (before the 1978 energy price hikes)
found 10 programs where banks had shaved 1/2% to 1-1/2% interest
off regular home improvement loan packages for conservation
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loans. All ten were cancelled within 3 months, due to "abysmal"
consumer interest. The major finding was that lowering interest
without stretching out the repayment schedule did not put enough
potential projects into the positive cash flow mode. [17]
An additional benefit to bond financing is that repayment
schedules can be longer than banks will agree to. While this
must be negotiated in advance, it is not unusual for banks to
require full repayment in three to five years; while the revenue
bond could go as long as 30 years. This lowers the monthly
repayment considerably, and puts more projects in the realm of
possibility. For example, comparing our $100,000 dollar 10 year
bank loan at 18% to Acme Frisbee Company to a $100,000 dollar
IRB loan at $13.5% for 20 years.
Bank Loan at 18% Interest IRB Loan at 13.5% Interest
Principal Due: $100,000.00 Principal Due: $100,00.00
10 Years 15 Years
Mo. Payment: $ 1,801.86 Mo. Payment: $ 1,298.00
This arrangement would allow the Acme Frisbee Company to invest
in energy conservation or renewable energy projects costing
$100,000, and theprojects would only have to save $1,298 a month
to make the investment attractive. Using traditional financing
arrangements would require savings of $1,800 to be attractive
39% greater.
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There are two kinds of tax exempt bonds - general obliga-
tion bonds and revenue bonds.
In the case of a general obligation bond, bonds are issued
in the name of the citizens of a political entity and backed by
the ability to tax, thus guaranteeing ability to repay. Such
bonds are usually used for large capital outlay projects that
cannot be funded from short term tax income, so a long-term debt
is incurred, much like a mortgage.
As such, consent of the taxpayer is often required, usually
through referenda. The law on this vary by state. Such pro-
cedures are usually used to raise money to pay for such projects
as schools, sewers and other items usually considered to be for
the "common good."
In 1980, the State of Massachusetts passed a law to use
general obligation bonds to finance energy conservation and
renewable energy projects. In July of that year, the Massachu-
setts Alternative Energy Property Program was established by an
act of the legislature to provide up to $5 million dollars in
funding for the improvement of buildings and facilities owned by
the Commonwealth, its political subdivisions and public
authorities. [18]
Projects in solar thermal, wood/alcohol/biomass and solar
electric, including wind and photo voltaics, were authorized up
to $2.5 million dollars. Bonds for hydro power can be issued up
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to $1 million dollars, and the remaining $1.5 million dollars is
dedicated to public housing projects. An additional $15 million
dollars was approved for conservation. By 1982, all the funds
had been expended, and officials of the state energy office felt
the program was a big success. Due to financial conditions
within the state, however, it has been deemed politically
unlikely that additional bonds backed by the taxing authority of
the state would be approved for any non-essential purpose in the
future. [19]
Oregon used the same type of program, but for the general
public. In Oregon, a small scale local Energy Loan Program
(ELP) was approved by voters in May of 1980. [20] The ELP
administered by the Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE), allows
the state's bonding authority to be used to provide funding
through a loan fund for small scale projects which use renewable
resources to provide energy. After approval from the State
Treasurer, general obligation bonds are issued to provide the
required loan back-up funds. Enabling legislation (SB 611) for
the program was passed in 1979. A seven-member advisory
coramitte was appointed by the director of the ODOE on rules
governing the program and to review and make recommendations on
loan applications. As mentioned previously, individuals
receiving tax exempt financing cannot avail themselves of the
various Federal tax credits.
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Any individual, small business, non-profit cooperative
corporation or municipal corporation (including cities, counties
and special districts organized for a public purpose) may apply
for a loan. Small businesses are defined as sole proprietor-
ships, cooperatives or corporations in Oregon, organized for
profit and employing less than 100 people.
Small-scale energy projects have been defined to include
systems which use solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, waste heat
or water resources to supply heat, electricity or substitute
fuels. Term of repayment is not to exceed 30 years.
This program has been running for about a year, and has
loaned $15 million dollars at 12% for 20 years. The ultimate
size of the program is $680 million dollars.
The City of Baltimore, Maryland, initiated a home conserva-
tion loan program in April of 1981. [21] The program provides up
to $3,500 in loan funds to families with incomes of up to
$30,000 per year. The loan terms are 7 years at 11-1/4%
interest. Because this program is funded with a general
obligation bond issue, recipients cannot claim the 15% Federal
tax credit.
Area banks initiate and process the loans, and upon
implementation of the loan, the city buys them, using the
revenue bond proceeds.
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The experiences of Massachusetts, Oregon and Baltimore,
Maryland, are illustrative of programs based on general obliga-
tion bonds. As taxpayers across the country are struggling to
reduce taxes, a pro'gram based on backing bonds with taxation is
not always popular with voters. In this political climate,
revenue bonds are probably more feasible, as well as more
equitable, as the beneficiary of the loan is obliged to repay
it
.
Revenue bonds are sold by political subdivisions, or their
agents (such as housing authorities or industrial development
commissions). They are backed, not by the ability to tax, but
by the revenues the money will generate. For example, if a city
sold revenue bonds to bondholders and agreed to pay them 12% for
10 years, they could turn around and loan the money for 12.5% to
an industry to build a factory. The bondholders are reassured
as to the wisdom of their investment, not because the city could
back the bond via taxation, but because the factory has agreed
to repay the city. In other words, the bonds generated
revenue
.
Interest rates on revenue bonds are generally .5 to 1.5%
higher than on general obligation bonds, because of the higher
level of risk involved.
An important caveat is that such revenue bonds can only be
used if the loan has a valid, public purpose. The decision of
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what constitutes such a purpose is a decision which rests in the
taxing districts, and it cannot be presumed. For this reason,
it is necessary to secure expert advice before using this method
of capitalization.
People who receive financing under industrial revenue bonds
or other "subsidized government financing," cannot take
advantage of the energy tax credit, under a provision of the law
which established that credit. This provision was phased in
under the law, but becomes fully operational at the end of
1982 . [ 22 ]
Revenue bonds have been used for projects in both the
industrial and residential sector. In the residential sector,
the programs often could serve a larger population than they
do.
Many of the programs which exist around the country have
their origin in low income housing assistance. As a
consequence, eligibility is often determined by an income means
test - one must prove a degree of poverty before being eligible
for a tax exempt bond derived loan.
This requirement is not a Federal requirement. It is
imposed by the state or local housing board members. As such,
if it exists as regulation, it must go through formal change
process
.
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One of the best known tax exempt energy programs is the
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency Home Improvement Loan
Program. [23] In 1980, the Agency issued $26 million dollars
worth of tax exempt revenue bonds, one million dollars of which
were earmarked primarily for energy conservation rehabilitation.
Loans are made at 9%, with no means test.
If the property to be improved is a rental property, the
tenants must be predominantly low income, and receive a portion
of the benefits of lower energy costs. This program was a big
success, according to the project director, and led to the
modification of another agency program, the Owner-Occupied Horae
Improvement Loan Program. The modification allows funds which
were previously available only to renovate dwellings 15 years or
older to be used on any owner-occupied dwelling if thefunds are
for solar or energy conservation.
The City of Minneapolis, Minnesota has established a
revolving loan fund capitalized with revenue bonds. [24] Working
in conjunction with the local gas utility, Minnigasco, the loan
funds are made available as part of a total program, including
energy audits, installer certification, and financing. Loans
can be made up to $3,000 at 10% interest, with a long payback
schedule.
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The city's Community Development Corporation joined with
the gas company and issued tax exempt revenue bonds. The gas
company donated $50,000 to a pool to act as loan guarantee for
the loans, which were aimed at the residential sector, with no
means test. This loan guarantee pool removed the need to place
a lien on the loan recipient's home or other assets, and removed
what was perceived to be a significant barrier to program
success
.
The loans are collected by Minnigasco, as part of their
regular monthly billing process, and the money is turned over to
the C.D.C. to repay bondholders. No service charge was levied
by Minnigasco.
The program is a huge success, and attempts are underway to
expand it to investor-owned multi-family dwellings.
The Vermont Housing Authority began a low- interest loan
program in 1979 that was unusual in that they did not sell bonds
to raise the capital. Instead, they identified a reserve fund
created by a previous mortgage revenue bond issue. This reserve
fund was a pot, created by people who paid off loans generated
by the bond sale earlier than anticipated. After deducting a
prudent amount, which was left in reserve, the $2 million
dollars remaining was placed in local banks, with instructions
that the funds could be loaned at 8-1/2%, with a $3,000 per loan
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limit. The funds lasted two years, and ultimately paid for
weatherization of 800 homes. [25]
»
The State of Tennessee has used its housing development
authority to issue revenue bonds for solar water heaters since
1978. [26] It is set up to provide an incentive to builders to
include solar water heating systems in new construction for low
and moderate income housing. A 9% basic construction loan of up
to $44,000 can be made in urban areas, and up to $36,000 in non-
urban areas, to which an additional $2,000 can be added if it is
used by the builder for a solar water heater.
The program has begun to encounter constraints of a
different kind. The Mortgage Subsidy Tax Act of 1980, imposes
limits on the size of subsidized mortgages. These limits are
rather low for Tennessee, and builders have all they can do to
build a basic structure within the limits, without adding a
$2,000 cost for a solar water heater.
This program, one of the first to use revenue bonds in this
manner, has not resulted in a large demand for solar water
heaters. According to the project director, less than 20
systems have been financed. He attributed this to three
factors
:
1) Low energy costs, due to Tennessee Valley Authority
presence. Electric water heating costs about $200
annually, and a $2,000 loan at 9% for 20 years is about
the same cost.
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2) No publicity.
3) The program is targeted at low income people who are
wary of new products.
The Virginia Housing Development Authority (VHDA) estab-
lished an Energy Conservation and Rehabilitation Loan Program in
1978 to provide loans to low and moderate income persons to
finance home improvements for existing single-family residential
housing units. [27] Families whose income was approximately
$16,000 per year, or less, qualify. Loans for these purposes
included energy improvements, such a the installation of insula-
tion, storm windows and doors, and solar and alternative energy
systems. the homes are required to be owner-occupied at the
time of the loan issue. Loans are also made available for
improvements in buildings owned by public and non-profit organi-
zations. Capital is generated through a $5 million revenue
bond, issued by the VHDA for this purpose. Loans are made at
8.25 to 8.75 percent annual interest rates, to be paid back over
periods ranging from six months to fifteen years. The amount of
the loan ranges from $1,000 to $15,000 (the maximum allowed by
FHA regulations). Approximately 540 loans were made, with the
average loan being approximately $7,500 to $8,000. As many as
97 percent of these loans are said to be for energy-related
improvements. Loans were awarded on the basis of proof of
income level, credit, and the nature and need of the proposed
project.
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This program, like other revenue bond programs established
before passage of the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980,
sold its bonds and was successful at disbursing the funds for
intended purchase in short order. While the staff of the
Virginia Housing Authority wanted to reissue additional bonds,
the 1980 law significantly dampened their ability because it
placed restraints on the mark-up that issuing agencies could
take to cover operating expenses. They are studying ways around
this problem now.
The City of Baltimore, Maryland is going to be initiating a
sequel to its general obligation bond program, discussed
earlier, by issuing $7 million dollars in revenue bonds in the
Summer of 1982. [28] Aimed at buildings up to four families,
these loans will have 15-year terms, and be up to $15,000, at an
interest rate fixed at the time of the bond sale. Applicants
must have an income lower than $30,000. The loans will be
insured under the FHA Title I Loan Insurance Program.
The provisions of the IRS code governing industrial revenue
bonds allows use of the bonds for provisions of utility ser-
vices. The City of Suzanville, California, is investigating use
of IRB's to build geothermal energy systems to guarantee energy
to its industrial parks. [29]
The use of revenue bonds to assist the industrial sector to
install conservation and renewable energy is not new and is
growing.
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In 1980, in California, the legislature etablished the
California Alternative Energy Financing Authority, which has
authority to issue $200 million in revenue bonds to finance
projects utilizing alternative energy sources, including
cogeneration, solar, biomass, wind, geothermal, and hydroelec-
tric facilities
. [30] It has been set up similarly to existing
housing authorities and industrial development authorities, but
has as its primary emphasis, revenue generating energy projects.
This authority is now functioning, and is issuing bonds during
the Spring of 1982 for six projects (hydroelectric, cogeneration
and district heating), totaling $18,500,000 at approximately 10%
interest for 10 years.
One of the interesting findings of this project is that,
since alternative energy projects and conservation pay for
themselves in a rather short time frame, bonds can be for a
shorter term (7-10 years) which makes them attractive to
investors, allow slightly lower interest rates, and still be
desirable project financing.
Contrary to popular belief, it is not necessary to have a
major bond sale involving minimum purchases of $20,000 in order
to utilize the tax exempt bond avenue. "Mini-bonds" can be just
as fruitful a way to go.
The Township of East Brunswick, New Jersey (population
40,000) sold mini-bonds in 1978, in amounts of $100, $500 and
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$1,000. This was followed by Ocean County, New Jersey, which
raised $1 million dollars with a similar sale in 1979, and
Rochester, New York, which raised $500,000. [31
]
Mini—bonds (or citizen's bonds, as they are coming to be
known) can be sold either as general obligatiion bonds or
revenue bonds, and can be used to create capital pools that
could be used by the commercial and industrial sector, as well
as residential for the implementation of retrofit conservation
measures
.
[32
]
Such small issues can be part of a general community energy
strategy, and can be used to involve members of the community in
solving the problem. Given the apparent intractable nature of
the energy program, an offer of information, a broad-goaled
implementation program, a way to invest, and the provision of
low-cost, long-term financing can be designed to be very
powerful
.
Pension Funds
Each employer in Franklin County that provides a pension
plan for its employees has a trust fund it manages on their
behalf. As such, large amounts of money must be invested in
conservative investments, with an adequate rate of return, to
provide for the employees' retirement. The same situation
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exists with public agencies, such as school systems, cities and
hospitals
.
It has been argued successfully elsewhere that pension
funds should invest into "socially responsible" investmens. For
example, Alabama invests its public pension funds in construc-
tion loans to firms wishing to relocate into Alabama, on the
theory that a thriving economic environment in Alabama is a good
guarantee to a secure retirement for its civic workers. Florida
is looking at using its pension funds for its state employees to
issue home mortgages. California is doing the same. [32]
Loan Guarantees
A variety of programs exist to guarantee loans, thus
removing risk from the lender and providing for a slightly lower
interest rate.
HUD offers Federal loan insurance to single family property
owners under the FHA Title I Program. This program insures 90%
of each loan. A similar program exists for multi-family
loans
.
[33]
A community can also etablish a program to insure its own
loans, by establishing a default pool, funded by C.D.B.G. or
U.D.A.G. funds, which is maintained as long as the loans are
outstanding
.
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Leveraging
One device that can be used in projects involving public
funds dedicated to a specific purpose is leveraging. In this
strategy, public funds such as U.D.A.G. grants are placed in a
local financial institution and allowed to be loaned out
interest free, if they are mingled with private funds at market
rates. Together, the mingling of interest-free money and market
rate money are loaned out at a below-market rate.
This has the effect of forcing the financial institution to
create a dedicated loan pool of below market rate loans far in
excess of the public funds alone, and results in a theoretically
greater good accomplished. The cost to the municipality is the
foregone interest on the grant funds.
The limits of this device are that for some kinds of public
good activities, such as low income housing renovation, where
the recipients are unable to repay loans at all, leveraging does
not help. It is only useful in situations where loans are to be
made, and where the leveraging funds are not expected to be
repaid at maximum rates of return. [34]
In the Holyoke, Massachusetts energy conservation program
mentioned earlier, leveraging was used to good effect.
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"Designed to offer financing options attractive
enough to help some of these companies invest in
the improvement now, the loans will be available from
the city s Industrial Affairs Corporation, using a
revolving fund of$1.272 million in financing from
Holyoke's nine banks and $508,000 from the HUD grant.
"For every $2.50 of bank funds borrowed at market
rates, each loan will include $1 from the HUD grant at
zero interest.
"The Office of Industrial Affairs administrator
hopes to have audits on the 110 small industries in
Holyoke completed in about two years. After that, the
program will be expanded to include commercial
buildings . "[35
]
The Southern Tier Energy Enterprise Development Loan
Program (S.T.E.E.D.) capitalized its programs with funds
supplied by the Appalachian Regional Commission ($850,000 in
1979). The Commission makes loans to an eight-county region of
New York State. There are approximately 800 firms in the eight-
county region. S.T.E.E.D. funds cover all expenses (technical
assistance, loan administration costs and loan principal) for an
energy project which will result in creation of or retention of
one job for every $10,000 loaned. In two and one-half years,
only one default has occured, and all but $20,000 has been
committed. Maximum loans are for $50,000, at 8% for five years.
S.T.E.E.D. loans 40% or more of the total amount necessary for a
particular project and promotes initial participation by conven-
tional loan institutions, thus creating leveraging. A loan
242
review committee reviews applications and makes recommendations
to the S.T.E.E.D. director. This program works in tandem with
the state's E.A.S.I. Program, which offers energy audits and
technical assistance. [36]
It is not unusual for a program to be designed where a
subsidy is mixed with a leveraging program.
Subsidy takes three basic forms:
1) Through direct subsidy as principal reduction.
2) Through direct subsidy as interest reduction.
3) Through direct payment to borrower, who borrows
less.
There are advantages to each form, perhaps best illustrated
by example.
Principal Reduction
Presume a public agency wishes to provide $15,000 at
interest for a 15-year terra, in order to finance a conservation
project. First, it negotiates loan terras with a private lender
at 17% (the market rate) for 15 years. This results in an
original loan payment of $230.86 (principal and interest).
Next, the desirable loan payment is calculated or established.
For example, the public agency might want to establish a $185.00
monthly payment. Since a monthly payment of $185.00 at 17%
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monthly payment. Since a monthly payment of $185.00 at 17%
would repay only $12,000 at the end of 15 years, the difference
in principal between the original loan and the subsidized loan
is $3,000, which is paid to the lender by the public authority,
at the initiation of the loan.
Interest Subsidies
In this case, the public funds are used to defray interest,
not principal. We will use the same case as above - a loan of
$15,000 for 15 years. Since the desire is to make the loan at a
lower percentage than 17% market rate, the monthly payments will
be $185.00, instead of $230.00, with the public agency making up
the balance.
The public agency could either make 15 years' worth of
payments at $45.86 per month, totaling $8,254.80, or provide a
one lump settlement. This settlement size is determined by
finding the principal amount that could be borrowed for 15 years
at market rates for a monthly payment of $45.86 at 17%. In this
case, it amounts to approximately $3,000. Therefore, the public
agency pays a lump sum of $3,000 to the financial institution
after tax benefits of various subsidies.
While the monthly payment to the financial institution by
the loan recipient is the same in both cases, the after-tax
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benefits to the recipient are not. Recalling our earlier
example of , a taxpayer earning $23,500 who finds that 344 of each
marginal dollar is due the government in taxes. According to
IRS regulations, interest payments are tax deductible to
individuals. This means that any amount paid in interest is
deducted from gross wages before the tax rate is calculated. By
offering the subsidy by interest reduction, one of the side
effects is denying the borrower the tax deduction which, in this
case, is worth 344 on the dollar. Our $23,500 taxpayer, if he
received a principal reduction instead of an interest reduction,
gains a $45.86 tax deduction every month, or $550 a year. Given
our mythical 15-year loan and the 34% tax bracket, the taxpayer
comes out $2,806 to the good after taxes ($550 x 15 x $.34 =
$2,806).
In addition to the public sector incentives described
above, six methods exist that enable public and private building
owners to have the work done without using either government or
their own funds, or at least without going in the red.
These six methods are:
1) Conventional Financing
2) Shared Savings
3) Energy Management
4) Micro Utility
5) Leasing
6 ) Guaranteed Cash Flow
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Each of these methods have advantages and disadvantages, and are
suitable for some situations and not others; perhaps best
illustrated by example.
Conventional Financing
In most circumstances, people wishing to finance energy
efficiency improvements would try to secure funds from a local
bank or financing agency or some major- institutional lender such
as a pension fund or insurance company. In this case, the loan
is evaluated by traditional criterion, mostly having to do with
the credit worthiness of the borrower. If the borrower has a
lot of debt relating to assets, or is in financially shaky
circumstances, the financial institution might deny the loan, or
place a lein on the business which clouds title of otherwise
disposable assets. In addition, financial institutions often
require very short payback terras, making the cash flow of a good
investment difficult to handle.
If possible, working with traditional lenders is an
advantageous way to go, because the borrower gets to retain a
higher percentage of the benefits of the project. If forced to
use other financing means, the net benefit to the borrower is
often reduced, However, it might be the only option open. In
like public or non-profit agencies,other circumstances,
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obtaining permission to borrow might be extremely difficult or
illegal
.
Shared Savings
In this arrangement, a building owner makes a deal with a
firm who specializes in reducing energy costs. The firm
inspects the building, selects improvements that will reduce
energy consumption significantly, and after appropriate legal
contracts are signed, makes the improvements. Energy consump-
tion prior to the improvements (usually going back two years) is
compared to energy consumption after the improvements. The cash
value of the energy savings are split between the building owner
and the company doing the improvements. While arrangements vary
according to the transaction, the split is usually 50-50 for 7
years, with the title to the improvements going to the building
owner after that time. This arrangement allows building owners
who have no money for capital improvements to upgrade their
building, and lower energy costs.
The disadvantages are chiefly in lost opportunity. Since
the investor receives 50% of the savings, and out of that must
pay for all the legal and techncal work, and derive a salary, it
follows that the improvements chosen must have a very high
payback, indeed. Within the industry, most companies offering
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this service won't even look at a potential situation unless the
energy bill involved is $250,000 annually, and they won't invest
in improvements unless they repay the investment in 18 months to
two years.
These constraints create a situation that leads to "skim-
ming the cream" off potential improvements, leaving undone
improvements that contain potential improvements, that contain
potential to yield handsome rates of return, but not large
enough to split in half profitably.
In addition, the improved-upon facility's owner loses the
tax credits, depreciation, and so forth. In the case of build-
ings owned by tax exempt organizations, this is no loss, as they
did not have the use of them, anyway. By letting private
investors participate in what would otherwise have been a public
expenditure, the tax credits and depreciation become available
to the project, thus lowering the project cost by utilizing the
subsidy. (The IRS has a variety of positions on the use of tax
credits in public buildings. Depending on circumstances, a
qualified tax attorney is required in these deals.)
In a study done by the Solar Energy Research Institute, [37]
it was reported that the main function of shared savings plans
is to attract business owners to investigate their savings
potential. Often, after considering the size of return possible
to the project, the building owner chooses to go ahead with the
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project under a more traditional financing arrangement, thereby
keeping the savings for themselves.
One of the earliest school systems to use shared savings
was the Yuba City Unified School District in Yuba City,
California, one of the less affluent of California's school
districts. In 1975, they contracted with a firm to install
various conservation devices. The firm originally proposed
receiving 70% of the savings for three years in return for the
installation, but the school board negotiated a payment of 90%
for a two-year package, with title to the equipment passing at
the end of two years. The school board found a 40 to 60%
reduction in natural gas use, and 35% reduction in electricity.
At the end of two years, the vendor proposed an additional
two-year contract to do other conservation measures, under a 65%
- 35% split. This was agreed to, and resulted in still lower
bills.
The vendor reported having done 27 school districts in the
last six years, only two of which were not happy with the pro-
ject, and those two felt that the savings achieved were so
dramatic that the vendor must have been doing something
illicit. [38]
The use of shared savings raises the possibility of a
municipality or county treating public buildings energy costs,
not as a liability, but as an asset. The local government can
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issue bid requests for companies to reduce waste in public
facilities in return fora percentage of the savings. This
redefining of liabilities into assets is essentially an
educational process, with potentially huge cost savings. For
example, the City of San Francisco, California, which had a
modest conservation program in its public buildings, aimed at
reducing its $8 million dollar annual energy bill. Officials
believed that a shared savings bid could result in reducing
energy costs to $4 million in' two years, at no cost to the city,
and would result in approximately $100 million dollars saved by
the year 2000. [39]
There are currently 65 firms offering this service. [40]
See Appendix III.
Energy Management Companies
Basically, an energy management company sells comfort
levels. It enters into an agreement with a building owner (or
user, such as a renter) to provide temperatures in a certain
range, or water (both hot and cold) at certain temperatures at a
cost below that now paid by the user. The way the energy
management company provides those services, and how much it pays
to provide them, are not of concern to the building user,
who
has agreed to pay a regular fee, monthly, for comfort. In
this
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situation, the risk is borne by the energy management company,
who agrees to receive a fee from the user and, in turn, be
billed by the various utilities.
Example: A plant with an energy bill of $150,000 annually
commits to pay an energy management company $120,000 annually
for comfort. The energy management company contracts out for
building improvements, which result in utility costs $90,000,
and a monthly payment of $10,000 for equipment for five years.
The building users come out: $150,000
120,000
$ 30,000 Monthly to
the good
The energy management company $120,000
comes out: - 90,000
10,000 (for 5 years)
$ 20,000 Net
If the energy management company does its work badly, and
only reduces the energy bill to $115,000, it loses $5,000
annually ($120,000 - $115,000 = $10,000 loan, or a loss of
$5,000).
In order to make a deal like this work, the energy manage-
ment company must be able to design a system of conservation and
renewables with attractive financing. This form of financing
must save enough energy to pay design and procurement costs,
maintenance, and still provide a profit margin, while paying
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less than the previously responsible person did, regardless of
inflation, fuel cost increases, or other variables.
An example of companies in energy management is Scallop
Thermal Management, Inc., which has 72 projects underway in this
country, mostly in big office buildings.
The most thoroughly documented example of their approach is
the Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital project, in
Philadelphia. Working on a turnkey basis, Scallop Thermal
Services will install more than $2 million dollars worth of
capital improvements in the hospital facilities. At the close
of the ten year contract, title of the improvements will be
transferred to the hospital. In addition, another $2 million
dollars in service calls and maintenance will be furnished by
Scallop. The hospital complex, which has nine buildings total-
ing 2,200,000 square feet of space, covers most of two city
blocks in downtown Philadelphia. Over the ten year life of the
contract, energy consumption is expected to be reduced by 8%.
It should be noted that the improvements being installed by
Scallop are not aggressive, being limited to relamping, energy
management microprocessors and heat recovery devices. [41]
One thing that needs to be borne in mind about energy
management companies is that their goal is not to optimize the
project for energy savings. It is to optimize the project for
profitability to themselves. This means that the most cost
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beneficial investment will be used - not the most energy-saving
one.
Micro Utilities
In the micro utility concept, an energy-producing piece of
equipment is placed near an energy user. The equipment produces
energy which is sold to user, usually for a cost pegged to, but
lower than, the cost of energy available from the competing
major utility.
For example, a food processing factory which burns natural
gas may decide that it must lower its fuel bills. It could make
available a piece of land for the construction of a solar pond,
which would be owned by a second party. The food processing
plant would then buy heat from the pond, paying perhaps 75% of
the cost of heat provided by gas. It gains lower fuel bills and
a secure energy supply. The pond owner gets tax credits,
depreciation and a secure income stream.
The Mt. Diablo Unified School District in Mt. Diablo,
California is making available a portion of its school roof to
an outside investor. The investor, California Energy Investment
Corporation, will construct a 3,000 square foot solar system on
the roof, which will produce heat to warm the swimming pool.
The school district will buy the heat at a cost 15% less than
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the utility would charge. After 5 years, the school may buy the
system for a small cost. [42]
The American Solar King Company of Waco, Texas is in
business to establish solar micro utilities. Offering medium
temperature (100-212°F) solar systems, the company has gone
public, and is carried on the OTC stock exchange. They install,
maintain and operatea solar system on the host's property (or
continguous property owned by others), and sell their energy for
80% of what the competing utility would have charged. They aim
at providing 50-70% of energy requirements. [43]
Another firm pushing the micro utlity concept is LUZ
International
.
"Three textile manufacturers have signed 20- year
contracts to purchase steam from the "largest indus-
trial solar process heat installations in the
country," according to Arnold J. Goldman, President of
LUZ International, Ltd.
"LUZ, a Cal ifornia- based energy company, will
design, install and maintain the systems of each of
the textile mills and will sell the energy to the
plants at 10 percent less than they would pay for the
fossil fuel. 'The customer pays only for the BTU's
used. ' Goldman said.
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"Each system will consist of acres of solar
collectors that are parabolic trough systems covered
with a reflective material. The trough systems track
the sun and focus sunlight on a heat pipe at the focal
point of the parabola. The pipe contains a heat
transfer fluid that can reach 550 degrees Fahrenheit.
The fluid is used directly or circulated to a heat
exchanger that produces the industrial process
s team . " [44
]
In the micro utility concept, the energy supplier can use
any technology, including wood-fired cogeneration, wind, solar,
geothermal and hydroelectric. The cost of the delivered energy
can be allowed to escalate parallel to the competing utlity
fuels, or long term flat rate contracts can be negotiated. In
some cases, the facility can be financed by the energy user, or
if preferable, by separate investors.
Guaranteed Cash Flow
In this case, the vendor agrees to perform conservation
practices and improvements on the host facility. The improve-
ments are guaranteed to reduce energy consumption. The vendor
bills for their services are on a monthly payment plan level
less than the cash value of the savings, resulting in a positive
cash flow to the building owner from the first day of the pro-
ject. If the equipment is sold, this is a form of time pur
chase, and may require some form of guarantees from the vendor
that they won' t expect payment of the devices don' t work.
The
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Honeywell Corporation is currently offering this kind of
financing for its line of computerized energy management
devices. [45] The arrangement also works for rental equipment.
An example of combining the 40% individual tax incentive
and a positive cash flow financing program is found in south
Florida, where the A.T. Bliss Company sells solar domestic water
heaters. A.T. Bliss raised the capital and purchased the solar
systems. It franchises dealers who work under the name
Nationwide Power Corporation. Nationwide sells, for $478, a
basic installation package of roof mounting and non-removable
plumbing. The homeowner can get 40% of that $478 back in a tax
credit. The entire solar system is then installed, with a
moratorium on rental payments for two years. After two years,
the customers pay rent of $9.00 monthly for as long as they want
to use the equipment. No buyout option exists. The value of
energy saved equals or exceeds the monthly rental. [46]
Leasing
Leasing is a widely used financial tool, usually practiced
by firms who specialize in it, which act as financial agents for
equipment manufacturers. Banks also lease equipment. From the
familiar example of leasing automobiles to more exotic technolo
eies like jet planes and bulldozers, leasing is a financial toolg
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that has been used for years. In leasing, a user pays a flat
monthly fee for a fixed term for the use of an item. After the
lease term is up, the item is returned to the leasing agency,
where it is leased again, or sold. Some leases contain
provisions whereby the lessee can buy the item at the end of the
fixed term at "fair market value."
In addition to the obvious benefit of obtaining equipment
without capital outlay, the lessee receives protection against
obsolescence, protection from breakdowns, and guaranteed
servicing. It also allows renters of space to acquire energy
cost reductions without having to make capital investments to
someone else's property.
Leasing also opens up opportunities for investors who need
tax shelters to invest in the equipment via a limited partner-
ship. These investors (the limited partners) put up some or all
of the capital for a deal arranged by a broker, an equipment
dealer, or other third party (such as a county). As the limited
partner, they can receive the Federal Investment Tax Credit, the
Federal Energy Tax Credit, (if applicable), state tax credits
and accelerated depreciation. In many case, even if the lessor
only paid exactly the costs of the project, leaving no profit
margin except a reasonable rate of return, investors receive 50%
of their investment back the first year in tax shelters, and an
additional 20% each year for the next four years. [47]
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Under the conditions of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981,
leasing became both beneficial in some situations and more
complex in others. Indeed, it has become sufficiently complex
that the term leasing actually applies to different kinds of
financial transactions:
1) True Lease
2) Lease Purchase
3) Safe Harbor Lease
True Lease (traditional leasing ). In order to be defensible as
a lease, the transaction should meet a variety of conditions,
two of which are primary:
• The property must not be "limited use" property. It
must be able to be detached, moved, and used by another
customer (such as an automobile).
• The term of the lease cannot exceed 50% of the useful
life of the property. The useful life of the property
is a tax convention, having nothing to do with reality
or its real usefulness. It is typically a life assigned
to it, determined by obsolescence, building ownership
turnover, etc. Being restricted to a short, useful life
means that the lease term must be very short. This
makes it difficult to do profitable leasing of much
conservation and renewable equipment. This is the
reason most auto lease firms use true leases.
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An example of a true lease arrangement providing reduced
energy bills for no capital outlay is Adrian College in Adrian,
Michigan. They entered into a lease arrangement with Viron
Corporation of Kansas City, Missouri, for a variety of energy
conservation projects, including an energy management computer
system, an automatic scheduling system for electric fans and
motors, and lighting modifications. The total capital
investment package came to $210,000, and the lease payments are
set up to be always less than the fuel savings, resulting in a
positive cash flow to the institution from the first day.
It is worth noting that the leasing firm refused to
consider a wide range of other conservation strategies, because
their payback period would be longer than the two years. In
fact, the lease deal is calculated to pay back itself in 1.57
years, indicating annual savings of $133,000, or a rate of
return on the investment of 63%. This particular lease runs 7
years, with the lease payment covering legal, design, and
material specification work in addition to actual purchase
costs. The energy consulting company obtained the capital for
the project from a private investor who holds the lease, thereby
obtaining the tax benefits, and presumably lowering the monthly
cost to the college. [49]
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Lease purchase . In a lease purchase, the deal is structured
much like a lease, but title to the equipment passes at the end
of the lease term usually for a nominal sum. Because of this,
the user of the equipment can take all the tax breaks. Because
the lessor does not retain ownership of the property, the lease
payments are often higher in a lease purchase than a lease. The
cost of financing a purchase this way is usually 2 to 3% higher
than a conventional loan. The "Lease Purchase" is actually a
form of conditional sale.
Safe harbor leasing . Created by the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981, "Safe Harbor" is a kind of simple financial transaction
that is declared to be in "safe harbor" (e.g. - the IRS won' t
examine it for validity) if a few conditions are met. This
creation of safe harbor dispenses with a large number of complex
rules that must be met by other kinds of leases.
Key provisions of the Safe Harbor Law are:
• The limited use property provision does not apply.
• A transaction will be treated as a lease if both parties
say it is a lease. This rules out the danger of the IRS
defining the transaction as a conditional sale.
• The equipment must qualify for the investment tax
credit
.
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• The permissible terra of the lease can be up to 90% of
the "useful life" according to Section 167 of the Tax
Code, or 150% of the class life.
• The user may buy the equipment for a nominal fee at the
end of the transaction.
• The Lessor must be a corporation.
Safe Harbor leasing is under considerable attack in the
U.S . Congress, and many observers feel it will be significantly
curtailed during the 82nd Congress.
The preceding review of financing strategies has detailed a
wide range of available tools that can be used by Franklin
County to make a transition from a future dependent on non-
renewable fuels to one based on conservation and locally
produced, renewable energy. In the process, a significant drain
on the area's capital could be arrested, and large numbers of
people employed. By using these strategies, investment oppor-
tunities can be created for local citizens seeking socially
beneficial investments, either for themselves or such institu-
tions as pension funds. Many of these investments enhance
profitability of local employees from the first day they are
instituted, and/or leave more money in householders' budgets.
To utilize these opportunities will require a catalytic
role be played by the county, if the county is to avoid the
unpleasant future spelled out in the early chapters of this
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work. A commitment of human and financial resources will be
required probably biggert than anything attempted by a Massachu-
setts County in history. This commitment will not be an
expense, but a series of investments - paying handsome returns.
The problem of warning the citizens requires a statement of
the problem, an individually implementable solution, and the
vigorous leadership of local officials, equipped with the tools
just described. The last chapter of this work lays out the
correct warning strategies.
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CHAPTER VIII
A CORRECTLY ISSUED WARNING TO FRANKLIN COUNTY
The Alert
The citizens of Franklin County, Massachusetts will go
bankrupt if they continue their current dependence on imported
energy. From a $47.7 million dollar total county energy bill in
1975, the county's energy costs soared to $150 million in 1980,
and will rise to 357 million annually in the year 2000 (in 1981
dollars )
.
Of this amount, approximately half is actually paid for by
residents. The other half is paid for by people purchasing
goods or services provided in the county, but exported.
Since the county's total payroll is less than $325 million
dollars (in 1981 dollars), it is obvious that the situation
cannot continue. Beyond 1987, the energy bill of the county's
households will exceed 30 percent of their income and lead to
shortage of available funds for other essentials. By 1993, this
will rise to 40 percent of all household income, and it is
projected to hit 50 percent by the year 2000.
The situation is one of extreme vulnerability. It is the
result of dependence on imported oil and nuclear generated
266
267
electricity, both of which are subject to interruption. The
escalating cost of energy will sap the strength of the county's
economy, exporting capital which is needed to create and
maintain jobs.
This situation is obviously not taken seriously by the
county, as prior county investment dealing with energy issues
have been curtailed. The county extension service energy con-
servation program has been phased out. The County Planning
Office has been told to concentrate on other things, and the
county energy task force is facing growing apathy. Such
responses are not limited to the county, but part of a national
trend.
According to a New York Times poll done in 1978, nearly
half of the nation's adults took the view that, "We are just
being told there are shortages so oil and gas companies can
charge higher rates. "[1] Other polls taken around the same time
found only one quarter of those who hadn' t graduated from high
school believed there was an energy shortage. [2] A survey of 30
public opinion polls undertaken by Stanford University found
that public conern about energy was greatly overshadowed by
concerns about inflation, unemployment, crime and lack of trust
in government. [3]
Unless the citizens of Franklin County heed the alert and
take evasive action, the county will not survive economically.
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Visitors in the year 2000 will find ghost towns sprinkled
with summer resort communities and a vastly reduced population
of old people, subsistence-style farmers and artisans.
During the years between the present and the year 2000, the
county will experience a reduction in goods and services avail-
able to its citizens, as providers flee to more economically
vibrant areas. Parents will experience reduced educational and
recreation opportunities for their children, and job opportuni-
ties for themselves. Health care will diminish and crime will
increase. In general, the quality of life will decline, unless
evasive action is taken.
This evolution will strongly resemble historic destruction
of other societies, where resources were depleted or grew so
expensive they could not be utilized. From the dust bowls of
the 1930' s in America's midwest to the export-based economies of
the Third World, history has witnessed many examples of
economies that failed due to the lack of proper evasive action.
The Evasion Plan
The county can avoid the unpleasantness forecast for it by
adopting an aggressive plan of switching its energy supply from
one dependent on imported energy to one dependent on conserva-
tion and locally-produced energy.
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The county possesses ample renewable energy assets to fuel
its economy and have enough left over to export. The plan
devised here uses only nine percent of the available renewable
energy potential. All of the technologies which it must employ
already exist in Franklin County and are being used success-
fully. All of the investments required pay a handsome rate of
return. No rare, exotic or dangerous materials are used. The
plan requires a total investment of $388 million dollars over a
period of 25 years, most of which remains in the county, while
replacing $818 million dollars in purchased energy, almost all
of which would leave the county. Thus, the plan returns $2.10
for every dollar invested and creates an average of 443 new
job-years of work each year - every year - for 25 years. This
work varies in complexity, but should not require importing of
skills
.
Implementation of this plan will require substantial poli-
tical courage on the part of the county's leadership, because
the size of the project dwarfs previous county economic develop-
ment efforts and the returns require substantial up-front
capital investment. In order for political leadership to func
tion, an educated and supportive constituency must be created
and given leadership roles in the transition.
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Rationale for Local Leadership Involvement
As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, Franklin
County is going to suffer devastating economic impacts from
energy costs if some kind of evasive action is not taken. In
spite of this, many people would argue that it is not the role
of government, particularly local government, to solve the
problem. Several answers exist.
First, local officials should become active because most
local governments are, themselves, among the most wasteful of
energy consumers, with their public schools, administration
buildings and hospital buildings often old and under-maintained.
A large part of the taxpayer's dollar could be saved in this
area alone.
Secondly, as the warning literature indicated, the presence
of local elected officials as deliverers of the warning message
and the prescribed evasive behavior is essential to public
reception of the message.
Third, the position of local officials permits a view of
the interconnection of the problems and solutions that is simply
not available to individual citizens and business concerns. An
example of this is in the area of marginal costs. Since the
warning of resource depletion is issued, at least in part by
price signals, the warning signals are seriously minimized.
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Thus, a situation emerges where energy industries see the true
price signal and the customer sees a much weaker version. This
creates two radically different perspectives of the same prob-
lem. Since one of the preconditions of an effective warning is
agreement as to the nature of the problem among those getting
and giving the warnings, the likelihood of adequate and timely
response to the warning is seriously jeopardized. Local
government can assist in the process by both explaining the
notion of marginal costs and assisting in providing subsidies,
for which it need not pay.
Fourth, many of the available subsidies are available only
if public agencies act in some fashion. For example, governmen-
tal action is required to obtain the low interest rate and long
repayment schedules that can be obtained from revenue bond
financing. Resources such as HUD's Community Development Block
Grants, etc. can only be obtained by government agencies.
Fifth, and probably most important, is the provision of
jobs. The capital outflow presents a clear and present danger
to the county, just as a raging fire or imminent explosion does.
County involvement and investment can be defended as an
investment in public health.
Last, but not least, local lenders should get involved
because the voting public prefers political involvement. Nearly
six people in ten believe that various levels of government have
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primary responsibility for developing and promoting energy
conservation, according to a poll taken by Opinion Research
Corporation in July, 1980. [4]
Attributes of an Ideal Effort
If Franklin County is to successfully make the transition
from an economy dependent on vanishing, expensive, traditional
fuels, to one using conservation and renewables for part of its
energy, it will have to devise a program to ensure the transi-
tion. The program should have the following attributes:
• It must be fiscally sound and self-renewing - it cannot
be a grant program, funded by an endless stream of
government or private foundations.
• It should help both public and private sector energy
users
.
• Access to it must be easy and uncomplicated.
• It should address the landlord-tenant dichotomy, where
neither has the incentive to save energy.
• It should make it possible for private firms to use it
to market their wares and services.
• It should have associated with it an inspection program
to verify that devices and improvements financed with it
work as promised.
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• It should address the problem of publ icly- owned
buildings, whose owners do not have access to capital
improvement funds.
• It should use local capital, if possible, to retain
profit to the local economy.
• It should favor conservation over renewables, and both
of those over traditional fuels.
• It should make loans for projects which will provide
annual savings greater than the annual loan repayment.
• It should not attempt to compel borrowers to complete
minimum conservation first, but should facilitate those
actions by whatever means necessary.
• It should actively encourage use of the most current
knowledge on conservation and renewables in new
construction.
• Public officials should be a vocal, visible leading
force.
• The plan should be presented as a way for individuals to
save money.
• Publicity should be aimed at people in their homes and
churches and other public gatherings, using the
principles developed in earlier chapters.
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The Role of the Citizens
Citizens should be told from the beginning that the county
is choosing a course for the future which will touch all of
their lives and which will require action from all of them. The
long-term nature of the problem should be explained, and the
need to establish long-term solutions should be spelled out.
This requires a major public education effort.
It is suggested that a system of monitoring traditional
fuel consumption be established, utilizing oil company and
utility resources. Actual consumption should be plotted against
the desirable consumption level and reported in monthly
bulletins every month for the next 25 years.
Every household and business has a measurable role. Their
targets should be calculated and they should be told what the
targets are. The reporting process should focus on jobs which
will leave the county if the target is not met. Any time a
period of three or four months passes with goals unmet, the
failure should trigger a spate of efforts to encourage new
efforts in conservation and use of renewable energy. This
should be paid for out of broker's fees, which I will explain
later.
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The feedback process should be used in schools, work
places, homes, churches and anywhere else highly visible to the
people. As this is a long-term effort, feedback should be
designed to use enduring display media.
Citizens should be told the dimensions of the problem, the
role of the county in the solution and their role in the solu-
tion. Given the adoption of financing tools which are spelled
out here, we can truthfully state that the county will get
something for nothing, every year for 25 years, if they will
just act to protect themselves and their families now.
This effort should be headed by a steering committee of
prominent citizens and business people, who should meet quarter-
ly and receive reports of the progress of various efforts.
Local and national political figures should be recruited to
visit the county, praise its progress and learn about the
strategy involved.
The project should be presented as a project for all the
people, as meaningful for industrialists as for low-income
citizens
.
Renewable Energy Site Brokering
Franklin County should establish an aggressive program to
identify and encourage utilization of renewable energy sites for
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wind and hydro power. This will be accomplished by initiating
new, or developing existing, site data and embarking on a low
cost monitoring program. Simultaneously, the county should
enter negotiations with Northeast Utilities for its services as
a wheeling agent, for wheeling units of renewable generated
power from sites to public buildings. This can be done instead
of a PURPA buyback arrangement. If the produced power is just
going to disappear into the New England power grid, county
financing should be retained for other projects. If suitable
institutional arrangements can be developed so that the citizens
of Franklin County can retain ownership of the produced power,
either by having it dedicatd to them by Northeast Utilities or
by establishing a public power authority or public utility, then
the benefits of cheaper, more secure electricity would be
retained by the county, which would justify investment of its
public monies.
A recent report studying the ability of the county to
establish a regional alternative power authority which would
issue revenue bonds to finance development of alternative energy
sources and also possess the ability to market the power pro
duced by them, concluded that, in order for the county to issue
revenue bonds, specific enabling legislation was needed at the
state level. Efforts to secure such legislation are
underway. [6
]
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If suitable sites can be found in proximity to existing or
new commercial users, industrial revenue bonds should be
utilized to facilitate utilization.
The county should proceed to zone-selected areas for wind
utilization and advertise the zone's availability, along with a
statement that tax exempt financing is available to qualified
developers if the project will be of direct economic benefit to
the county.
The county should establish a pool of local capital dedi-
cated to conservation and renewable energy. This pool should be
identified, and then advertised widely as to its availability.
Given the anticipated capital shortage in the 1990's, available
capital dedicated to the suggested use from area pension funds,
school endowments, alumni organizations, banks and area inves-
tors is apt to make investors search out opportunities. This
fund can be made secure by loan guarantees discussed elsewhere
and can be leveraged by using it in conjunction with revenue
bonds or other funds.
The investors should be given a competitive rate of return
and should be asked not to sacrifice the use of their assets,
but just to target them.
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Public Buildings Program
Franklin County should establish an office dedicated to
locating investors for shared savings in its public buildings.
This office would negotiate with county public building owners
for their participation in a major public bid process, whereby
public buildings suitable for shared savings would be "packaged"
for investors. The office should insure that investors' return
on investment is limited to the 25 to 30 percent range, and that
opportunities for such arrangements as micro utilities are also
publicized. This office should see itself as 'selling waste,'
and should have the compensation tied to savings. Public build-
ings should pay a few percent of their realized savings to the
office for services rendered. To the maximum extent possible,
the capital for these investments should be raised locally, so a
firm undertaking shared savings is introduced to the building
and the capital simultaneously, thus keeping profits in the
county.
Since schools alone are responsible for 25 percent (.8
TBTU's) of the commercial building energy demand (see conserva-
tion chapter), a significant potential exists in the educational
community. Since energy costs will continue to rise every
several years, buildings already treated can be rebid, as more
steps become financially rewarding. The range of arrangements
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possible are endless, and include giving investors 100 percent
of savings for a short period of time.
One function of the county office should be to act as
energy accountant, correcting bills by degree days, and negoti-
ating items such a alterations in buildings under contract.
This service, and the service of advertising for bidders, could
be extended to private sector building owners under a similar
fee arrangement. To capitalize this office, it is suggested
that a U.D.A.G or C.D.B.G grant be obtained, or funds transfer-
red from any job development activity currently underway, as the
effort will develop better returns for the county than virtually
any other investment option.
Commercial and Industrial Sectors
.
The county should sell general obligation bonds for the
purpose of creating a loan pool to be loaned out to commercial
and industrial firms for the practice of conservation and
renewables. The loans would repay bond holders and only in
default circumstances would the county have to invest any money.
Careful screening of the projects and firms should hold that
amount to near zero. If general obligation bonds are not
practical, then revenue bonds should be used. Some of the
tasks envisioned for a new regional power authority can be
undertaken prior to enactment of its enabling legislation by
using the six existing industrial development authorities or
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regional development authorities in the six major cities of
population in the county: Greenfield, Orange, Montague,
Deerfield, Northfield and Shelborne Falls. Although these
groups cannot own power producing facilities, they can sell
revenue bonds to loan money to finance facilities producing heat
or conservation. The terms of the loans should be such as to
allow borrowers to see a positive cash flow from the first day.
This can be accomplished by long repayment schedules.
Northeast Utilities has a program of commercial and indus-
trial audits that has been underway for several years. Under
this program, firms can obtain expert advice on conservation
potential. Experience around the country is that many identi-
fied conservation opportunities go unexploited due to lack of
financing
.
Franklin County should arrange for Northeast Utilities to
inform customers receiving an audit of the availability of
long-term, low interest financing. Auditors should also be
requested to demonstrate benefits to the firm of seizing the
opportunity. A backlog of completed audits exists in the county
which have not had their results implemented, due to lack of
capital
.
The presence of financing at attractive terms, while a
necessary precondition to a transition in energy supply, is not
sufficient. One study of the effectiveness of a revolving loan
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program found that most managers of 800 small to medium size
industries in upstate New York needed substantial assistance in
filling out loan application forms. The study also found that
the presence of a neutral party, who was not involved in the
actual sale of the projects, provided comfort and reassurance to
the managers. It was also determined that establishing a board
of locally respected businessmen to review project proposals and
loan conditions went a long way toward gaining credibility and
trust.
The same study found that the quickest way to gain accep-
tance for ideas which use unfamiliar technology was to collect a
variety of potential users and bus them to see a working instal-
lation. This process of "tire kicking" proved very fruitful.
The county should be host to a continuing series of
seminars for local firms arranged by the county or the Chamber
of Commerce. These seminars should present various vendors and
their exhibits, representing the full range of conservation and
renewable equipment. At these meetings, details of the county's
financial plan should be presented. The county should provide
staff to arrange such meetings, initially funded with government
money and later, from broker's fees.
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Residential Sector Program
Cognitive dissonance theory tells us that, contrary to
popular opinion, peoples' attitude change follows behavioral
changes. People act first, and then adjust their attitudes to
match. Research in this area indicates that, once people make a
choice, especially a decision to take a particular action, they
tend to rationalize the action by emphasizing the positive
aspects and de-emphasizing the negative ones. As time goes by,
the individual comes to see the chosen option as clearly
superior and aligns his attitude to support it. The important
thing is often to get people to take the first step, from which
larger, more important steps can be taken.
This is illustrated by research conducted by Freedman and
Fraiser, [8] who first demonstrated that people could be induced
to put up a large ugly sign on their front lawns reading, "drive
carefully" if they were first approached with smaller, incremen-
tal, requests. When asked, as the first request, to place the
large, ugly sign on their lawn, only 17 percent of the residents
contacted agreed. In contrast, when residents were first
approached by a person asking them to sign a petition favoring
safe driving, virtually 100 percent of these residents agreed to
sign a petition. Subsequently, another experimenter visited the
residents who signed the petition. Fifty-five percent agreed to
the incremental request of placing the large, ugly sign on their
lawn
.
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Given the research on advertising campaign effectiveness
discussed earlier and these psychological phenomenon, it can be
recommended that Franklin County mount an advertising campaign,
utilizing free premiums, followed by a block weather ization
program such as the Northampton or Fitchburg campaign, followed
by a major energy home improvement financing effort.
The Franklin County Housing Authority should be asked to
establish a revenue bond program of home improvement loans not
governed by a 'means test' to be used for energy conservation
and renewables. The county should apply for U.D.A.G. or
C.D.B.G. grants to pay for the weatherization supplies.
Consumers should receive announcements with their fuel
bills, electric bills, energy audits and through any other
appropriate means that financing for energy conservation is
available for anyone who wants it, and that the loans will be
structured so that the total payments of the loan and tradi-
tional fuels wil be less than previous bills.
County fuel, oil and gas companies, as well as Northeast
Utilities, should be asked to collect the loan payments and
forward them to the housing authority.
Loans should be encouraged for use of non-polluting
renewables and less freely dispensed for polluting renewables,
particularly residential wood heaters.
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PRESS RELEASE
The County Commissioners of Franklin County, Massachusetts
today announced that they are mounting a 25-year, $300 million
dollar energy conservation and renewable energy program. This
program is designed to reduce the county's dependence on energy
that must be purchased outside the county.
"Each year we lose about 900 job-years of work for the
county by buying energy produced elsewhere," said
,
the county economic development officer. "By a strong public
effort, we will create 443 jobs annually and keep millions of
dollars in the local economy."
All citizens will be given information on how to have lower
energy bills, along with simple devices to help conserve. The
county will also be organizing "block weatherization parties,"
where more detailed information and supplies will be furnished.
"Participants in the parties can expect to lower energy bills 20
percent," said.
The plan calls for the county to loan money to any citizen
who desires it for energy conservation or the use of renewable
energy. Each loan is designed so that the citizen will be
better off financially after practicing conservation, by combin-
ing lower fuel bills with the loan repayment. The loan funds
will be raised by selling tax exempt bonds. Participating
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agencies will include the housing authority, six industrial
development authorities, and a proposed renewable energy
development authority.
The county is instituting a series of special programs to
help public buildings switch from imported fuels, assist commer-
cial and industrial facilities to obtain technical advice and
financing of conservation and renewables, helping homeowners
obtain information and financing, encouraging outside investors
to develop sites for windmills and hydro power.
"We just can't sit here and let our county wither away,"
said County Commissioner
,
Chairman for the Board
of Commissioners. "If we don't take this action, our county
will die. In order to protect our families and friends, we must
all do our part."
The plan calls for the widespread adoption of technologies
already in use in the county. Citizens wishing to participate
in the program should call *
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APPENDIX I
CALCULATIONS OF RESIDENTIAL ENERGY USE - 1975-2000
Space Heating
Existing dwelling units . The energy demand for space heating
for existing housing units constructed prior to 1975 will be
reduced 40 percent per unit through the "retrofitting" of all
dwelling units to meet ECAP standards.
Changes in housing stock . The next step in arriving at an
energy demand for the residential sector was to consider growth
trends in housing stock, population, dwelling unit mix and the
turnover rate for housing units.
Franklin County's population is projected to increase by 11
percent between 1975 and 2000, a slowed growth rate from the
preceding years. To meet the increase in population, assuming
that the number of persons per household remains constant (2.74
persons per household), 2,585 new dwelling units will have to be
constructed by the year 2000. The breakdown of new residential
dwellings between single and multi— family units is anticipated
to be 54 percent (1,396 units) and 46 percent (1,189 units),
respectively, and the total 2,000 housing stock of 25,700 units
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will have a composition mix of 65 percent single-family and 35
percent multi- family . This compares to the 1975 housing mix of
66 percent single-family and 34 percent multi-family units.
New dwelling units . The energy demand for space heating per
housing unit constructed after 1975 will be lowered through
policies of mandated design efficiencies and quality of
construction. This will include proper orientation of housing
units toward the sun and taking advantage of appropriate
location of window areas to increase exposure on southern walls
and decrease or eliminate exposure on northern walls. Energy
demand reductions through passive solar design will be 20
percent less than the 1975 average demand per housing unit.
In addition, new housing construction will meet and conform
to ECAP standards so that the per unit energy demand will be 40
percent less than the 1975 average demand per housing unit.
Space Heating Summary
Existing Dwelling Units - 40 percent less per unit
with ECAP standards
New Dwelling Units
Single Family - 40 percent less per unit with
ECAP standards
20 percent less per unit with
passive solar design
60 percent less per unit
than 1975 average demand
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Multi-Family - 40 percent less per unit with
ECAP standards
20 percent less per unit with
passive solar design
20 percent less per unit due
to using cogeneration and
district heating
80 percent less per unit
than 1975 average demand
Space heating in existing dwelling units . The 1975 space
heating demand was 2.1 trillion BTU's (63 percent of the total
sector demand) or approximately 92 million BTU's per dwelling
unit. Space heating demand per dwelling unit will be reduced by
40 percent in the year 2000, through the implementation of ECAP
standards
.
92MBTU'
s
X .40 = 37MBTU 1 s
Unit Unit
92MBTU 1 s - 37MBTU'
s
= 55MBTU 1 s
Unit Unit Unit
23,115 Units x 55MBTU'
s
= 1.27 Trillion BTU's
Unit
Space heating in new dwelling units . The 1975 space heating
demand of 92 million BTU's per dwelling unit will be reduced by
60 percent for new s ingle- family units and by 80 percent for new
multi-family dwelling units due to the application of ECAP
standards (40%), passive solar design (20%) and by clustering
multi- family units and utilizing district heating (20%).
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Single Family - 92MBTU'
s
x ( .40 + .20), = 55MBTU's
Unit Unit
92MBTU 1 s - 55MBTU 1 s = 3 7MBTU * s
Unit Unit Unit
Project 1,396 new single family units
x 37MBTU 1 s = .05 trillion BTU's
Unit
Multi-Family - 92MBTU 1 s x (.40 + .20 + .20) = 74MBTU's
Unit Unit
92MBTU 1 s - 74MBTU '
s
= 1 8MBTU '
s
Unit Unit Unit
Project 1,189 new multi-family units
x 18MBTU'
s
= .02 trillion BTU's
Unit
The total space heating demand for the residential sector in the
year 2000 is, therefore, calculated to be .05 trillion BTU's +
.02 trillion BTU's + 1.27 trillion BTU's = 1.34 trillion BTU's.
This compares to the 1975 demand of 2.1 trillion BTU's.
Low Capital Cost Measures
• Set back of thermostat to 68°F during the day and to
60-63°F during the night through winter season.
• Furnace tune-up involving minor adjustments, cleaning,
lubrication and replacement of filters.
• Installation of air conditioner thermostat and increase
of temperature setting to 78°F during the summer.
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• Extremely tight weatherization with techniques such as
caulking of cracks around windows, doors and
foundation, weatherstripping of windows and doors and
closing of window shades at night.
• Reduction of appliance and lighting use.
High Capital Cost Measures
• Improvement of the thermal integrity of the existing
home by installing insulation to meet the R-values of
30 in the ceiling, 11 in the walls and 19 in the
floors
• Installation of storm windows and doors
• Use of improved, efficient appliances such as hot water
heaters, refrigerators, freezers, stoves, clothes
dryers, air conditioners, etc.
APPENDIX II
CALCULATIONS OF COMMERCIAL ENERGY USE 1975-2000
Assuming that the turnover rate for commercial building
stock correlates to commercial building stock energy demand:
•
.6 percent per year of the commercial building stock is
retired and replaced with new buildings, or 3 percent
of the commercial building stock is retired every five
years and replaced with new buildings.
• The 3 percent turnover rate every five years equals .6
percent of the energy demand per year, or 3 percent of
the energy demand per every five years.
• Every five years, 3 percent of the existing 1975
commercial building stock is converted into new,
efficient buildings which have an energy demand of 50
percent less than their 1975 counterparts.
• The energy demand for remaining existing buildings is
reduced by 25 percent from 1975 to 1985 and by another
10 percent from 1985 to the year 2000.
• With a commercial building stock of between 1,000 and
1,500 firms, assume an average of 1,025 firms which
used 3.8 trillion BTU's in 1975.
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• A turnover rate of 3 percent per five years, or 15
percent between 1975 and 2000 means that 154 firms will
turn over. These firms used .6 trillion BTU's in 1975
and if they are rebuilt to be 50 percent more efficient
in 2000, they will use .3 trillion BTU's in 2000.
• The remaining, existing 1975 commercial stock used 3.2
trillion BTU's, and a 25 percent efficiency improvement
between 1975 and 1985 means they will use 2.4 trillion
BTU's. If the 871 firms improve their energy effici-
ency by another 10 percent between 1985 and 2000, they
will use 2.1 trillion BTU's in the year 2000.
• The total energy demand for the commercial sector in
the year 2000 will, therefore, be: .3 trillion BTU's
(new commercial stock) + 2.1 trillion BTU's (existing
commercial stock) =2.4 trillion BTU's.
Low Capital Cost Measures
Space Heating -
• Reduction of temperature in the winter during occupied
periods to 65°F.
• Reduction of indoor temperature in the winter to 55°
F
during unoccupied periods
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• Improvement of heating system efficiency boilers, heat
exchangers, radiators, ducts and baseboards
Air Conditioning -
• Raise indoor summer temperature to 78°F
Ventilation -
• Reduction of ventilation requirements by installing
filter to remove air impurities, confing or eliminating
smoking areas, and by eliminating artificial ventila-
tion completely if plausible or allowable.
• Reduction of ventilation rates to minimum allowable
standard (approximately 3 cfm/person)
• Elimination of ventilation during unoccupied hours
• Maintenance of the ventilation system by lubricating
blowers, cleaning filters, checking dampers for proper
closing, and checking ducts for leaks.
Water Heating -
• Reduction of wasted hot water by eliminating leaks in
faucets and pipes
• Reduction of the use of hot water by allowing dish-
washers and laundry equipment to be run only on full
loads
• Reduction of hot water temperature to better match the
purpose for which it is used
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Lighting -
• Elimination of wasteful use habits such as leaving
lights on which aren' t being used for a specific task
• Adjustment of the illumination levels so that the
amount of lighting corresponds to the task being done
• Performance of effective maintenance such as cleaning
dirty lamps and replacing worn-out ones.
High Capital Cost Measures
Space Heating -
• Installation of insulation to ASHRAE-90-75 standards
• Installation of double glazing or storm windows
Air Conditioning -
• Installation of insulation and double glazing
• Substitution of present system for one which utilizes
outdoor air for cooling. Two systems, called
"economizer cycle cooling" and "enthalpy cycle
cooling," can be used in the appropriate climates for
which they were designed
Water Heating -
• Reduction of flow from faucets by installing spray type
adaptors or special orifices
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• Insulation of pipes, storage tanks and water heaters
• Installation of smaller hot water tanks nearer to
the point of use
Lighting -
• Replacement of inefficient lamps with the most
appropriately matched lamp for the task to be
performed
• Improvement of switch control mechanisms to allow the
reduction of the ratio of luminaires to switches in
order to avoid turning on unnecessary numbers of
luminaires
.
• Installation of dimmers and times to reduce lighting
demand.
APPENDIX III
FIRMS OFFERING SHARED SAVINGS PLANS TO FINANCE
CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS
Advanced Roof-Energy Systems, Inc ., Champion Tower, 400 E.
Anderson Lane, Suite 460, Austin, TX 757752
Aegis Energy Associates
,
607 Airport Blvd., Doylestown, PA
American Energy Savings, Inc
., 8956 Tampa Ave., Northridge, LA
91324
Barber-Colman Company, Environmental Controls Division, 1300
Rock Street, Rockford, IL.
BBC Energy Management, Inc
., 316 Park Crest Drive, Freeport, IL
61032
The Benham Group
,
1200 N.W. 63rd St., P. 0. Box 20400, Oklahoma
City, OK 73156
Computerized Energy Management, Inc
., Div. of Erin Mechanical,
Inc., 5201 Detroit Ave., Cleveland, OH 44102
CSL Energy Controls, CSL Industries
,
2029 Century Park East,
Suite 110, Los Angeles, CA 90067
De Bar Business Services, Inc
., 530 South Federal Highway,
Deerfield Beach, FL 33441
De Clement-Siegel Engineering, Inc ., 22255 Greenfield Road,
Suite 500, Southfield, MI 48075
Diversified Energy Systems, Inc ., DES/CE, 1017 W. 9th Ave., King
of Prussia, PA 19406
Econergy, Inc
., 2466 West 2nd St., Denver, CO
Economy Systems, Ltd ., P. 0. Box 2136, Ann Arbor, MI 48106
Energistics, Inc
., P. 0. Box 695, E. Brunswick, NJ 08816
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Energy Applications, Inc
., 227 Long Reach Village Center,
Columbia, MD 21045
Energy Conservation Technicians
,
Div. of Worchester Air
Conditioning Co., Inc., 148 Pleasant St., P. 0. Box 100,
Ashland, MA 01721
Energy Control Systems, Inc
., 828 E. Lewelling Blvd., Hayward,
CA 94541
Energy Management Controls
,
3521 Florida Ave., Kenner, LA 70062
Energy Management Controls
,
276 S. Logan St., Elyria, OH 44036
Energy Management Engineering, Inc
., 7957 California Ave., Fair
Oaks, CA 95618
Energy Management, Inc
., 200 Boylston St., Newton, MA 02167
Energy Master of Maryland, Inc.
,
12021 Old Gunpowder Road,
Beltsville, MD 20705
Energy Management Services
,
2933 E. 3300 So., Salt Lake City, UT
84109
Energy Recovery for Industry & Commerce, Inc
., (ERIC), 2714 20th
St., South Birmingham, AL 35209
Energy Services and Management Corp ., 125 High St., Suite 903,
Boston, MA 02110
Energy Services, Inc
., 510 Fairgrounds Court, Nashville, TN
37211
Entech Engineering Associates
,
828 Penn St., P. 0. Box 32,
Reading, PA 19603
Environmental Interfaces, Inc., 2795 Randi Lane, Salem, OR
97303
W. S. Fleming and Associates, Inc. , 1501 S. Main St., Box 135,
Fiarfield, IA 52556
M. Garetano Associates, Inc ., 148 E. Main St., Huntington, NY
11743
General Energy Services , 104 Lexington Ave., Buffalo, NY 14222
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General Systems, Inc.
,
1360 W. 9th St., Cleveland, OH 44113
R. D. Goss, Inc
., R519 Williams St., Clearfield, PA 16830
Harley Ellington Pierce Yee Associates
,
26111 Evergreen Road,
Southfield, MI 48076
Heaton-Levine Energy Management Engineers
,
1145-A Mission St.,
San Francisco, CA 94103
Herzog-Hart Corp
., Hart Corp., 462 Boylston St., Boston, MA
02116
Hillsboro Electric
,
Energy Management Div, 3914 Hillsboro
Circle, Nashville, TN 37215
Honeywell Corporation Commercial Buildings Group
,
Honeywell
Plaza, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55408
Jasco Corp., 3 Manor Road N., Greenlawn, NY 11740
Johnson Controls, Inc
,
507 E. Michigan, Milwaukee, WI 53202
Kos ter/Hopkins & Company, Inc ., 2341 Cedar Shores Circle,
Jacksonville, FL 32210
Lighting Technology, Inc.
,
2115 112th Ave., N.E., P. 0. Box
3532, Bellevue, WA 98009
The Montgomery Wells Co ., Starks Bldg., Louisville, KY 40202
Natkin Energy Management, Natkin & Co., (Fischback Corp.), 2775
So. Vallego, P. 0. Box 1598, Englewood, CO 80150
Northeastern Solar Management , 15 Bond St., Great Neck, NY
10021
Pacific Energy Spectrum , 11941 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, CA
90025
Parsons Brinkerhoff, Inc., 1 Penn Plaza, New York, NY 10019
QLA Inc.
,
2036 Pierce Mill Road N.W., Washington, DC 20010
Rosenfield, Steinberg and Associates , 2102 6th St., Santa
Monica, CA 90405
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Scallop Thermal Management Inc
., A Royal Dutch/Shell Group Co.,
80 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10020
Servidyne, Inc.
,
2120 Marietta Blvd.,N.W., Atlanta, GA 30377
Sun Law Energy Corp
., 14651 Ventura Blvd.
,
Sherman Oaks, CA
94013
Standard Utilities Research Engineers Inc
., (SURE), 250 E. 17th
St. G, P. 0. Box 2062, Costa Mesa, CA 92627
STV Engineers, Inc.
,
11 Robinson St., Pottstown, PA 19464
Superior Energy Management, Div. of Superior Supply Co., Inc.,
215 Laura, Wichita, KS 76211
Sure Air Ltd
., 291 Broadway, New York, NY 10007
Talbert, Cox & Associates, Inc?
., 6185 S. Buford Highway, Suite
C-112, Atlanta, GA 30017
T.E.M.P. (Total Energy Management Planning) Associates , P. 0.
Box 12634, Jacksonville, MS 39211
Total Energy Management Consultants (TEMCON) , 2350 Station St.,
Indianapolis, IN 46218
Western Pacific International
,
880 S. Palm Ave., Suite 11,
Alhambra, CA 91803
APPENDIX IV
CONVERSION FACTORS
Approximate Heat Content of Various Fuels
Petroleum
Crude Oil
Refined Products
Imports, Average
Consumption, Average
Gasoline
Jet Fuel, Average
Naphtha-type
Kerosene- type
Distillate Fuel Oil
Residual Fuel Oil
5.8 MMBTU/ Barrel
6.0 MMBTU/ Barrel
5.5 MMBTU/ Barrel
5.2 MMBTU/ Barrel
5.6 MMBTU/ Barrel
5.3 MMBTU/ Barrel
5.6 MMBTU/ Barrel
5.8 MMBTU/ Barrel
6.2 MMBTU/ Barrel
Natural Gas Liquids 4.0 MMBTU/ Barrel
Natural Gas
Wet
Dry
1.0 BTU/Cubic Foot
1.0 BTU/Cubic Foot
One gallon of fuel oil contains an average of 138,000 BTU's.
One cubic foot of natural gas contains an average of 1,000 BTU's
One kilowatt-hour of electricity equals 3,409.52 BTU's.
One cord of wood is estimated to contain an average of
18,000,000 BTU's.
One gallon of gasoline contains an average of 125,000 BTU's.
One gallon of diesel fuel contains an average of 139,000 BTU's.
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